Exhibit E

Conduct of New York Authorities

re Colorado Sanctions

Combined documents showing New York’s adoption and enforcement of Colorado disciplinary actions without independent review.

New York authorities relied solely on Colorado’s disciplinary determinations without conducting any independent review, violating principles of due process, federal primacy, and ethical jurisdiction under 22 NYCRR § 1240.13(b).

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
held in and for the First Judicial Department
in the County of New York on January 16, 2020.

Present:
Hon. Judith J. Gische, Justice Presiding
Angela M. Mazzarelli
Troy K. Webber
Cynthia S. Kern
Peter H. Moulton, Justices.

In the Matter of

Youras Ziankovich
(admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
an attorney and counselor-at-law:

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department,
Petitioner,

—against—

Youras Ziankovich,
Respondent.

(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324)

An order of the Supreme Court, State of Colorado, having been entered on or about October 31, 2018, and affirmed February 1, 2019, suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of Colorado for a period of one year and one day, with three months to be served, and the remainder to be stayed upon the successful completion of a two-year period of probation, for charging excessive and nonrefundable fees, failing to keep unearned fees in trust, failing to promptly return unearned fees, and misrepresenting to a client the filing date of an immigration application;

And the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, by Jorge Dopico, its Chief Attorney (Denise M. Szekely, of counsel), having moved this Court on October 21, 2019 (M-3666), for an order, pursuant to the doctrine of reciprocal discipline as set forth in 22 NYCRR § 1240.13, disciplining respondent (who, as Youry Ziankovich, was admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on February 26, 2014), predicated upon the aforesaid discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Colorado, and directing him to demonstrate why discipline should not be imposed upon him in the State of New York for the underlying misconduct, or, in the alternative, suspending respondent for one year, or otherwise sanctioning him as this Court deems appropriate;

(M-3666, M-7531) — January 16, 2020

And respondent having submitted an affirmation in opposition to the motion for reciprocal discipline, and the Committee having submitted an affirmation in reply;

And respondent having moved this Court on October 21, 2019 (M-7531), for an order striking the Committee’s reply, and the Committee having submitted an affirmation in opposition to the respondent’s motion to strike, and respondent having submitted an affidavit in reply;

Now, upon reading and filing the papers with respect to the motions, and due deliberation having been had thereon, and upon the Opinion Per Curiam filed herein, it is unanimously

ORDERED that the Committee’s motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1240.13 (M-3666) is granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of six months, effective February 18, 2020, and until further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent’s motion to strike the Committee’s reply papers is denied (M-7531); and it is further

ORDERED that during the period of suspension respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk, or employee of another; that respondent is forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission, or other public authority; that respondent is forbidden to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent is directed to fully comply with the provisions of the Court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred or suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR § 1240.15), a copy of which is annexed hereto and made a part hereof.

ENTER:
APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPREME COURT
FIRST DEPARTMENT
STATE OF NEW YORK

I, Susanna Roodjass, Clerk of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, do hereby certify that I compared the foregoing with the original thereof filed in said office, and that the same is a correct transcript of said original.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of this Court.

CLERK

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
JAN 16 2020
FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Justice Presiding, Hon. Judith J. Gische
Justices: Angela M. Mazzarelli, Troy K. Webber, Cynthia S. Kern, Peter H. Moulton

In the Matter of Youras Ziankovich,

M-3666 (admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
M-7531,
an attorney and counselor-at-law:

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department,
Petitioner,

—against—

Youras Ziankovich,
Respondent.

Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Youras Ziankovich, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on February 26, 2014.

Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New York (Denise M. Szekely, of counsel), for petitioner.

Respondent pro se.

Motion No. 3666, Motion No. 7531 — October 21, 2019
IN THE MATTER OF YOURAS ZIANKOVICH, AN ATTORNEY

PER CURIAM

Respondent Youras Ziankovich was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on February 26, 2014, under the name Youry Ziankovich. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained a registered address within the First Judicial Department. This Court retains continuing jurisdiction pursuant to the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.7(a)(2).

