Ziankovich v. EOIR & Colorado Disciplinary Authorities
When a State Crosses the Line into Federal Law
What happens when a state disciplinary body reaches beyond its borders and attempts to control a legal practice governed exclusively by federal law?
That question lies at the heart of Ziankovich v. EOIR & Colorado Disciplinary Authorities, a federal civil action now pending before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The case was brought by Youras Ziankovich, a New York–licensed attorney whose work consisted solely of federally authorized immigration representation. He was never licensed in Colorado. He never practiced Colorado law. Yet Colorado disciplinary authorities asserted power over his federal practice anyway.
In 2018, the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) and its Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ) imposed sanctions on Mr. Ziankovich for conduct carried out under federal authorization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1).
Those state sanctions did not remain confined to Colorado. They were affirmatively transmitted to federal agencies, including the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), triggering
cascading federal consequences that continue to this day.
The lawsuit challenges that chain reaction—state action reaching into federal space, followed by federal reliance on a jurisdictionally contested state order—and asks a federal court to draw a clear constitutional line.
Why This Case Matters
This case is not about relitigating a state disciplinary proceeding. It is about who gets to regulate federally authorized practice.
At stake is a foundational principle of American constitutional law: when Congress authorizes a professional activity and places it under federal regulation, states may not override that decision simply because the practitioner happens to be physically present within their borders.
If state regulators may penalize federally authorized conduct and export those penalties to federal agencies, the practical result is a backdoor veto over federal law—one exercised without congressional approval and without uniform national standards.
This case asks whether such a system is compatible with the Supremacy Clause, due process, and the structure of federalism itself.
The Legal Fault Lines
- Federal Supremacy — States may not punish conduct that federal law expressly permits. (Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963))
- Administrative Accountability — Federal agencies must exercise independent judgment and lawful process, not rely mechanically on state action.
- Due Process and Free Professional Expression — Lawyers practicing in federally regulated fields may not be sidelined through extrajurisdictional enforcement.
- Limits on Extraterritorial Power — A state may not project its disciplinary authority into federal forums or other jurisdictions.
A Broader Federal Question
Immigration law is not the only field affected by this dispute. The same structural tension arises in tax practice, patent law, administrative advocacy, and other federally regulated professions.
As professional practice becomes increasingly national—and federal—old assumptions about geographic control are colliding with modern regulatory reality. This case places that collision squarely before a federal court.
Filed in Washington, D.C., where the relevant federal agencies act and where the federal consequences are felt, the case seeks clarity on a question that affects practitioners far beyond a single state.
What the Lawsuit Seeks
- A judicial declaration that Colorado lacked jurisdiction to discipline federally authorized legal practice;
- An injunction preventing federal agencies from enforcing or relying on federal consequences derived from jurisdictionally defective state action;
- Recognition that ongoing reciprocal sanctions constitute a continuing federal injury requiring judicial relief.
Follow the Case
Court filings, exhibits, and updates will be published on this site as the case proceeds before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Already on Docket:
1. Complaint
4. Plaintiff’s Application for TRO/PI
14. Federal Defendants’ Combined Opposition and Motion to Dismiss
19. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
20. Plaintiff’s Reply on Federal Defendants’ Opposition to TRO/PI
22. Combined Reply of the Federal Defendants
23. Plaintiff’s Notice Regarding Authority Already Cited in the Record
29. Colorado Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss