Case 1:25-cv-03121-LLA Document 14 Filed 11/21/25 Page 1 of 30
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
Civil Action No. 25-3121 (LLA)
Plaintiff,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, et al.,
Defendants.
FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ COMBINED
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION TO BE EXCUSED FROM LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7(N)(1),
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents . i
Table of Authorities .. ii
Introduction . 1
Background . 2
Legal Standards . 5
I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction . 5
II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim .. 5
III. Preliminary Injunction . 6
Argument .. 7
I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing . 7
II. Plaintiff’s Claims Fail .. 8
A. Plaintiff’s APA Claim Fails .. 8
B. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Fail .. 12
C. Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment Act Claim Fails .. 15
III. Plaintiff Has Not Shown He Suffers Irreparable Harm . 16
IV. Plaintiff Has Not Shown the Balance of the Equities Favors Injunctive Relief .. 18
V. The Court Should Order That Ziankovich Posts a Bond as a Condition of Preliminary Relief . 19
VI. Federal Defendants Should Be Relieved From the Requirements of Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1) . 19
Conclusion .. 21
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .. 15
Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 2012) .. 20
Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011) . 5
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .. 6, 12, 20
Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .. 12
Aviles-Wynkoop v. Neal, 978 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2013) . 17
Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155 (2018) .. 6
Borgess Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) .. 9
Bullock v. Hana Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 22-2608 (DLF), 2024 WL 620440 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2024) . 16
Campaign for Accountability v. Dep’t of Just., 155 F.4th 724 (D.C. Cir. 2025) . 8
Carroll v. Off. of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 235 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2017) . 20
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) .. 19
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) . 6, 7, 16
Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2025) .. 16
Connecticut v. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279 (D.D.C. 2018) .. 19
Cornish v. Dudas, 540 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2008) .. 17
Cornish v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2012) .. 16
Da Costa v. Imm. Investor Program Office, 80 F.4th 330 (D.C. Cir. 2023) .. 12
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) . 7
Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969) .. 6
Economic Research Srvs., Inc. v. Resolution Economics, LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 47 (D.D.C. 2015) . 17
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) .. 10
Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) . 8
Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 2010) . 9
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) . 13
Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367 (2024) . 7
Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) . 1
Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .. 17
Gulf Coast Mar. Supply, Inc. v. United States, 867 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2017) . 6
Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .. 7
Havens v. Mabus, 146 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D.D.C. 2015) .. 9
Htet v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 24-1446 (RC), 2025 WL 522033 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2025) . 19
Indian River County v. Rogoff, 254 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2017) .. 12
Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005) . 5
Kim v. FINRA, 698 F. Supp. 3d 147 (D.D.C. 2023) . 18
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) .. 5
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) . 5
Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 2012) .. 16
Matter of Ziankovich, 192 A.D.3d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) .. 3
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) .. 6
Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minn. v. Zinke, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2017) . 20
Morrissey v. Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2021) . 16
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., Civ. A. No. 15-1582 (APM), 2015 WL 9269401 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2015) . 7
Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2005) . 18
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) .. 6, 18
Partington v. Houck, 723 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2013) .. 14, 15
Partington v. Houck, 840 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2012) .. 14
People v. Ziankovich, 433 P.3d 640 (Colo. 2018) .. 1, 3
PETA v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2014) . 20
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) . 13
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) .. 13
Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons, 453 F. Supp. 3d 404 (D.D.C. 2020) . 5
Santos v. Collins, Civ. A. No. 24-1759 (JDB), 2025 WL 1823471 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2025) . 16
Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) . 13
Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 88 (D.D.C. 2023) . 6
Seed Co., Ltd. v. Westerman, 840 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 2012) . 12
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) .. 8, 20
Tapp v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 3d 383 (D.D.C. 2016) .. 13
Taylor v. Clark, 821 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.D.C. 2011) . 5
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) . 11
U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops v. Dep’t of State, 770 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D.D.C. 2025) . 7
United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023) . 7
United Steel v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 839 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C. 2012) . 9
Virginia v. Johnson, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) . 9
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) . 6
Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1985) . 17
Ziankovich v. Members of the Colorado Supreme Court, No. 20-1314, 2021 WL 4047000 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) . 3, 11, 18
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) . 11
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) .. 10
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 . 15
Rules
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) .. 3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .. 1, 2, 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) .. 16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .. 2, 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) . 19
Regulations
8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f) .. 11
8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(1) .. 9, 10
8 C.F.R. § 1003.107 . 8
Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and Procedures, and Representation and Appearances, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,914 (Dec. 18, 2008) . 18
INTRODUCTION
Federal Defendants, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”); Pamela J. Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; and Daren Margolin, in his official capacity as Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (collectively, “Federal Defendants”), respectfully submit this opposition to pro se Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI Mot.,” ECF No. 4). Federal Defendants contemporaneously move to dismiss the Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6).