The Attorney Grievance Committee (Committee) seeks an order, pursuant to the Rules of Professional Misconduct (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 and the doctrine of reciprocal discipline, finding that the conduct underlying respondent’s discipline in Colorado would constitute misconduct in New York; directing him to demonstrate why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed for the underlying misconduct; and/or suspending him for one year, or, in the alternative, imposing such sanction as this Court deems appropriate based on his discipline in Colorado. Respondent, pro se, opposes, asserts defenses to reciprocal discipline, and moves to strike the Committee’s reply.

In 2017, the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) filed a complaint charging respondent with seven disciplinary violations. While respondent is not admitted in Colorado, under Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.5(a), the Colorado Supreme Court has disciplinary jurisdiction over him based on his practice of immigration law within that state.

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ) of the Colorado Supreme Court granted the OARC partial summary judgment sustaining six of the alleged violations, and directed a hearing be held before a three-member Hearing Board (which included the PDJ) for a determination as to liability on the remaining charge and sanction. Respondent appeared pro se and testified at the hearing.

The factual and judicial findings in this matter are as follows. On June 30, 2016, Hennadiy Zhakyavichyus and Iuliia Vyshniavska retained respondent to apply for adjustments of their respective immigration statuses, for which they paid him the full agreed-upon fee of $6,000 to handle both matters, but they discharged him on August 4 and August 9, 2016, respectively, because both of them were dissatisfied with the pace at which their matters were being handled. At the time of his August 9 termination, respondent told Zhakyavichyus that he had filed his citizenship application on August 4; however, records showed that the earliest date it could have been filed was August 9. Further, respondent, who did not keep contemporaneous time records for his work, billed the couple a total of over $5,000 for their joint, initial two-hour meeting with him. He claimed that the fee was justified under the terms of their retainer agreements.

The PDJ granted the OARC partial summary judgment finding that the fees respondent charged violated Colorado RPC 1.5(a) (a lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses); he failed to deposit $5,000 of the advance fee paid to him by Zhakyavichyus into an attorney trust account in violation of Colorado RPC 1.5(f) (advances of unearned fees are the property of the client and shall be deposited in the lawyer’s trust account) and Colorado RPC 1.15 (a lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in the lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property); by including a nonrefundable “case evaluation fee” of $1,000 in his retainer agreements he violated Colorado RPC 1.5(g) (nonrefundable fees and nonrefundable retainers are prohibited [and] any agreement that purports to restrict a client’s right to terminate the representation, or that unreasonably restricts a client’s right to obtain a refund of unearned or unreasonable fees, is prohibited); upon termination of his services by the clients, he failed to promptly return unearned fees and thereby failed to take steps reasonably practicable to protect the clients’ interests in violation of Colorado RPC 1.16(d); and by misrepresenting the filing date of Zhakyavichyus’s application he engaged in dishonest conduct in violation of Colorado RPC 8.4(c).

However, the Hearing Board did not sustain the charge alleging that respondent violated Colorado RPC 1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation), finding that the OARC had not met its burden of proof with respect to such.

The Hearing Board did not find that “the substance of Respondent’s representation caused particular harm to his clients” but, nevertheless, found that “he caused both actual and potential injury [to them] in relation to his improper charging of fees and his dishonesty” (People v Ziankovich, 433 P.3d 640, 653 [Colo. O.P.D.J. 2018]). In particular, Zhakyavichyus was harmed when respondent failed to tell him the truth about the mailing date of his application; Vyshniavska “saw little benefit from the fees she paid [him]” and was disheartened about lawyers based on the experience; and her case took longer to resolve as a result of respondent’s misconduct (id.). Also, it concluded that he caused both clients potential harm by not placing their fees in trust, and his misconduct harmed the public and legal profession by diminishing the public’s trust in lawyers (id.).

