Supremacy Case

01. Complaint — Ziankovich v. EOIR et al.

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH )

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; )

PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney )

General of the United States; )

SIRCE E. OWEN, in her official capacity as Acting ) Case No.: ____________

Director of EOIR; )

BRYON M. LARGE, in his official capacity as Presiding )

Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

WILLIAM R. LUCERO, in his official capacity as )

Former Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

JESSICA E. YATES, in her official capacity as )

Attorney Regulation Counsel for the Colorado )

Supreme Court; and )

COLORADO SUPREME COURT, )

Defendants. )

__________________________________________

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Plaintiff, Youras Ziankovich, an attorney licensed in the State of New York, to challenge the unlawful and unconstitutional use of state-imposed disciplinary measures by Colorado authorities and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) to restrict federally authorized legal practice. Plaintiff alleges that Colorado state actors, acting without jurisdiction, imposed disciplinary sanctions against him for conduct that occurred solely within the scope of federal authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1). These sanctions were then transmitted to federal agencies and triggered reciprocal discipline by EOIR, without independent review or due process.

The challenged actions violate the Supremacy Clause, the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Colorado lacked jurisdiction to impose discipline for federally authorized conduct, and an injunction prohibiting EOIR and other federal authorities from enforcing or relying upon such void state action.

The federal agencies and state officials named herein have, without lawful jurisdiction or process, imposed reciprocal and continuing sanctions upon Plaintiff’s federal immigration practice. These actions, based on void or extrajurisdictional state determinations, have resulted in an ongoing disqualification from practice before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), despite Plaintiff never being licensed in Colorado and the original proceeding lacking jurisdiction. (See Exhibit A, Exhibit D, and Exhibit E.)

This case also implicates significant questions of national policy. If state authorities may penalize federally authorized immigration representation and transmit such sanctions to federal agencies, immigrant communities nationwide are deprived of access to counsel guaranteed under federal law. The controversy therefore extends beyond Plaintiff’s personal circumstances and bears directly upon the integrity of federal immigration practice.

Rooker–Feldman Disclaimer. Plaintiff does not seek review, reversal, or annulment of any Colorado state-court judgment. Instead, Plaintiff challenges independent federal and extraterritorial conduct—including (i) the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s reciprocal discipline imposed without independent review and without due process, and (ii) Colorado officials’ intentional transmission and continued out-of-state use of their order to cause federal consequences. The relief sought is prospective and federal-facing: to declare and enjoin the federal reliance on a state action issued without state jurisdiction as a matter of federal law, without vacating or revisiting any state judgment. See also ¶¶ II and III.

Plaintiff expressly disclaims any request that this Court “overturn,” “vacate,” or otherwise “review” the Colorado judgment as such; the controversy here concerns federal injuries inflicted by non-judicial and administrative conduct occurring beyond the state forum.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI), the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706). Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.

Jurisdiction is also proper under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, as Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief against federal and state officials in their official capacities to halt ongoing constitutional violations.

Independent Federal Injury Statement. This action “arises under” federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Plaintiff alleges independent federal injuries caused by (a) EOIR’s reciprocal discipline adopted without independent fact-finding or jurisdictional review (APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706), and (b) Colorado officials’ intentional out-of-forum conduct directed at federal agencies in Washington, D.C., foreseeably producing federal disabilities. The injury complained of is not the state-court judgment, but the federal and extraterritorial acts that give continuing effect to it outside Colorado. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011).

No state-court review sought. Plaintiff neither invites nor requires this Court to “review and reject” any state judgment; rather, Plaintiff seeks federal declaratory and injunctive relief that governs federal reliance and out-of-state enforcement going forward.

Personal jurisdiction over the federal Defendants is proper because the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the Attorney General of the United States are headquartered in the District of Columbia, and the challenged federal actions were issued and enforced from within this District.

Personal jurisdiction over the state Defendants is proper because they intentionally directed their conduct toward federal agencies located in the District of Columbia, foreseeably causing injury in this forum. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984). The Colorado disciplinary authorities transmitted their orders to federal institutions in Washington, D.C., knowing and intending that reciprocal federal discipline would follow. These acts establish sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because multiple Defendants reside in the District of Columbia, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this District, including the issuance of reciprocal federal discipline.

