Case 1:25-cv-03121-LLA Document 29 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 32
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03121-LLA YOURAS ZIANKOVICH, Plaintiff, v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, et al., Defendants.
COLORADO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5),
4(c), AND 4(m)
Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon M. Large, sued in his official capacity;
Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates, sued in his official capacity; and the Colorado Supreme Court (“Colorado Defendants”) respectfully move to dismiss the Complaint, ECF No. 1, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), 4(c), and 4(m).
BACKGROUND
This case is about Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich’s displeasure with Colorado state court disciplinary proceedings finding that he violated multiple state rules of professional conduct.
In the underlying state-court actions, Plaintiff, a New-York licensed attorney, lived in and operated a law office in Colorado and represented Colorado clients in immigration matters, practicing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
A. State Disciplinary Proceedings
The disciplinary actions were filed by Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”), now led by Attorney Regulation Counsel Yates, who is appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law in Colorado.
Attorney disciplinary actions are heard before an impartial Hearing Board and presided over by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“PDJ”).
See Ziankovich v. Large, No. 17-cv-02039, 2019 WL 4463283, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2019) (“Ziankovich III”); see also People v. Ziankovich, 17PDJ037, 433 P.3d 640 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2018) (imposing suspension for one year and one day, with three months to be served and the remainder stayed upon successful completion of a two-year period of probation, with the requirement of practice monitoring and trust account monitoring) (“Ziankovich I”); People v. Ziankovich, No. 19PDJ068, 474 P.3d 253 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2020) (after respondent unsuccessfully attempted to remove the proceeding to federal court and then declined to participate in state court proceedings, imposing 30-month served suspension for different misconduct than in the 2018 case) (“Ziankovich II”).
A. State Disciplinary Proceedings
The disciplinary actions were filed by Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”), now led by Attorney Regulation Counsel Yates, who is appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law in Colorado. Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *1 (citing Colo. R. Civ. P. 251.3(c)(3)-(4); 251.10).
Attorney disciplinary actions are heard before an impartial Hearing Board and presided over by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“PDJ”). Id.
The 2018 case was brought by then-OARC counsel Bryon Large, id., who has since been appointed PDJ, following the retirement of Former PDJ William R. Lucero.
After charges were filed and preliminary issues were briefed, then-PDJ Lucero held a two-day hearing in which Plaintiff appeared and participated, and the PDJ Hearing Board found that Plaintiff had violated numerous Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct–specifically finding violations of Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), (f) & (g); 1.15A(a); 1.16(d); and 8.4(c)–for Plaintiff failing to keep client funds separate from his own operating account, charging unreasonable and non-refundable fees, and for conduct involving fraud misrepresentation, deception, or deceit. See Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *1-2; see also Ziankovich I, 433 P.3d at 647-49.
As he re-asserts here, Plaintiff’s primary defense in the state court proceedings was that Colorado did not have jurisdiction to discipline him, as he was not a licensed Colorado attorney. Ziankovich I, 433 P.3d at 642-43, 650; see also Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *2.
In a written ruling before the hearing, and again in the order finding violations and imposing discipline, the PDJ ruled that it had jurisdiction. Ziankovich I, 433 P.3d at 642-43, 650; Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *2.
The PDJ also rejected Plaintiff’s asserted Due Process, Commerce Clause, and First and Fifth Amendment defenses; as here, Plaintiff “does not explain the factual or legal underpinnings of these defenses.” Ziankovich I, 433 P.3d at 650; see also Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *2.
The PDJ Hearing Board suspended Plaintiff from the practice of law in Colorado for one year and one day, with three months to be served and the rest stayed pending completion of a two-year probationary period. Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *2.
Plaintiff appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, raising the same jurisdictional defense, and on February 1, 2019, the supreme court issued an Order and Mandate affirming the PDJ Hearing Board. Id. at *3. The U.S. Supreme Court also denied certiorari review. Ziankovich v. Colorado, 589 U.S. 925 (2019).
Plaintiff would have been able to file a simple affidavit for reinstatement after the three months served. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 242.38. He did not do so. Instead, Plaintiff was disciplined for new violations. See Ziankovich II, 474 P.3d at 256-62.
Following his unsuccessful efforts to remove the proceeding to federal court and declining to participate in the state court proceedings, on August 3, 2020, the PDJ found Plaintiff had committed six more violations of Colorado’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which resulted in a 30-month served suspension. See id.
Because Plaintiff did not file a simple affidavit for reinstatement after 2018’s three-month suspension, and due to the second suspension, Plaintiff must petition for readmission. Colo. R. Civ. P. 242.39.
B. Impact in Other Jurisdictions
As a result of the Colorado disciplinary outcome, the State of New York State, where Plaintiff is licensed, suspended him from the practice of law for six months and “until further order of th[e New York] Court.” ECF No. 1-1, at .pdf pages 72-85.