The Board found further that respondent acted recklessly with regard to his dishonesty toward Zhakyavichyus but knowingly engaged in his fee-related misconduct; therefore, under sections 4.12, 4.62, and 7.2 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards), suspension was the presumptive sanction. Additionally, the Board majority found there were aggravating factors, namely: dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim, and indifference to making restitution. Nevertheless, the majority found that four of the aforementioned factors were entitled to relatively little weight (ABA Standards § 9.22). While the majority found mitigation, based upon respondent’s lack of any prior discipline and his inexperience in the practice of law, it gave relatively little weight to his unblemished disciplinary history as he had only been a licensed attorney for two years at the time of his misconduct (ABA Standards § 9.32).

Based on the presumptive sanction of suspension, the analysis of the aggravation, mitigation, and pertinent case law, as well as its “collective sense of fairness and proportionality,” the majority ultimately concluded that respondent should be suspended for one year and one day, with three months to be actually served and the remaining period stayed upon completion of probation (Ziankovich, 433 P.3d at 656). The Hearing Board also directed respondent to, among other things, promptly make restitution to Vyshniavska and Zhakyavichyus ($1,500 and $1,000, respectively) and barred him from seeking reinstatement to practice law in Colorado until he did so.

In dissent, the PDJ disagreed as to the length of suspension, believing respondent should serve nine months of his suspension, but agreed with the majority that the remainder of the one year and one day suspension should be stayed upon completion of a two-year probation period and that the conditions as set forth in the opinion should be imposed. In July 2018, the Hearing Board stayed respondent’s suspension pending his appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, but on October 10, 2018, the PDJ revoked the stay based on respondent’s failure to comply with the practice monitoring condition. Thus, by order dated October 31, 2018, the PDJ directed respondent’s immediate suspension in accordance with the Hearing Board’s June 30, 2018 opinion. By order dated February 1, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court denied respondent’s appeal and affirmed the Hearing Board’s decision in full. In or about April 2019, respondent filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court (see Ziankovich v. Colorado, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 133 [2019]), which was denied.

The Committee advises that, to date, respondent has not made restitution to his former clients.

By order dated March 21, 2019, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) immediately suspended respondent from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security based on his discipline in Colorado.

As stated above, the Committee requests that, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13(a) and (b), this Court find respondent has been disciplined by a foreign jurisdiction and order him to demonstrate why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed for the underlying misconduct; and/or suspending him for one year, or, in the alternative, imposing such sanction as this Court deems appropriate based on his discipline in Colorado.

The only defenses to reciprocal discipline are enumerated at 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b), to wit: a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard in the foreign jurisdiction; an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct; or the misconduct at issue in the foreign jurisdiction would not constitute misconduct in New York (Matter of Hoffman, 34 A.D.3d 1 [1st Dept 2006]).

Respondent argues that the defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(1) and (3) apply herein and the imposition of reciprocal discipline would be unjust under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(c). As to his asserted due process defense under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(1), respondent argues that he is not subject to the Colorado Supreme Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction as he is not a member of the Colorado Bar. As to Colorado RPC 8.5(a), under which Colorado disciplinary authorities asserted jurisdiction over him based on his practice of immigration law within that state, he argues that it is only a “general rule” and is thereby trumped by Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 251.1(b), which provides that attorneys licensed to practice in Colorado are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court. Additionally, he argues that the Colorado Supreme Court’s imposition of discipline in an immigration matter violates federal law and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Sperry v Florida (373 U.S. 379 [1963]).

Respondent argues that, contrary to the Committee’s position, his conduct in Colorado would not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR § 1200) rule 1.5(d) because under the terms of his retainer agreements both clients agreed to pay him, inter alia, a $1,000 case evaluation fee if he were discharged; his conduct would not violate (22 NYCRR § 1200) rule 1.5(a) because under New York case law he was entitled to charge and keep this “minimum fee” as the clients did not expressly indicate they were discharging him for cause (see Joel R. Brandes v Zingmond, 151 Misc. 2d 671 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1991]); his fees were neither unreasonable nor excessive as he did a substantial amount of work for both clients (which included filing Zhakyavichyus’s application); based on our case law his fees did not rise to a level for which discipline is warranted (see e.g. Matter of Doria, 165 A.D.3d 33 [1st Dept 2018]); therefore, his fees were not excessive in violation of rule 1.5(a); and, as his fees were not excessive, he did not fail to refund unearned monies and did not fail to take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to his clients after they discharged him in violation of rule 1.16(e).