III. PARTIES AND STANDING

Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich is a natural person and attorney licensed by the State of New York (Attorney Registration No. 5196324), residing in Montgomery, Texas. Between 2015 and 2018, Plaintiff engaged in federally authorized immigration practice pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1). He has never been licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado. Plaintiff has standing to bring this action because he has suffered and continues to suffer direct injury traceable to the actions of Defendants, including loss of federal recognition, reputational harm, and ongoing disqualification from federal immigration practice.

Plaintiff’s work as a federally authorized immigration advocate directly served immigrant communities in the United States. His exclusion from federal practice, compounded by Colorado’s void disciplinary action, creates barriers not only for him but also for vulnerable populations seeking lawful representation. See Exhibit F, ¶8 (describing continuing harm to Plaintiff’s ability to serve immigrant communities).

Plaintiff’s Declaration (Exhibit F, ¶¶6–8, 11) confirms under penalty of perjury that he remains indefinitely excluded from federal immigration practice, has no available path to reinstatement in Colorado due to nonlicensure, and continues to suffer reputational, financial, and professional harm. These sworn facts establish standing by demonstrating ongoing injury and the absence of any adequate remedy at law.

Defendant Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Justice headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia. EOIR is responsible for the recognition and discipline of immigration practitioners and maintains a federal registry of authorized representatives. EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline against Plaintiff based on the Colorado action.

Defendant Pam Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States, sued in her official capacity. The Attorney General oversees EOIR and is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of federal immigration law and related disciplinary policies.

Defendant Sirce E. Owen is the Acting Director of EOIR, sued in her official capacity. She is responsible for administering EOIR’s disciplinary programs and policies.

Defendant Bryon M. Large is the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado, sued in his official capacity. He presides over attorney disciplinary matters in the State of Colorado. Between 2015 and 2018, Defendant was employed in the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel for the Colorado Supreme Court and personally organized and participated in unlawful acts targeting Plaintiff.

Defendant William R. Lucero is the former Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado, sued in his official capacity. From 1999 until his retirement in 2021, he presided over attorney disciplinary matters for the Colorado Supreme Court. In 2018, while serving as PDJ, Defendant Lucero issued disciplinary orders against Plaintiff despite Plaintiff never being licensed in Colorado. On November 1, 2018, Lucero personally transmitted the suspension order to multiple federal agencies, including the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security, with the specific intent and foreseeable effect of triggering federal reciprocal discipline.

The effect of Defendant Lucero’s actions has not ended with his retirement. Because Colorado’s reinstatement process vests exclusive authority in the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, and because Plaintiff was never licensed in Colorado, Lucero’s orders created a continuing barrier to any federal reinstatement. His November 1, 2018 transmission of the suspension order was not a routine ministerial act but a deliberate, extrajurisdictional step designed to influence federal agencies in Washington, D.C., and to ensure that Colorado’s order would have nationwide effect. Unlike other Colorado officials, Defendant Lucero personally initiated and executed the transmission of disciplinary orders to federal bodies, thereby establishing the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction under Calder v. Jones and directly causing Plaintiff’s continuing federal disability.

Defendant Jessica E. Yates is the Attorney Regulation Counsel for the Colorado Supreme Court, sued in her official capacity. She directs disciplinary investigations and prosecutions before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge.

Defendant Colorado Supreme Court is the highest court of the State of Colorado, which formally adopted and transmitted disciplinary orders affecting Plaintiff’s professional standing.

Plaintiff seeks relief solely against these Defendants in their official capacities. All Defendants are either (a) federal actors responsible for enforcing unconstitutional or ultra vires disciplinary actions, or (b) state actors who acted beyond their jurisdiction and intentionally caused federally cognizable harm.