Plaintiff also names as defendants various state agencies and officials. See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 10–11. Undersigned does not represent those non-federal defendants.
Plaintiff is advised that his failure to respond to this motion may result in the Court (1) treating the motion to dismiss as conceded, (2) ruling on the motion based on Federal Defendants’ arguments alone, or (3) dismissing the claims for failure to prosecute. See Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court suspended Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich’s law license for six violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Responsibility. People v. Ziankovich, 433 P.3d 640, 647–49, 656–58 (Colo. 2018). Based on that Colorado state suspension, and as required by federal regulations, EOIR imposed reciprocal sanctions, suspending Ziankovich from practicing before federal immigration authorities. New York followed with its own sanctions soon after, and Ziankovich remains suspended to this day. Ziankovich protests his suspension based on the Colorado State findings because, he says, Colorado never had jurisdiction to impose its sanction.
Ziankovich’s claims fail for a variety of reasons. First, Ziankovich lacks standing to challenge his EOIR suspension because he remains suspended by New York. Even if the Court orders EOIR to reinstate Ziankovich, he remains prohibited from engaging in the practice of law by operation of his suspension by New York. The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Second, the Court should also dismiss Federal Defendants because Ziankovich has failed to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Ziankovich’s Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claim fails because federal regulations required EOIR to suspend Ziankovich immediately after Colorado imposed its sanction. Ziankovich’s constitutional claims fail because he does not identify a constitutionally protected right to practice law before federal immigration authorities. In any event, Ziankovich received substantial due process because he was afforded an opportunity to respond. Finally, Ziankovich’s Declaratory Judgment Act claim fails because that statute does not provide an independent claim. For the same reasons, Ziankovich is unlikely to succeed on the merits and therefore is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
Even if the Complaint survives dismissal and the Court finds Ziankovich is likely to succeed on any one of his claims, he is still not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Ziankovich has failed to establish irreparable harm because EOIR’s suspension does not prohibit Ziankovich from otherwise practicing law. The public interest and balance of the equities also decisively weigh against preliminary injunctive relief because EOIR has independent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys appearing before it, and Ziankovich has not identified a compelling countervailing interest.
For these reasons, Federal Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss, dismiss the claims against Federal Defendants, and deny Ziankovich’s motion for preliminary relief as moot.
BACKGROUND
Ziankovich is an immigration attorney barred in New York. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 8. Between 2015 and 2018, he resided in Colorado, from where he practiced immigration law before EOIR. Id. at 13 ¶ 1. He was not barred in Colorado. Id. at 8. In 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court sanctioned Ziankovich for various violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. at 13 ¶ 2; Ziankovich, 433 P.3d at 656–58. Colorado transmitted the disciplinary order to EOIR; in February 2019, EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline based solely on the Colorado order, which resulted in Ziankovich’s removal from the federal roster of recognized representatives. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 14 ¶¶ 4, 5; see also id. at 16 ¶ 10. The state bar of New York also imposed a disciplinary penalty. Id. at 17 ¶ 11; Matter of Ziankovich, 192 A.D.3d 180, 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). Ziankovich remains suspended in New York. Ex. 1, EOIR Decision at 2 (attached hereto).
