THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH )
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, )
et al., )
Defendants. )
__________________________________________
PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this Reply in support of his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 4) (“PI Motion”) and in response to Federal Defendants’ combined Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Preliminary Relief (ECF No. 14) (“Federal Defendants’ Opposition”).
Consistent with the Court’s practice, Plaintiff focuses this Reply on the four Winter/Chaplaincy factors as argued by Federal Defendants: (1) irreparable harm; (2) likelihood of success to the extent Federal Defendants tie it to the preliminary-injunction standard; (3) balance of equities; and (4) the public interest.
For the reasons set forth below, Federal Defendants’ Opposition does not undercut Plaintiff’s showing. EOIR’s reciprocal discipline continues to impose an independent, ongoing federal disability; the resulting professional stigma and exclusion from federal immigration practice constitute classic irreparable harm under D.C. Circuit precedent; the balance of equities and public interest favor preventing unconstitutional and ultra vires federal action; and no meaningful bond is warranted in this APA/constitutional case against the government.
I. FEDERAL DEFENDANTS MISCONSTRUE IRREPARABLE HARM
Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable harm because: (1) EOIR’s suspension “does not prohibit Ziankovich from otherwise practicing law”; (2) any absolute bar stems from New York’s suspension; (3) Plaintiff has not alleged loss of specific clients; (4) any economic harm is compensable; and (5) delay in seeking relief defeats any finding of urgency.
Each premise is wrong.
A. EOIR’s Reciprocal Discipline Imposes an Independent, Ongoing Federal Disability
Federal Defendants’ irreparable-harm argument rests on the assertion that “no injunction in this matter would permit Ziankovich to provide legal services of any kind to any individual,” because “that potential absolute prohibition is on account of his suspension by the New York bar.” (ECF No. 14)
But this mischaracterizes both the injury and the relief requested.
1. The injury is a federal immigration-practice disability, not abstract “inability to practice law in general.”
Plaintiff’s Motion and Complaint consistently define the injury as his continuing exclusion from federal immigration practice before EOIR and DHS, together with his federal disciplinary listing and the absence of any pathway to federal reinstatement due to EOIR’s reliance on void Colorado orders. EOIR’s own disciplinary materials and final order confirm that the federal suspension is expressly grounded in Colorado’s actions and maintained as a matter of federal administrative practice.
Even accepting arguendo that New York has imposed reciprocal measures, New York’s temporary discipline neither explains nor justifies EOIR’s continuing refusal to reconsider Plaintiff’s federal status or to cease relying on a state order that, as applied here, is void and extraterritorial. The harm is therefore independently federal: Plaintiff remains barred from a distinct field of practice—federal immigration work—by a federal agency acting on a state predicate that no tribunal has ever reviewed for jurisdiction or preemption.
2. Colorado’s lack of any mechanism for non-licensee reinstatement makes the federal disability effectively permanent.
The Complaint and supporting declaration explain that Colorado offers no meaningful path to “reinstatement” for non-licensees. Because Plaintiff was never licensed there, he has no state license to restore, and the only theoretical avenue is discretionary action by the very officials whose ultra vires conduct is at issue. EOIR, in turn, insists on Colorado “reinstatement” as a condition precedent to federal relief.
This feedback loop renders the federal disability ongoing and self-perpetuating, exactly the type of “continuing disability” the Motion identified as irreparable: Plaintiff cannot resume federally authorized practice, cannot clear his federal record, and cannot cure the defect through any ordinary professional channel. See PI Motion (ECF No. 4).
3. The requested injunction targets EOIR’s own federal action, not New York’s.
Federal Defendants’ Opposition repeatedly conflates Plaintiff’s federal claims with his separate state-bar history. But the Motion does not seek an order compelling New York to do anything. Instead, it requests narrowly tailored relief directed at EOIR: to stop enforcing and publicizing reciprocal discipline based on Colorado’s extrajurisdictional orders, and to restore Plaintiff to EOIR’s roster pending adjudication of his federal claims.
Whether New York maintains any separate status is irrelevant to whether EOIR’s own conduct inflicts irreparable harm under Rule 65. The injury is the federal exclusion itself and the federal reliance on an unconstitutional state predicate, not the aggregate of all possible licensing consequences.