No State-Court Review Sought. Plaintiff’s injuries persist independently of any state-court judgment: EOIR’s ongoing federal disqualification and the absence of any state mechanism for a non-licensee to “reinstate” create a continuing federal disability. The requested relief addresses that federal disability and future extraterritorial transmissions, not the substance of the Colorado judgment. See Compl. ¶¶ 12–14 (continuing disability)

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  1. Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich is an attorney licensed in New York since 2014. From approximately 2015 through September 2018, Plaintiff engaged in federally authorized immigration practice pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1), including representation before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Plaintiff never sought or held a license to practice law in Colorado.
  2. In 2018, while Plaintiff resided in Colorado, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) initiated disciplinary proceedings under Case No. 18PDJ059. See Exhibit A (Colorado suspension order, Oct. 31, 2018). That proceeding resulted in a nine-month suspension, including three months active and six months stayed. The discipline was based on Plaintiff’s representation in federal immigration matters, which was authorized by federal law and not subject to state regulation. Plaintiff never acted as, nor represented himself as an attorney authorized to practice law in Colorado and/or licensed in any form in Colorado. The disciplinary proceedings initiated by Colorado authorities concerned only Plaintiff’s federal immigration representation, which was conducted exclusively pursuant to federal authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1), without invoking or relying upon any state licensure or state-based legal authority. At no point did Plaintiff hold himself out as a Colorado attorney or engage in state-regulated practice.
  3. Plaintiff, admitted solely in New York, was subject to New York Rules of Professional Conduct for all non-court federal practice. As confirmed by NYSBA Ethics Op. 1027, only New York rules govern such conduct in the absence of predominant effect in another licensing jurisdiction.
  4. The disciplinary order from 18PDJ059 was transmitted to federal agencies, including EOIR. See Exhibit D, Respondent’s Opposition to DHS Motion, ¶¶3–6, 10–16 (describing improper initiation and lack of jurisdiction).
  5. In or around February 2019, EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline based solely on the Colorado order, without conducting an independent review or affording Plaintiff an opportunity to contest the action. See Exhibit C (EOIR Summary Adjudication and Final Order). This resulted in Plaintiff’s removal from the federal roster of recognized representatives.
  6. In October 2018, Plaintiff relocated to Texas and ceased all professional activities in Colorado, including representation of clients before the federal authorities within physical boundaries of the State of Colorado. Nevertheless, on October 31, 2018, Defendant Bryon M. Large, at that time attorney employed in the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), and its Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ), then William R. Lucero, initiated disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiff based on his immigration work, despite the fact that the representation was federally authorized and not subject to Colorado regulation.
  7. Plaintiff attempted to remove the state disciplinary proceeding to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. While removal was pending, the OARC and PDJ continued the proceedings in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The federal court ultimately remanded the case, finding that attorney discipline proceedings were not removable.
  8. In 2020, the PDJ entered the second order (No. 19PDJ068) suspending Plaintiff based on the assertion that performing federally authorized immigration practice while physically located in Colorado constituted unauthorized practice of law under state rules. This order was transmitted to federal agencies, causing further reciprocal discipline. (See Exhibit A, Exhibit E, and Exhibit F ¶¶4, 7.)
  9. This theory directly contravenes Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), which held that states may not discipline conduct explicitly permitted by federal law. The Colorado disciplinary authorities, including the OARC and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, acted with the specific intent to trigger federal consequences by transmitting their orders to EOIR and other federal agencies. These actions were not incidental but purposefully directed at federal institutions headquartered in Washington, D.C., with the foreseeable and intended effect of excluding Plaintiff from federal practice. Such deliberate targeting establishes minimum contacts with this forum under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
  10. On or about February 26, 2019, EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline based solely on the Colorado orders, without independent fact-finding, due process, or jurisdictional review. EOIR did not provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for reciprocal discipline, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
  11. The State of New York subsequently imposed reciprocal discipline, again relying exclusively on the Colorado orders without independent investigation or jurisdictional review.
  12. Under current EOIR policy, attorneys subject to an active suspension in any jurisdiction are categorically ineligible for reinstatement to federal practice, regardless of where they are licensed. Because Colorado imposed a suspension of more than one year, its internal rules require a formal petition for reinstatement. However, Plaintiff was never licensed in Colorado, and thus has no license to “reinstate.” The Colorado system offers no mechanism for reinstatement of nonlicensees, except by discretionary ruling of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge — who, in this case, is the same individual responsible for the original sanctions and their transmission to federal authorities. As a result, the Colorado suspension is, in practical effect, permanent and non-reviewable. Consequently, EOIR will not consider Plaintiff for reinstatement, and the bar to federal practice continues indefinitely. See Exhibit F, ¶7 (explaining impossibility of reinstatement for a nonlicensee, rendering the Colorado suspension effectively permanent).
  13. As a result of this chain of actions, Plaintiff remains excluded from federal immigration practice, suffers continuing reputational harm, and faces ongoing disqualification that prevents him from seeking reinstatement. No tribunal has ever reviewed the legitimacy of the Colorado sanctions under federal standards. This disqualification constitutes a continuing disability, blocking Plaintiff from federal reinstatement and chilling future lawful practice. See Exhibit F, ¶¶6–8, 11 (continuing exclusion, reputational harm, and daily professional disability).
  14. Plaintiff does not seek to overturn the Colorado disciplinary orders as such, but rather challenges their continuing federal consequences, which arise from state action taken without jurisdiction and improperly relied upon by federal agencies. Exhibit F, ¶11 further confirms that no tribunal has ever reviewed Colorado’s jurisdiction and that Plaintiff’s federal disability continues unabated.
  15. Plaintiff’s professional vulnerability has been recognized at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. On February 21, 2025, the U.S. Department of State officially designated Plaintiff as a “wrongfully detained U.S. national” under the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act, based on his imprisonment abroad by an authoritarian regime. See Exhibit F, ¶9 and attached letter from the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs. This designation confirms that Plaintiff’s legal advocacy had national significance and that his ongoing professional disability carries consequences for public policy and U.S. interests in protecting independent advocates.