Ziankovich contests the propriety of the Colorado sanctions. He asserts that he exclusively practiced immigration law before federal authorities and that he “never acted as, nor represented himself as, an attorney authorized to practice law in Colorado and/or licensed in any form in Colorado.” Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 13 ¶ 2. Ziankovich alleges that he was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because he solely practiced federal immigration law. Id. at 15 ¶ 8, 16 ¶ 9. Because his Colorado suspension exceeded one year, Ziankovich asserts that he remains excluded from federal immigration practice, suffers continuing reputational harm, and faces ongoing disqualification that prevents him from seeking reinstatement. Id. at 18 ¶ 13.
Ziankovich has made these arguments on numerous occasions before the Colorado Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, and has been denied each time. Ziankovich v. Members of Colorado Supreme Court, No. 20-1314, 2021 WL 4047000, at *1–2 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (summarizing prior cases); see also Matter of Ziankovich, 192 A.D.3d at 181 (“While [Ziankovich] is not admitted to the Bar of the state of Colorado, under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5(a), the Colorado Supreme Court has disciplinary jurisdiction over him based on his practice of immigration law within that state.”).
Ziankovich disclaims seeking review of the Colorado state judgments, asserting instead that he challenges their continuing federal consequences, which arise from state action taken without jurisdiction and improperly relied upon by federal agencies. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 18 ¶ 14; see also id. at 6. He brings a five-count complaint alleging various statutory and constitutional claims. Only Counts II, III, and IV assert claims against Federal Defendants.
Count II is an APA claim challenging, as arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and a denial of due process, Ziankovich’s suspension from federal immigration practice without independent, APA-compliant review of his Colorado suspension. Id. at 21–22. Count III asserts claims under the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 22–23. Count IV is a Declaratory Judgment Act claim, asserting that EOIR may not impose or maintain reciprocal sanctions based on allegedly void Colorado disciplinary actions. Id. at 23–24.
Ziankovich asks the Court for various declaratory judgments. As against Federal Defendants, he asks the Court to enjoin enforcement of any disciplinary actions against him based on the Colorado orders or any reliance on those state orders as a basis for denial of reinstatement or continued exclusion from the federal roster of recognized representatives. Id. at 27. He also asks for an order directing his removal from any federal list or record of suspension, a declaration that this case is a matter of substantial public interest, attorney’s fees, and other relief the Court deems appropriate. Id. at 28.
Ziankovich asserts Counts I and V against the state defendants, but not against the Federal Defendants. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 20–21, 24–25. Federal Defendants therefore do not address those claims.
Over a month after filing his complaint, Ziankovich, on October 20, 2025, moved for preliminary injunctive relief. See generally PI Mot. (ECF No. 4). That motion essentially seeks the same relief as that sought by the complaint. See Proposed Order, PI Mot. (ECF No. 4) at 19–21. Federal Defendants oppose and contemporaneously move to dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.
A complaint must be dismissed where there is “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Established law requires the Court to “determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance.” Taylor v. Clark, 821 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.D.C. 2011) (cleaned up). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law “presume[s]” that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a plaintiff must establish the Court’s jurisdiction over his claims.” Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons, 453 F. Supp. 3d 404, 414 (D.D.C. 2020). “The Court must ‘assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Id. (quoting Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The court may consider materials outside the pleadings in determining whether it has jurisdiction. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “If the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction as to any claim, it must dismiss that claim.” Sanchez-Mercedes, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 414.
II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
A complaint must be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). The Court must “take as true all well-pled factual allegations within [a plaintiff’s] complaint” while also “disregard[ing] any legal conclusions, legal contentions couched as factual allegations, and unsupported factual allegations within the complaint.” Gulf Coast Mar. Supply, Inc. v. United States, 867 F.3d 123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
III. Preliminary Injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Such a request involves the exercise of a very far-reaching power that “should be sparingly exercised.” Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citation omitted). The movant must demonstrate all of the following factors by “a clear showing”: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm absent preliminary emergency relief; (3) the balance of equities between the parties tips in favor of the movant; and (4) preliminary relief serves the public interest. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); accord Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The third and fourth factors, harm to the opposing party and the public interest, merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
Preliminary injunctions are not “awarded as of right,” but “[a]s a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction does not [even] follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff’s showing of a likelihood of success on the merits.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018). “Rather, a court must be persuaded as to all four factors.” Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (D.D.C. 2023).