Following the 2020 Colorado disciplinary order, New York suspended Plaintiff “for a period of 30 months . . . and until further order of this Court.” Id. at 93-100.
Consequently, federal agencies, including EOIR, moved for his suspension, which the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered. Id. at 56-59.
Plaintiff has not asserted that he has moved for reinstatement in New York, a necessary prerequisite to practicing before EOIR. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107.
C. Federal Proceedings in Colorado
Plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking declaratory relief that OARC did not have jurisdiction to initiate state disciplinary proceedings against him because he was not licensed to practice law in Colorado and did not practice before Colorado state courts or agencies, but rather practiced federal immigration law in federal courts in Colorado. Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283, at *3.
As he does here, Plaintiff also raised First and Fifth Amendment claims, as well as Due Process and Commerce Clause claims, under Section 1983. Id.
Initially, the district court dismissed his complaint under the Younger abstention doctrine, but by the time Plaintiff appealed, the state proceedings had ended so the Tenth Circuit remanded. Id. at *3-4.
The Magistrate Judge then recommended dismissal, finding that the PDJ and OARC had jurisdiction and the authority to discipline Plaintiff and that Plaintiff had failed to offer competent evidence that would establish his other claims. Id. at *4; see also Ziankovich v. Large, No. 17-cv-02039, 2019 WL 4640803 (D. Colo. May 31 2019) (Rec.).
The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Ziankovich III, 2019 WL 4463283.
It ruled that Plaintiff’s claims failed under the theory of issue preclusion, given that he had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and did litigate the issues in the state proceedings. Id. at *6-13.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. See Ziankovich v. Large, 833 F. App’x 721, 724-25 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 2020) (“Ziankovich IV”).
D. Current Proceedings in this Court
Almost five years later, Plaintiff has now filed suit in this Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, but raising the same jurisdictional, First and Fifth Amendment, and Due Process claims.
He has done so evidently without attempting to gain readmission in New York.
Instead, he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief directed to the federal Defendants to force them to allow him to resume practice in EOIR, including asserting that the Colorado disciplinary judgments are “void.” ECF No. 1, at 2-3, 8, 23-24, 26 ¶ 1.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends Colorado’s action of notifying federal agencies constitutes an impermissible intrusion into federal law and thus violates the Supremacy Clause and that Colorado had no jurisdiction to discipline him because only New York could do so (Claim 1), id. at 20-21; that Colorado’s “disciplinary actions and their ongoing consequences” infringe on his right to free speech, petition, and professional expression, and that the imposition of sanction “without a meaningful hearing or opportunity to contest jurisdiction or federal authorization” violates his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment (Claim 3), id. at 22-23; that he is entitled to declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 because there remains an “actual and ongoing controversy” as to the “authority of state and federal Defendants to impose and enforce disciplinary measures against Plaintiff” and therefore he seeks a “declaration that: Colorado lacked jurisdiction to discipline Plaintiff” (Claim 4), id. at 23-24; and that Colorado Defendants Large, Yates, and the Colorado Supreme Court engaged in unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation by imposing discipline on him (Claim 5), id. at 24-25.
Plaintiff filed this Complaint on September 8, 2025, ECF No. 1, but did not properly serve the Colorado Defendants, see ECF Nos. 13, 21.
This Court ordered Plaintiff to effect service first by December 5, 2025, and ultimately by January 9, 2026. ECF No. 13, at 3; ECF No. 21, at 3.
Although Plaintiff has affirmed to this Court that he has served most of the Colorado Defendants, ECF No. 26, for the reasons discussed below in Section III, he has not effected proper service.
And, after Plaintiff filed notice that he had not served Former PDJ Lucero, ECF No. 26, this Court issued a minute order seeking Plaintiff’s position on dismissing Former PDJ Lucero, given that he was succeeded as Colorado’s PDJ, see Minute Order (Jan. 12, 2026).
Plaintiff subsequently confirmed that he does not oppose the dismissal of Former PDJ Lucero, “without prejudice, provided that such dismissal does not affect Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against the successor Presiding Disciplinary Judge or other Defendants.” ECF No. 28, at 1.
This Court thereafter ordered Former PDJ Lucero’s dismissal. See Minute Order (Jan. 20, 2026).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Defendants can move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); accord Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom., 945 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2019).
A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking. Id.
Courts evaluate a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Morgan v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 304 F. Supp. 3d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 2016).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), as well as other bases for dismissal, courts “must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenges.” Id. at 246 (citation omitted).
When, as here, the motion to dismiss is based on a facial attack, the court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint. Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
However, it should not accept unsupported inferences or legal conclusions presented as factual allegations. Morgan, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 246.