Contrary to respondent’s arguments, none of the defenses to reciprocal discipline apply herein. Respondent received notice of the charges against him and vigorously defended himself at the trial (disciplinary hearing) and appellate levels which, as noted, included a federal lawsuit against the OARC. In addition, the record amply supports the Colorado Supreme Court’s misconduct findings. Further, respondent’s misconduct in Colorado would constitute misconduct in New York in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR § 1200) rules 1.5(a), 1.5(d), 1.16(e), and 8.4(c). Respondent has also not demonstrated that it would be unjust under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(c) for this Court to impose reciprocal discipline, nor do his arguments in support of his motion to strike the Committee’s reply papers have any merit.

As a general rule, in reciprocal disciplinary matters, this Court gives significant weight to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction in which the charges were initially brought (see Matter of Peters, 127 A.D.3d 103, 109 [1st Dept 2015]; Matter of Cardillo, 123 A.D.3d 147, 150 [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Jaffe, 78 A.D.3d 152, 158 [1st Dept 2010]). Only in rare instances will this Court depart from its general rule (see Matter of Lowell, 14 A.D.3d 41 [1st Dept 2004], appeal dismissed 846 [2005], lv denied 5 708 [2005]).

As noted, the Colorado Hearing Board majority imposed a suspension of one year and one day, with three months to be served (subject to his successful completion of a two-year probationary period and certain conditions imposed), while the PDJ would have imposed an actual nine-month suspension with the remainder of the one year and one day stayed. While a one-year suspension would not be out of line with our precedent (see Matter of Novins, 119 A.D.3d 37 [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Chang, 57 A.D.3d 151 [1st Dept 2008]; Matter of Brashich, 304 A.D.2d 207 [1st Dept 2003]), as noted, all but three months of respondent’s suspension in Colorado was stayed with the Hearing Board majority having opined that “a served suspension of longer than three months would be unduly harsh” (Ziankovich, 433 P.3d at 655). However, “the policy of this Court is not to stay suspensions” (Matter of Hagendorf, 17 A.D.3d 25, 28 [1st Dept 2008]; see also Matter of Jarblum, 51 A.D.3d 68 [1st Dept 2008]).

Accordingly, the Committee’s motion for reciprocal discipline, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13, is granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months, and until further order of this Court. Respondent’s motion to strike the Committee’s reply papers is denied.

All concur. [January 16, 2020] Order filed.

The Attorney Grievance Committee’s motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13 (M-3666) is granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of six months, effective February 18, 2020, and until further order of this Court. Respondent’s motion to strike the Committee’s reply papers is denied (M-7531).

Appellate Division, First Judicial Department

22 NYCRR § 1240.15 — Conduct of Disbarred or Suspended Attorneys

(a) Prohibition Against Practicing Law. Attorneys disbarred or suspended shall comply with Judiciary Law §§ 478, 479, 484 and 486. After entry of an order of disbarment or suspension, the affected respondent shall not accept any new retainer or engage in any new case or legal matter of any nature as attorney for another. However, during the period between the entry date of the order and its effective date, the respondent may wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters which were pending on the entry date.