Moreover, federal immigration practice is jurisdictionally distinct. Eligibility to appear before EOIR does not depend on holding an active New York license where EOIR’s own regulations independently authorize federal practice. Thus, EOIR can fully redress the federal disability regardless of any temporary or collateral status in New York.
B. Professional Stigma and Chilling of Federal Advocacy Are Classic Irreparable Injuries
Federal Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s alleged harms—loss of clients, earning capacity, and reputation—are “economic” and fully compensable (ECF No. 14). That is not the law in this Circuit.
Plaintiff’s Motion detailed that:
- he remains unable to represent clients before immigration tribunals and to maintain his professional credentials;
- his federal disciplinary listing imposes a stigma that deters future clients and professional partners;
- the continuing exclusion has a chilling effect on his constitutionally-protected advocacy and participation in federal fora; and
- these harms are not amenable to later monetary compensation.
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that:
- Loss of professional standing and reputational injury linked to governmental sanction or disqualification constitute irreparable harm, particularly where they impair First Amendment activity or access to federal institutions. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing irreparable harm where government actions chilled religious exercise and stigmatized plaintiffs);
- Ongoing regulatory restraints that prevent participation in a regulated profession or federal program likewise satisfy irreparable harm. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 187–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging federal enforcement and collateral reputational harms).
Plaintiff’s circumstances are squarely within that line of authority: a federal agency has branded him as a disciplined practitioner, barred him from a specialized field of practice, and continues to publish and rely on that status based on an unreviewed state order. That combination of stigma, professional exclusion, and chilled advocacy is paradigmatic irreparable harm, not a mere “loss of clients” reducible to dollars.
Federal Defendants’ effort to recharacterize these injuries as ordinary economic loss ignores both the factual record and controlling precedent.
C. Plaintiff’s Timing Does Not Negate Ongoing, Self-Perpetuating Harm
Federal Defendants finally contend that Plaintiff’s “delay” in seeking a preliminary injunction shows a lack of urgency and undermines irreparable harm (ECF No. 14). Their argument omits critical context and misapplies the delay cases they cite.
1. Plaintiff was wrongfully detained abroad for over four years.
As Federal Defendants themselves acknowledge, Plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated by the Government of Belarus from April 11, 2021, until April 30, 2025. During that period, he was physically unable to litigate in U.S. courts, much less seek emergency federal relief. To treat that period as “unexcused delay” would invert the equitable analysis and punish him for victimization that the U.S. Government has formally recognized.
2. Plaintiff acted reasonably promptly once he could return and access the courts.
After his release and return to the United States, Plaintiff filed this action on August 1, 2025, and then moved for preliminary injunctive relief on October 20, 2025. For a pro se litigant recovering from wrongful detention, rebuilding his practice, and assembling a complex federal case involving multiple agencies and historical records, this short interval is anything but a sign of indifference.
3. Ongoing, continuing disability is not cured by prior delay.
Even in the cases Federal Defendants invoke, delay is only one factor; it is not dispositive where the injury is ongoing and self-perpetuating. Here, each passing day extends:
- Plaintiff’s exclusion from federal immigration practice;
- the publication and reliance on his federal disciplinary status; and
- the chilling effect on his advocacy and professional opportunities.
The Motion expressly framed this as a “continuing disability” under federal jurisprudence—an ongoing legal restraint that persists until the underlying federal misconduct is corrected. See PI Motion (ECF No. 4). Such harm remains irreparable even if the initial wrongful act occurred years earlier, particularly where, as here, the plaintiff diligently sought relief in other fora before circumstances (including a hostage-like detention) interrupted his efforts.
In short, Federal Defendants’ delay argument cannot erase the reality that Plaintiff is suffering present, not merely historical, injury.
II. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS (AS RELEVANT TO PRELIMINARY RELIEF)
Federal Defendants recycle their Rule 12 arguments to assert that Plaintiff is “unlikely to succeed” and therefore cannot meet the first Winter factor. Plaintiff has already addressed these contentions in detail in his Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19). For purposes of preliminary relief, Plaintiff needs only to demonstrate a “substantial indication” of likely success. He has shown far more.
1. Standing and Causation Are Satisfied Because EOIR Alone Imposes the Federal Disability.
Federal Defendants insist Plaintiff lacks standing because “he remains suspended by New York.” But the injury at issue is a federal disability created and maintained solely by EOIR:
(1) EOIR enforces Plaintiff’s federal suspension;
(2) EOIR publishes the federal disciplinary listing; and
(3) EOIR conditions reinstatement on an impossible Colorado process that Plaintiff, as a non-licensee, cannot access.
An order restraining EOIR from enforcing Colorado’s ultra vires sanctions would therefore fully redress the federal harm, regardless of any separate or temporary status in New York. This satisfies all components of Article III standing—injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability.
2. Supremacy Clause and Preemption Claims Are Strongly Supported by Federal Precedent
Plaintiff’s claims rest on the foundational rule that states may not regulate, punish, or discipline conduct expressly authorized by federal law.
In Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a state cannot discipline an attorney for practicing before a federal tribunal under federal authorization. Multiple federal and state courts have reaffirmed this principle:
- Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
- Desilets v. State Bar of Michigan, 600 N.W.2d 315 (Mich. 1999) (state may not discipline federally authorized immigration practitioners)
- Poole v. Comm’r of IRS, 905 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1990)
Here, Plaintiff practiced exclusively under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1), which independently authorizes representation before EOIR. Federal immigration practice is not derivative of state bar licensing. EOIR administers a federal adjudicatory system under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and has independent authority to admit practitioners regardless of state licensing status. See Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Thus, the legality of Plaintiff’s federal practice turns on federal law alone, and EOIR cannot constitutionally rely on a state order issued without jurisdiction as a basis for federal exclusion. Colorado’s attempt to discipline Plaintiff for federally authorized conduct intruded into a preempted federal domain. EOIR’s automatic adoption of such unconstitutional state action magnifies, not cures, the Supremacy Clause violation.
3. Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on His APA Claims
EOIR’s handling of Plaintiff’s case constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
EOIR:
(1) relied exclusively on Colorado orders issued without jurisdiction,
(2) ignored the impossibility of Colorado reinstatement, and
(3) failed to engage in any reasoned decisionmaking.
An agency may not give federal effect to an unlawful state predicate. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (agency action is arbitrary and capricious where it fails to engage in reasoned decisionmaking). Yet EOIR performed precisely such rubber-stamping here. This is a textbook APA violation.
4. Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on His Constitutional Claims
A. Procedural Due Process
EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline without providing Plaintiff any meaningful opportunity to contest Colorado’s extraterritorial findings—a clear violation of due process.
The Supreme Court in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1968) (disciplinary action without meaningful notice violates due process), held that even attorney disciplinary proceedings must satisfy fundamental fairness and cannot be conducted via unreviewed procedural shortcuts. EOIR’s mechanical adoption of Colorado’s void orders violates this constitutional mandate.
B. First Amendment Retaliatory and Chilling Harm
By excluding Plaintiff from federal tribunals based solely on a void state action, EOIR’s discipline chills his federally protected advocacy. The D.C. Circuit recognizes such chilling effects as constitutional injuries supporting preliminary relief. Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 305.
5. Plaintiff’s Showing Exceeds the “Substantial Indication” Standard
Taken together:
- multiple lines of federal precedent (Sperry, Kroll, Desilets, Poole);
- undisputed facts demonstrating Colorado’s lack of jurisdiction;
- EOIR’s failure to conduct independent review;
- clear APA violations;
- fundamental due process defects (Ruffalo); and
- constitutional chilling consequences—
provide far more than the minimal showing required for preliminary relief.
Plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling likelihood of success on every major theory pled.
In sum, the factual record and controlling precedent provide far more than the “substantial indication” of likely success required at this stage. Plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause, APA, and constitutional claims each present strong, independently sufficient grounds for preliminary relief.
III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND
PUBLIC INTEREST FAVOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF
Federal Defendants argue that the balance of harms and the public interest “decisively weigh against” a preliminary injunction because EOIR has an institutional interest in regulating practitioners and because injunctions are “extraordinary remedies.” That argument overstates the impact of the requested order and understates the public interest in lawful federal administration.