Importantly, however, a “movant’s failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. Moreover, “[a]bsent a ‘substantial indication’ of likely success on the merits, ‘there would be no justification for the court’s intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review.’” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., Civ. A. No. 15-1582 (APM), 2015 WL 9269401, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2015) (citation omitted). “Federal courts start from the presumption that they lack such jurisdiction,” and “the party invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving it.” U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops v. Dep’t of State, 770 F. Supp. 3d 155, 161 (D.D.C. 2025).
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing.
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1), as “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Standing is a “bedrock constitutional requirement.” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023). It requires that a plaintiff “possess a personal stake” in the outcome, which “helps ensure that courts decide litigants’ legal rights in specific cases, as Article III requires.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 379 (2024). The standing doctrine thus “serves to protect the ‘autonomy’ of those who are most directly affected so that they can decide whether and how to challenge the defendant’s action.” Id. at 379–80. “By limiting who can sue, the standing requirement implements the Framers’ concept of the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” Id. at 380 (citation modified).
Importantly, standing is “not dispensed in gross.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (citation modified). “Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Id. (citation modified). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [he] has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” Campaign for Accountability v. Dep’t of Just., 155 F.4th 724, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Ziankovich cannot establish the third element of standing, redressability.
“Redressability examines whether the relief sought, assuming that the court chooses to grant it, will likely alleviate the particularized injury alleged by the plaintiff.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663–64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). “Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998). At bottom, Ziankovich seeks reinstatement to practice law before federal law enforcement authorities. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 27. But no order of this Court directed at Federal Defendants can redress that injury because Ziankovich “currently is suspended” from the practice of law in New York. Ex. 1, EOIR Decision at 2 (attached hereto). Ziankovich is solely barred in New York and does not assert he is barred in another state. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 13 ¶ 1. It is that state suspension that prevents him from being reinstated by EOIR. Ex. 1, EOIR Decision at 2 (attached hereto). Even if the Court orders EOIR to reinstate Ziankovich, he still likely may not engage in the practice of law on account of his suspension in New York. Once reinstated to the practice of law in New York, Ziankovich may again move for reinstatement by EOIR. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107. But there is no relief this Court can grant Ziankovich vis-à-vis Federal Defendants that would redress Ziankovich’s asserted injury. He, therefore, lacks standing.
II. Plaintiff’s Claims Fail.
A. Plaintiff’s APA Claim Fails.
Under the APA, “the agency’s role is to resolve factual issues and arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record, and the court’s role is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Havens v. Mabus, 146 F. Supp. 3d 202, 214 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation modified). In an APA case, “courts may only set aside agency actions, including those of the [EOIR], that are found to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” United Steel v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 839 F. Supp. 2d 232, 245 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified). “In evaluating agency actions under this standard, courts must consider ‘whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’” Id.
“An agency action usually is arbitrary or capricious if: the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Virginia v. Johnson, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2009). “Factual conclusions are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard and may be overturned where they are ‘unsupported by substantial evidence in a case[.]’” Borgess Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013). “When reviewing for substantial evidence, [the Court] do[es] not ask whether record evidence could support the [Plaintiff’s] view of the issue, but whether it supports the [agency’s] ultimate decision.” Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “The agency’s decision is presumed to be valid, and a court must not ‘substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” Havens, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (citation modified). EOIR’s decision to suspend Ziankovich easily meets these standards.
Federal regulations require EOIR to seek the immediate suspension of any practitioner “who has been suspended or disbarred by . . . the highest court of any State[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(1). Those regulations further require the Board of Immigration Appeals to “forthwith enter an order immediately suspending the practitioner from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and/or DHS.” Id. § 1003.103(a)(4). “Such immediate suspension will continue until imposition of a final administrative decision.” Id. Ziankovich does not challenge the propriety of these regulations. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1). He complains, rather, that EOIR’s reliance on the “Colorado orders, without conducting any independent review or jurisdictional analysis, and without providing notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard” was “arbitrary and capricious,” “an abuse of discretion,” and “a denial of due process.” Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 22 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), and (D)). Ziankovich’s claim fails because EOIR followed its regulations.