(b) Notification of Clients. Within 10 days of the date of entry of an order of suspension or disbarment, the affected respondent shall notify, by certified mail and, where practical, electronic mail, each client of the respondent, the attorney for each party in any pending matter, the court in any pending matter, and the Office of Court Administration for each action where a retainer statement has been filed pursuant to court rules. The notice shall state that the respondent is unable to act as counsel due to disbarment or suspension. A notice to a respondent’s client shall advise the client to obtain new counsel. A notice to counsel for a party in a pending action, or to the Office of Court Administration in connection with an action where a retainer statement has been filed pursuant to court rule, shall include the name and address of the respondent’s client. Where counsel has been appointed by a court, notice shall also be provided to the appointing court.

(c) Duty to Return Property and Files. Within 30 days of the date of entry of the order of suspension or disbarment, the affected respondent shall deliver to all respondent’s clients or third parties, or to a successor attorney designated by such clients or third parties, all money and property (including legal files) in the possession of the respondent to which such clients or third parties are entitled.

(d) Discontinuation of Attorney Advertising. Within 30 days of the date of entry of the order of suspension or disbarment, the affected respondent shall discontinue all public and private notices through advertising, office stationery and signage, email signatures, voicemail messages, social media, and other methods, that assert that the respondent may engage in the practice of law.

(e) Forfeiture of Secure Pass. Within 30 days of the date of entry of the order of suspension or disbarment, the affected respondent shall surrender to the Office of Court Administration any Attorney Secure Pass issued to him or her.

(f) Affidavit of Compliance. Within 45 days after the date of service of the order of disbarment or suspension, the affected respondent shall file with the Court, together with proof of service upon the Committee, an affidavit in the form in Appendix B to these Rules showing a current mailing address for the respondent and that the respondent has complied with the order and these Rules.

(g) Compensation. A respondent who has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law may not share in any fee for legal services rendered by another attorney during the period of disbarment or suspension but may be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for services rendered prior to the effective date of the disbarment or suspension. On motion of the respondent, with notice to the respondent’s client, the amount and manner of compensation shall be determined by the court or agency where the action is pending or, if an action has not been commenced, at a special term of the Supreme Court in the county where the respondent maintained an office. The total amount of the legal fee shall not exceed the amount that the client would have owed if no substitution of counsel had been required.

(h) Required Records. A respondent who has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law shall keep and maintain records of the respondent’s compliance with this rule so that, upon any subsequent proceeding instituted by or against the respondent, proof of compliance with this rule and with the disbarment or suspension order or with the order accepting resignation will be available.

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
held in and for the First Judicial Department
in the County of New York on March 12, 2020.

Present — Hon. Judith J. Gische, Justice Presiding
Angela M. Mazzarelli,
Troy K. Webber,
Cynthia S. Kern,
Peter H. Moulton, Justices.

In the Matter of Youras Ziankovich
(admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
an attorney and counselor-at-law:

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department, M-539
Petitioner,

Youras Ziankovich
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324), Respondent.

An order of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, having been entered on or about October 31, 2018 and affirmed February 1, 2019, suspending respondent (who, as Youry Ziankovich, was admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on February 26, 2014) from the practice of law in the State of Colorado for a period of one year and one day, with three months to be served and the remainder to be stayed upon the successful completion of a two-year period of probation, for charging excessive and nonrefundable fees, failing to keep unearned fees in trust, failing to promptly return unearned fees, and misrepresenting to a client the filing date of an immigration application;

and an order of this Court (M-3666), having been entered January 16, 2020, granting the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department’s motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13 and suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of six months, effective February 18, 2020, and until further order of this Court, and denying respondent’s motion (M-3571) to strike the Committee’s reply papers;

Upon respondent’s motion for reargument, modification, and a stay of sanctions and enforcement of the aforementioned order of this Court entered January 16, 2020 (M-3666), and other relief;

and the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, by Jorge Dopico, its Chief Attorney (Denise M. Szekely, of counsel), having submitted an affirmation in opposition to respondent’s motion;

and respondent having submitted a reply;

Now, upon reading and filing the papers with respect to the motion, and due deliberation having been had thereon, it is unanimously

ORDERED that the motion is denied.