V. LEGAL CLAIMS

COUNT I – Violation of the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI)

Defendants Bryon M. Large, Jessica E. Yates, and the Colorado Supreme Court, acting under color of state law, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon Plaintiff for conduct that was explicitly authorized and regulated by federal law, namely immigration representation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1).
These sanctions constitute an impermissible intrusion into a field preempted by federal law and violate the Supremacy Clause.

By transmitting these sanctions to federal agencies and other states, the state Defendants caused continuing harm in a domain they lack constitutional authority to regulate. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). See also Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (states may not impose regulations with extraterritorial consequences).

New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 1027 confirms that a New York-admitted attorney practicing in non-court federal matters is subject exclusively to New York ethics rules, even when conduct occurs outside New York, unless the predominant effect is in another licensed jurisdiction. In Plaintiff’s case, all federal practice was subject to New York rules. Colorado’s assertion of jurisdiction thus violated the principle of professional rule consistency and unlawfully overrode federal and New York ethical standards. See NYSBA Ethics Op. 1027 (2014).

This Count seeks prospective relief only to restrain Colorado officials’ extraterritorial use of a state disciplinary order to influence federal agencies outside Colorado, in conflict with federal supremacy over immigration practice (cf. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Baylson). Plaintiff does not seek to reverse any state judgment; he seeks to prevent future out-of-state effects and federal reliance that violate the Supremacy Clause. See Exhibit A, and Exhibit F, ¶7 (discussing inability to seek reinstatement in Colorado).

COUNT II – Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706)

Defendants EOIR, Pam Bondi, and Sirce E. Owen imposed reciprocal disciplinary sanctions upon Plaintiff based solely on the Colorado orders, without conducting any independent review or jurisdictional analysis, and without providing notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

These actions constitute arbitrary and capricious agency conduct, an abuse of discretion, and a denial of due process, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), and (D). See Exhibit C (EOIR order adopting Colorado’s sanctions without independent findings).

Plaintiff challenges EOIR’s own federal action—its adoption and maintenance of reciprocal discipline without independent, APA-compliant review—not the validity of any state judgment. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the Court may set aside EOIR’s federal determination as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law insofar as EOIR failed to examine state jurisdiction and due process before relying on a state predicate.

COUNT III – Violation of the First and Fifth Amendments

The disciplinary actions and their ongoing consequences infringe upon Plaintiff’s rights to free speech, petition, and professional expression protected by the First Amendment.