A. The Requested Relief Is Narrow and Preserves, Rather Than Disrupts, the Proper Status Quo
Plaintiff does not ask the Court to strip EOIR of its disciplinary authority or to grant him blanket immunity from regulation. The Motion seeks a narrowly tailored injunction that:
- temporarily stays EOIR’s reciprocal suspension insofar as it is based solely on Colorado’s extrajurisdictional orders;
- directs EOIR to restore Plaintiff’s ability to practice before EOIR while this case is pending; and
- restrains Colorado officials from further transmitting or pressing those orders to federal bodies for new federal consequences absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.
EOIR would remain free to:
- investigate and bring its own charges based on federal standards;
- impose discipline grounded in independent federal findings; and
- adopt reasonable regulations governing the practice of immigration law.
The injunction would merely prevent EOIR from giving automatic, unreviewed effect to a state order that, as applied here, is void under the Supremacy Clause and beyond Colorado’s jurisdiction.
B. The Public Interest Favors Preventing Unconstitutional and Ultra Vires Agency Action
When the government is a party, the balance of equities and public interest merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Federal Defendants correctly note that the public has an interest in effective regulation of attorneys, but they ignore the equally powerful public interest in:
- ensuring that federal agencies do not abdicate their responsibilities by blindly enforcing state-level determinations that violate federal law;
- protecting access to qualified counsel in immigration proceedings, especially where the federal government has acknowledged Plaintiff as a wrongfully detained U.S. national whose advocacy had national significance; and
- preventing chilling of protected advocacy by extrajurisdictional state retaliation.
In APA and constitutional cases, courts in this District have consistently recognized that the public interest favors enjoining unlawful or ultra vires government conduct, even where the defendant agency invokes broad institutional interests. Plaintiff’s requested relief would reinforce, not undermine, EOIR’s legitimate regulatory mission by requiring that federal discipline rest on a lawful, jurisdictionally sound predicate.
Federal Defendants’ concern that an injunction would “disrupt” EOIR’s management of practitioners is overstated: EOIR frequently imposes, modifies, and lifts suspensions in the ordinary course; pausing one reciprocal suspension pending judicial review of its legality is neither unprecedented nor administratively onerous.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD WAIVE OR SET ONLY A NOMINAL BOND
Finally, Federal Defendants request that any injunctive relief be conditioned on a bond under Rule 65(c) (ECF No. 14). In cases such as this—where a pro se plaintiff seeks non-monetary relief against the federal government for alleged constitutional and APA violations—courts routinely waive the bond requirement or set a purely nominal amount, because:
- the government faces no risk of compensable monetary loss from being temporarily enjoined from enforcing or publicizing a contested disciplinary order;
- the requested injunction does not compel any significant expenditure of funds, only modest administrative steps; and
- imposing a substantial bond would, in practice, deny access to equitable relief for individuals challenging unlawful government action.
The Proposed Order accompanying Plaintiff’s Motion accordingly requested that the Court waive bond, specifically noting that “Defendants will not suffer monetary damage from the issuance of this Order” and emphasizing Plaintiff’s pro se status and the strong public interest at stake.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court either:
- waive the bond requirement entirely, or
- in the alternative, set a purely nominal bond that does not undermine his ability to vindicate his federal rights.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Plaintiff’s original Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:
- GRANT his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction;
- ENTER the proposed interim relief set forth in his previously filed Proposed Order (or substantially similar relief tailored by the Court); and
- WAIVE the bond requirement under Rule 65(c), or set a nominal bond only.
Dated in Baytown, Texas this 15th day of December 2025.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Youras Ziankovich
Youras Ziankovich, Esq.
Plaintiff Pro Se
601 W Baker Rd., #11
Baytown, TX 77522
Phone: (346) 223-0284
Fax: (844) 858-7720
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of December 2025, I filed the foregoing PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION through the CM/ECF system. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.4(d), the CM/ECF system will automatically notify all counsel of record.
No service is required on the state defendants because they have not appeared.
s/ Youras Ziankovich
Youras Ziankovich
Plaintiff Pro Se