ENTER:

APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DEPARTMENT
STATE OF NEW YORK

I, Susanna Rojas, Clerk of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, do hereby certify that I have compared this copy with the original thereof filed in said office on March 12, 2020, and that the same is a correct transcript thereof, and of the whole of said original.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of this Court.

ROBERT J. ANELLO
Attorney Grievance Committee

Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney
Abigail T. Reardon, Deputy Chief Attorney
Ricardo E. Oquendo
Angela Christmas
Milton L. Williams, Jr.
Naomi F. Goldstein, Vice Chairs
Vitaly Lipkansky
Raymond Vallejo

180 Maiden Lane, 17th Floor
New York, New York 10038
(212) 401-0800
Email: AD1-AGC@nycourts.gov

Staff Attorneys:
Daniel J. Baek
Sean A. Brandveen
Kevin J. Culley
Kevin M. Doyle
Peter M. Hertzog
Kam Yuen, Motion Clerk
Kelly A. Latham
Jun Lee
Thomas M. Lee
Norma J. Lopez
Norma I. Melendez
Elisabeth A. Palladino
Kathy W. Parrino

September 25, 2020

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Supreme Court, Appellate Division
First Judicial Department
27 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10010

Via email only: kyuen@nycourts.gov, evillaro@nycourts.gov

Re: Matter of Youras Ziankovich, a suspended attorney
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324)
Motion for Reinstatement

Dear Mr. Yuen,

I am the attorney assigned to the above-referenced matter, involving Youras Ziankovich, a suspended attorney who has filed a Motion for Reinstatement following his six-month suspension for reciprocal discipline based upon a suspension by the Colorado Supreme Court. The current return date is September 28, 2020, having been adjourned from August 28, 2020.

As noted in my letter requesting the first adjournment in this matter, on August 3, 2020, the Colorado Supreme Court’s Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge issued an Opinion in Case Number 19PDJ068, stating that Respondent will be suspended there for 30 months as a result of conduct unrelated to the matter for which he received reciprocal discipline in New York. The Order and Notice of Suspension was entered on September 9, 2020; however, due to a change in staffing at the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel, we did not receive a copy of the Order and Notice of Suspension until September 22, 2020. Therefore, we are seeking the Court’s permission to adjourn the case one additional week, until October 5, 2020, in order to thoroughly respond to Respondent’s motion after reviewing this new order.

This request is over the objection of Respondent, who does not consent to the adjournment and maintains that the Colorado Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over him.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,

Denise M. Szekely

cc: Youras Ziankovich
14405 Walters Road, Suite 8500
Houston, TX 77014
y.ziankovich@polishlawyer.us

Sent by email only

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

In the Matter of Youras Ziankovich
(admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
a suspended attorney

NOTICE OF ENTRY

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department

Motion Nos. 2020-02793
Case No. 2020-03273 / 2019-00253

Youras Ziankovich
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324),
Respondent.

SIR/MADAM:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that within is a copy of an order and decision entered and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, on the 5th day of January 2021.

Dated: New York, New York
January 8, 2021

Respectfully,

Jorge Dopico
Chief Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner
Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department
180 Maiden Lane, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10038
(212) 401-0800
Email: AD1-AGC@nycourts.gov

Denise M. Szekely
Of Counsel

To:
Youras Ziankovich
14405 Walters Road, Suite 808
Houston, TX 77014
y.ziankovich@polishlawyer.us

Sent by Email Only

Respondent

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Judith J. Gische, J.P.
Troy K. Webber, J.
Angela M. Mazzarelli, J.
Cynthia S. Kern, J.
Peter H. Moulton, J.

Motion Nos. 2020-02793
Case No. 2020-03273
2019-00253

In the Matter of

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
(admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
a suspended attorney,

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department,
Petitioner,

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324),
Respondent.

Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on February 26, 2014.

Appearances:

Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney,
Attorney Grievance Committee, New York
(Denise M. Szekely, of counsel), for petitioner.

Respondent, pro se.