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman assertions also arises under Rule 12(b)(1). See Ananiev v. Freitas, 37 F. Supp. 3d 297, 312 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 587 F. App’x 661 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court “must resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
A motion to dismiss for insufficient process or insufficient service of process arises under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5). A Rule 12(b)(4) motion challenges the form of the summons, while a Rule 12(b)(5) motion challenges the manner in which service was made. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC, 766 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs proceeding pro se are generally held to a less stringent pleading standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
However, “the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not invariably apply when the litigant is a licensed attorney.” Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 109 F.4th 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
“The requirement that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally does not ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers.” Id.
ARGUMENT
I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff lacks standing, sovereign immunity bars the claims against the Colorado Supreme Court and the PDJ and ARC Defendants in their official capacities, and Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
The burden of establishing these elements rests on the plaintiff. Id. at 561.
Plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements.
Plaintiff asserts injury from his suspension from practice before EOIR. However, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that any injury is traceable to Colorado Defendants.
EOIR’s suspension was imposed by federal authorities based on Plaintiff’s reciprocal discipline in New York, not Colorado.
Thus, Plaintiff cannot show traceability or redressability as to the Colorado Defendants.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff could establish injury traceable to Colorado Defendants, sovereign immunity would bar his claims.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Sovereign immunity bars suits against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities unless the state has unequivocally waived immunity or Congress has validly abrogated it. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996).
The Colorado Supreme Court is an arm of the State of Colorado and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Dubuc v. Michigan Bd. of Law Examiners, 342 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2003).
Likewise, PDJ Large and Attorney Regulation Counsel Yates, sued in their official capacities, are entitled to sovereign immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Plaintiff argues that Ex parte Young permits his claims for prospective relief. However, Ex parte Young applies only where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002).
Plaintiff fails to allege an ongoing violation of federal law by the Colorado Defendants.
The Colorado disciplinary proceedings concluded years ago, and any alleged injury now arises from federal and New York actions, not ongoing Colorado conduct.
Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Under Rooker-Feldman, federal courts lack jurisdiction where the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by state court judgments and invites federal review and rejection of those judgments. Id. at 284-85.
Plaintiff’s claims seek precisely such review, as he asks this Court to declare Colorado’s disciplinary judgments void and to enjoin their effects.
II. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction and Service Is Defective.
Defendants also move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5) because Plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the Colorado Defendants and has failed to properly serve them.
To establish personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
The Colorado Defendants lack minimum contacts with the District of Columbia.
They are Colorado officials who acted solely within Colorado in administering Colorado attorney discipline.
Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that any Colorado Defendant purposefully directed activities toward the District of Columbia or availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities here.
The mere fact that federal agencies located in Washington, D.C. later relied on Colorado disciplinary orders does not establish personal jurisdiction over Colorado Defendants in this forum.
Plaintiff also failed to properly serve the Colorado Defendants.
Service on a state or state official must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), which requires service on the state’s chief executive officer or in the manner prescribed by state law.
Plaintiff did not serve the Colorado Governor or comply with Colorado’s service requirements.
Nor did Plaintiff properly serve PDJ Large or Attorney Regulation Counsel Yates in their official capacities.
Plaintiff’s attempted service by mail and electronic means was insufficient.
Accordingly, dismissal is warranted under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5).
III. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim.
Defendants also move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678-79.
A. Supremacy Clause
Plaintiff alleges that the Colorado Defendants violated the Supremacy Clause by disciplining him for conduct authorized by federal law.
However, the Supremacy Clause does not provide a private right of action. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015).
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a Supremacy Clause claim against the Colorado Defendants.
B. Due Process
Plaintiff also alleges that the Colorado Defendants violated his Due Process rights.
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a constitutionally protected interest and (2) deprivation of that interest without constitutionally adequate process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege either element.
Plaintiff received notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to present evidence and arguments in the Colorado disciplinary proceedings.
He also appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court and sought certiorari review from the United States Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege a lack of adequate process.
C. First Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that the Colorado Defendants violated his First Amendment rights.
However, attorney discipline for professional misconduct does not violate the First Amendment. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a First Amendment claim.
D. Extraterritoriality / Commerce Clause
Plaintiff alleges that the Colorado Defendants engaged in unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation and violated the Commerce Clause.
However, states have authority to regulate the practice of law within their borders, including disciplining attorneys who engage in misconduct affecting the state.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly establish impermissible extraterritorial regulation or a Commerce Clause violation.
E. Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.
However, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not create an independent cause of action.
Because Plaintiff fails to state any viable underlying claim, declaratory relief is unavailable.
IV. Dismissal Is Required Under Rule 4(m).
Finally, dismissal is warranted under Rule 4(m) because Plaintiff failed to timely and properly serve the Colorado Defendants.
Plaintiff was granted multiple extensions of time to effect service, yet failed to comply with Rule 4.
Accordingly, dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Colorado Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
Dated: February 2, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Counsel for Colorado Defendants
Attorney for the Colorado Defendants