Here, Ziankovich readily concedes, as he must, that he was twice suspended from the practice of law by the State of Colorado. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 13 ¶ 2; id. at 15 ¶ 8. He also concedes that EOIR’s decision to suspend him from federal immigration law practice was “based solely on the Colorado orders[.]” Id. at 16 ¶ 10. Indeed, “[o]n January 29, 2019, the Disciplinary Counsel for EOIR petitioned for [Ziankovich’s] immediate suspension from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Courts.” Ex. 1, EOIR Decision at 1 (attached hereto). The Board “granted the immediate suspension order on March 21, 2019, after taking into consideration [Ziankovich’s] arguments in opposition.” Id. Nothing more was required for EOIR to suspend Ziankovich from federal immigration practice.
Ziankovich maintains that Colorado acted without jurisdiction because he was never licensed to practice law in that jurisdiction. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 18 ¶ 14. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review Ziankovich’s suspension in Colorado. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284–88 (2005) (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars district court review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”). The Tenth Circuit already affirmed the dismissal of Ziankovich’s federal challenges to the Colorado state proceedings on those grounds. Ziankovich v. Members of the Colorado Supreme Court, No. 20-1314, 2021 WL 4047000, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021).
In any event, Ziankovich disclaims “seek[ing] to overturn the Colorado disciplinary orders” but only “challenges their continuing federal consequences.” Id. That is a distinction without a difference because federal regulations require any suspension to continue “notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal, if any, of the underlying disciplinary proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(4). The Colorado suspensions meant that Ziankovich no longer met the regulatory definition of “attorney” because he was under an “order suspending . . . him in the practice of law.” 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f). Ziankovich’s problems compounded when New York—where he was licensed—similarly suspended him, “relying exclusively on the Colorado orders[.]” See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 17 ¶ 11; id. at 13 ¶ 1. Ziankovich remains suspended to this day. EOIR’s decision to suspend Ziankovich was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.
Ziankovich also appears to assert likelihood of success on the merits on an unreasonable delay claim. PI Mot. (ECF No. 4) at 12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). He asserts that he requested on July 9, 2025, for EOIR to restore him to federal immigration practice and that, as of October 20, 2025, EOIR had not adjudicated his petition. Id. at 7 (citing Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Ziankovich does not assert such claim in his Complaint. See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 21–22 (asserting claims under Section 706(2) but not under 706(1)). He cannot now assert this new claim as a basis for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. Cf. Seed Co., Ltd. v. Westerman, 840 F. Supp. 116, 127 n.11 (D.D.C. 2012) (“A plaintiff cannot amend its complaint by asserting new claims in a responsive pleading to survive a motion for summary judgment.”).
In any event, EOIR denied Ziankovich’s petition on October 22, 2025. Ex. 1, EOIR Decision (attached hereto). Any unreasonable delay claim based on Ziankovich’s July 9, 2025, motion for reinstatement is now moot. See Da Costa v. Imm. Investor Program Office, 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (dismissing as moot unreasonable delay claims brought by noncitizens where the government adjudicated the noncitizens’ petitions after the initiation of the federal litigation). “Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Indian River County v. Rogoff, 254 F. Supp. 3d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 2017).
B. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Fail.
Ziankovich asserts a First Amendment right to free speech, petition, and professional expression. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 22. He also asserts procedural and substantive due process violations under the Fifth Amendment. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 23.
As an initial matter, Ziankovich fails to identify the precise contours of his constitutional claims. “A complaint must give the defendants notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they rest[.]” Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Ziankovich does not articulate the nature of the constitutionally protected interest he alleges is entitled to First Amendment or Due Process protections. Federal Defendants thus lack sufficient notice of the alleged First or Fifth Amendment interest Ziankovich asserts. That alone is enough to dismiss his constitutional claims.