Motion Nos. 2020-02793 & 2020-03273
November 2, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF YOURAS ZIANKOVICH, A SUSPENDED ATTORNEY

PER CURIAM

By order entered January 16, 2020, this Court, inter alia, granted the Attorney Grievance Committee’s reciprocal discipline motion, finding that the conduct underlying respondent’s 2018 discipline in Colorado would constitute misconduct in New York, and suspended him for a period of six months, effective February 18, 2020, and until further order of the Court (180 AD3d 140 [1st Dept 2020]). On March 12, 2020, this Court denied respondent’s motion for reargument, modification, a stay, and other relief.

On or about July 25, 2020, respondent filed a motion for reinstatement to the practice of law in New York pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.16(d). As relevant, respondent states that since this Court’s order of suspension entered January 16, 2020 (effective February 18, 2020), he has not been the subject of professional discipline in any court or jurisdiction; he has not been arrested, charged, or indicted of any felonies, misdemeanors, or traffic violations; he has fully complied with the order of suspension and filed an affidavit of compliance on July 24, 2020; and from January 16 to March 30, 2020, he was employed as a tax preparer, but since then has been unemployed.

The Committee cross-moves seeking an order: (1) denying respondent’s application for reinstatement, and (2) disciplining respondent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13 and the doctrine of reciprocal discipline, predicated upon recent discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Colorado, and directing him to demonstrate why discipline should not be imposed for the underlying misconduct, or, in the alternative, suspending respondent for 30 months, or otherwise sanctioning him as this Court deems appropriate.

While respondent is not admitted to the Bar of the State of Colorado, under Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5(a), the Colorado Supreme Court has disciplinary jurisdiction over him based on his practice of immigration law within that state.

By order dated June 20, 2018 (nunc pro tunc to May 31, 2018), the Supreme Court of Colorado suspended respondent from the practice of law in Colorado for a period of one year and one day, with three months to be served. As discussed below, this was based on, inter alia, charging an excessive fee and improperly treating advance fees as nonrefundable while representing a couple in an immigration matter, and misrepresenting to a client the date he mailed his immigration application (People v. Ziankovich, 433 P3d 640 [Colo OPDJ 2018]). Respondent’s defenses, including a challenge to Colorado’s jurisdiction over him as an out-of-state attorney with a practice limited to federal court, were rejected.

While respondent’s suspension was ultimately stayed pending his appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the stay was vacated and respondent’s suspension ultimately took effect on October 31, 2018. On February 1, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension, and on October 7, 2019, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thereafter, with respect to a separate client matter, respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct and ordered suspended from practicing law in Colorado for a period of 30 months (People v. Ziankovich, 474 P3d 253 [Colo OPDJ 2020]). The order took effect on September 9, 2020.

Respondent was disciplined based upon having violated Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4(a)(5), 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.5(g), and 3.4(c).

It was determined, inter alia, that respondent caused his clients actual harm by failing to diligently pursue their immigration matter, causing unnecessary delay, and bringing a retaliatory and frivolous lawsuit against them.

In reciprocal discipline proceedings pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13, respondent may raise the defenses enumerated therein. Respondent argues that defenses under 1240.13(b)(1) and (3) apply. Contrary to respondent’s position, none of the defenses apply, and reciprocal discipline is warranted.

As a general rule, this Court gives significant weight to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction in which the charges were initially brought.

Accordingly, the Committee’s cross motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13 is granted to the extent of suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of thirty (30) months, effective the date of this order, and until further order of this Court. Respondent’s motion for reinstatement is denied.

All concur.

Entered: January 5, 2021

Susanna Molina Rojas
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

In the Matter of Youras Ziankovich
(admitted as Youry Ziankovich),
a suspended attorney:

Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department,

Petitioner,

Youras Ziankovich,
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324),

Respondent.

NOTICE OF ENTRY

Jorge Dopico
Chief Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner

Attorney Grievance Committee
180 Maiden Lane, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10038
(212) 401-0800

Denise M. Szekely
Of Counsel