Further, the imposition of sanctions without a meaningful hearing or opportunity to contest jurisdiction or federal authorization constitutes a violation of procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.
These actions have created a chilling effect on Plaintiff’s participation in federally protected professional activity. See Exhibit F, ¶¶6–10 (describing reputational harm, chilling effect on advocacy, and weakened institutional credibility).

COUNT IV – Declaratory Relief (28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202)

An actual and ongoing controversy exists as to the authority of state and federal Defendants to impose and enforce disciplinary measures against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that:

  1. Colorado lacked jurisdiction to discipline Plaintiff for federally authorized conduct;
  2. The disciplinary orders issued in 18PDJ059 and 19PDJ068 are void as applied to federal practice;
  3. EOIR may not impose or maintain reciprocal sanctions based on such state actions.

Plaintiff seeks declarations regulating federal consequences only and injunctions directed to federal reliance and future extraterritorial use; no relief in this Count requires this Court to set aside or review any Colorado judgment. See Exhibits A–F.

COUNT V – Unconstitutional Extraterritorial Regulation

Defendants Bryon M. Large, Jessica E. Yates, and the Colorado Supreme Court, acting under color of state law, imposed disciplinary measures on Plaintiff for conduct that (a) occurred under exclusive federal authority and (b) had no nexus with the state’s legitimate regulatory interests.

By disciplining Plaintiff for federally authorized immigration practice based solely on physical presence or client location, Defendants engaged in unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation. See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989).

Their actions had intended and actual effects outside Colorado, including reciprocal discipline in the District of Columbia and New York, thus violating constitutional limits on state sovereignty.

According to NYSBA Ethics Opinion 1027, lawyers admitted in New York are governed by New York ethics rules in all non-court matters unless the predominant effect of their conduct occurs in another jurisdiction where they are also admitted. Colorado’s actions contravene this principle by applying its own rules to conduct lacking any substantial nexus with Colorado. Such conduct amounts to unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and grant the following relief:

  1. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, stating that:

a. The State of Colorado, including its Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel, Presiding Disciplinary Judge, and Supreme Court, lacked jurisdiction to discipline Plaintiff for conduct authorized under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1);

b. As a matter of federal law, the Colorado disciplinary order(s) may not be relied upon by federal agencies (including EOIR) to impose or maintain reciprocal federal disabilities absent independent federal review for jurisdiction and due process;

c. The actions of Defendant EOIR and NY Grievance Committees were unlawfully premised on a void state order;

d. Clarify that nothing herein vacates or reverses any Colorado judgment; the relief is prospective and governs federal reliance and extraterritorial use only.

  1. A permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants EOIR, Pam Bondi (in her official capacity as Attorney General), and Sirce E. Owen (in her official capacity as Acting Director of EOIR) from:

a. Enforcing or maintaining any disciplinary sanctions against Plaintiff based on the Colorado orders, unless and until EOIR conducts independent, APA-compliant review of the state predicate, including whether the state had jurisdiction and whether due process was afforded;

b. Relying on those state orders as a basis for denial of reinstatement or continued exclusion from the federal roster of recognized representatives.

  1. Enjoin Colorado officials in their official capacities from initiating new transmissions, urging, or coordinating any out-of-state or federal reliance on the Colorado order for federal purposes, except upon a request from a federal body accompanied by notice to Plaintiff and an opportunity to be heard;
  2. An order directing the removal of Plaintiff’s name from any federal list or record of suspended or disciplined immigration representatives, to the extent that such listing is based on the Colorado disciplinary orders.
  3. Recognize that this case presents matters of substantial public interest, including the protection of immigrant communities’ access to federally authorized counsel and the safeguarding of U.S. citizens against extrajurisdictional state interference in federal practice.
  4. An award of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees (if applicable), and any further relief this Court deems just and proper.
  5. Any further relief this Court deems just and proper, including recognition of Plaintiff’s continuing disability and chilling effect as a basis for standing.

Dated at Montgomery, Texas this 4th day of September 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

Youras Ziankovich, Esq.

Plaintiff Pro Se

16913 W Juneau

Montgomery, TX 77316

Phone: (346) 223-0284

Fax: (844) 858-7720

business@ziankovich.com