Ziankovich’s First Amendment claim fails. Even assuming his advocacy could constitute a First Amendment activity, Ziankovich does not allege that EOIR suspended him because of his immigration law practice. See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (articulating factors for a First Amendment retaliation claim). Nor does he allege that his EOIR suspension is somehow viewpoint or content discrimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”). Ziankovich concedes EOIR suspended him “based solely on the Colorado order[.]” Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 14 ¶ 5. Ziankovich does not challenge as unconstitutional the regulation pursuant to which he was suspended and disclaims any challenge to his state suspension. Indeed, “the standards and conduct of state-licensed lawyers have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation by the States[.]” Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995). In short, Ziankovich has failed to plead a First Amendment claim.
Ziankovich’s Due Process claim likewise fails because he does not identify a constitutionally protected interest in representing clients before immigration authorities. “In order to establish a Fifth Amendment due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he was deprived of protected property or liberty interests; and (2) that, in effecting that deprivation, the defendant did not afford him the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution.” Tapp v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 3d 383, 392 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified). Ziankovich has not identified (or attempted to identify) a protected property or liberty interest. Indeed, he cites no “independent source of law, state or federal, to support his argument that a lawyer has a constitutionally protected property interest in his ability to represent clients before” federal immigration authorities. Partington v. Houck, 840 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that civilian attorney lacks constitutionally protected right to represent clients before naval courts). In fact, Ziankovich cannot establish “an actionable liberty or property interest in the practice of law before” immigration authorities because Federal Defendants “have not completely excluded [Ziankovich] from the practice of law.” Id. at 242. EOIR’s suspension of Ziankovich does not preclude him from otherwise authorized practice of law. Ziankovich has failed to establish deprivation of a constitutional right.
Ziankovich explains in his preliminary injunction motion that he was suspended “without notice or opportunity to be heard.” PI Mot. (ECF No. 4) at 12. To the extent Ziankovich alleges a procedural due process violation, that claim fails. Even assuming he has a constitutionally protected interest in practicing law before federal immigration authorities, Ziankovich fails to establish a due process violation. Partington v. Houck, 723 F.3d 280, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “Due process at its core requires notice and hearing.” Id. at 287. “Thus, in determining whether the [EOIR] afforded [Ziankovich] due process in his disciplinary proceedings, [the Court] review[s] the record to determine whether [Ziankovich] received notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 288.
Here, EOIR provided to Ziankovich a Notice of Intent to Discipline dated January 29, 2019 (the “Notice”). Compl. Ex. 1, Compl. Attachments (ECF No. 1-1) at 50. That Notice informed Ziankovich of EOIR’s intent to suspend him “from practice before the Board [of Immigration Appeals] and the Immigration Courts for three (3) months because [he] has been suspended for three (3) months from the practice of law in Colorado.” Id. at 51. The Notice invited Ziankovich to respond to the proposed suspension “within 30 days of the date stated on the Proof of Service[.]” Id.
Indeed, Ziankovich engaged in extensive litigation before EOIR concerning his suspension. He filed an answer. Id. at 62; see also id. at 66–69. He moved to set aside the immediate suspension order, and later for reconsideration of the denial of that motion. Id. In fact, EOIR stayed its proceedings “until the United States District Court for the District of Colorado issued a decision in [Ziankovich’s] federal case.” Id. at 62. Upon the dismissal with prejudice of that federal case, EOIR resumed administrative proceedings. Id. at 62–63. Despite the opportunity to fully participate in the administrative proceedings and to present arguments, Ziankovich did not show “that any of the exceptions to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions exist in his case, particularly where the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has now dismissed his federal action concerning the Colorado disciplinary proceedings.” Id. at 63. And despite being suspended from practice before immigration authorities, Ziankovich “apparently continued to practice immigration law.” Id. In short, Ziankovich “received ample due process.” Partington, 723 F.3d at 289.
C. Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment Act Claim Fails.
Count IV asserts a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 23–24. As against Federal Defendants, Ziankovich asserts that EOIR “may not impose or maintain reciprocal sanctions based on” state sanctions. Id. But the Declaratory Judgment Act does not “provide a cause of action.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The “availability of declaratory relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Id. (citation modified). As discussed above, Ziankovich has “not alleged a cognizable cause of action and therefore ha[s] no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief.” Id. Ziankovich does not explain why he is likely to succeed on this claim. PI Mot. (ECF No. 4) at 11–13. Claim IV fails and should be dismissed.4
III. Plaintiff Has Not Shown He Suffers Irreparable Harm.
The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. And “while standing and irreparable harm overlap, they are far from the same.” Santos v. Collins, Civ. A. No. 24-1759 (JDB), 2025 WL 1823471, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2025). The moving party must demonstrate an injury that is “both certain and great” and “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 298). The injury must “be beyond remediation,” and thus where, as here, the “possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, [such possibility] weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
Plaintiff has the burden to put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy this high standard. “The movant cannot simply make ‘broad conclusory statements’ about the existence of harm. Rather, [the movant] must ‘submit[] . . . competent evidence into the record . . . that would permit the Court to assess whether [the movant], in fact, faces irreparable harm[.]’” Aviles-Wynkoop v. Neal, 978 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Cornish v. Dudas, 540 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2008)). Ziankovich hardly meets that exacting standard.
Specifically, Ziankovich fails to articulate any immediate harm that flows from EOIR’s suspension, and his “vague and threadbare allegations of future harm simply will not garner injunctive relief.” Economic Research Srvs., Inc. v. Resolution Economics, LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2015). Ziankovich says he will suffer irreparable harm by his inability to represent clients before EOIR and DHS, damages to his reputation and earning capacity, and the chilling effect on his constitutionally protected advocacy. PI Mot. (ECF No. 4) at 13. But Ziankovich nowhere in his complaint alleges that clients approached him for representation or that he had to turn away clients. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1).
To the extent Ziankovich argues that he suffers economic harm, such harm “does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “Clients, though not fungible in the traditional sense, are, nonetheless, the currency of commercial enterprise. Because they furnish the revenue, goodwill, and promise of future earnings that drive corporate success, their value is reducible to money.” Economic Research Srvs., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 53. Ziankovich does not allege his livelihood is at risk or that “the very existence of [his] business” is threatened; nor can he, because nothing in EOIR’s order prohibits him from engaging in any other permitted practice of law. That potential absolute prohibition is on account of his suspension by the New York bar, and no injunction in this matter would permit Ziankovich to provide legal services of any kind to any individual. Ex. 1, EOIR Decision at 1 (attached hereto).
Federal Defendants agree with the Court that Ziankovich has not perfected service of process consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Order (ECF No. 13); see also Cornish v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204–05 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding service of process insufficient where pro se plaintiff served federal defendants himself); Bullock v. Hana Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 22-2608 (DLF), 2024 WL 620440, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2024).
Indeed, “[s]ervice of process is an important requirement that serves as ‘a ritual that marks the court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit.’” Morrissey v. Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Ziankovich’s failure to properly serve Federal Defendants is a ground to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4). Permitting Ziankovich to cure service, however, would be futile considering the numerous other issues as identified in this motion to dismiss, and therefore, Federal Defendants primarily rely on those arguments.
Ziankovich’s failure to show irreparable harm is “bolstered by the delay” of his preliminary injunction motion. Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 928, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975). EOIR initially suspended Ziankovich on February 26, 2019. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 14 ¶ 5, 16 ¶ 10. Yet, Ziankovich waited until October 20, 2025, to move for a preliminary injunction. See generally PI Mot. (ECF No. 4). That motion was filed over a month after he filed his case in this District. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1). Even excusing Ziankovich’s inaction on account of his wrongful incarceration by the Government of Belarus from April 11, 2021, until April 30, 2025, Ziankovich still waited years to seek relief from this Court. This “unexcused delay in seeking extraordinary injunctive relief” should be “grounds for denial because such delay implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.” Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 292 (D.D.C. 2005). To the extent Ziankovich might claim he sought relief in other fora, his dissatisfaction with the outcome of those cases hardly constitutes irreparable harm. See Ziankovich, 2021 WL 4047000, at *1–2 (summarizing Ziankovich’s prior cases in Colorado).
IV. Plaintiff Has Not Shown the Balance of the Equities Favors Injunctive Relief.
The third and fourth requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction—the balance of harms and whether the requested injunction will disserve the public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. These factors tilt decisively against granting a preliminary injunction here. See Kim v. FINRA, 698 F. Supp. 3d 147, 172 (D.D.C. 2023) (“[A] court can deny preliminary injunctive relief solely on the balance of equities and public interest factors even in cases, like this, involving constitutional claims.”), appeal dismissed, No. 23-7136, 2025 WL 313965 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 27, 2025).
Granting a preliminary injunction would disrupt Federal Defendants’ management of the attorneys appearing before EOIR and the Department of Homeland Security. “EOIR frequently suspends or expels practitioners who are subject to a final or interim order of disbarment or suspension by their state bar regulatory authorities[.]” Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and Procedures, and Representation and Appearances, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,914, 76,915 (Dec. 18, 2008). The public has an interest in seeing Federal Defendants take decisive action when it comes to managing the conduct and credentialing of attorneys practicing before federal immigration authorities and EOIR’s authority to sanction attorney misconduct. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
V. The Court Should Order That Ziankovich Posts a Bond as a Condition of Preliminary Relief.
Federal Defendants respectfully request that any injunctive relief be accompanied by a bond. “The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
VI. Federal Defendants Should Be Relieved From the Requirements of Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1).
Federal Defendants respectfully move to be excused from Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1)’s requirement to file a certified list of an administrative record and serve an administrative record on Ziankovich. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(m), Federal Defendants and Ziankovich conferred, and Ziankovich indicates he does not oppose this request.
“In cases involving the judicial review of administrative agency actions, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the agency must file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record with the Court . . . simultaneously with the filing of a dispositive motion[.]” LCvR 7(n)(1). Where, as here, “the administrative record is unnecessary to decide the threshold legal questions presented by the pending motion to dismiss,” the Court may relieve the agency from that requirement. Htet v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 24-1446 (RC), 2025 WL 522033, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2025) (citation modified); see also Connecticut v. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279, 294 (D.D.C. 2018) (granting government’s motion to waive compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n) because the Court did not need to consider the administrative record in evaluating the motions before it); Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minn. v. Zinke, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 n.12 (D.D.C. 2017) (same); Carroll v. Off. of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 235 F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 n.1 (D.D.C. 2017); PETA v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014) (waiving compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n) and dismissing complaint).
An administrative record is not necessary to resolve the pending motions. Specifically, Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss relies on the non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint, documents incorporated by reference, or facts upon which the Court may take judicial notice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (presuming all well-pleaded allegations to be true at the pleading stage).
Moreover, the Court should first determine whether it has jurisdiction over this case before requiring Federal Defendants to compile and certify an administrative record. The Court must determine that it has jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits because “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (citation modified). That jurisdictional determination “is always an antecedent question to be answered prior to any merits inquiry.” Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation modified). Thus, the Court should first determine whether it has jurisdiction given that Federal Defendants argue in the first instance that Ziankovich lacks standing.
For these reasons, Federal Defendants respectfully request that the Court excuse them from the requirements of Rule 7(n) until further order by the Court.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Federal Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss and deny as moot Ziankovich’s motion for preliminary relief.
Dated: November 21, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
JEANINE FERRIS PIRRO
United States Attorney
By: /s/ Dimitar P. Georgiev
DIMITAR P. GEORGIEV, D.C. Bar #1735756
Assistant United States Attorney
601 D Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 252-7678
Attorneys for the United States of America
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
Civil Action No. 25-3121 (LLA)
Plaintiff,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, et al.,
Defendants.
[PROPOSED] ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Federal Defendants’ combined opposition and motion to dismiss, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is ORDERED that the claims against Federal Defendants are DISMISSED, and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED:
Date
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge