Supremacy Case

Exhibit F

EXHIBIT F

Motion for Reinstatement to Practice Before EOIR and DHS

(Filed July 9, 2025, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107)

Description: Plaintiff’s motion seeking reinstatement to practice before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including supporting exhibits, memorandum of law, and proof of service.
Source: Copy submitted to EOIR Office of General Counsel and USCIS Disciplinary Counsel.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600
Falls Church, VA 22041

In the Matter of:
YOURY ZIANKOVICH, Respondent
Disciplinary Case No.: D2018-0327

**MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT TO PRACTICE

BEFORE EOIR AND DHS
Submitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107, I respectfully move for reinstatement to practice before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following the expiration of the three-month suspension imposed by the Board of Immigration Appeals on November 21, 2019.

That suspension fully expired years ago and was not accompanied by probation, conditions, or independent findings of misconduct by EOIR or DHS.

Since that time, I have not been subject to any further federal disciplinary action. A reciprocal suspension was later imposed in New York solely on the same Colorado proceedings already relied upon by EOIR, without any independent findings of misconduct or client harm. I have filed a formal motion for reinstatement in the New York Appellate Division, First Department, which is currently pending.

I respectfully request reinstatement in light of these facts and in recognition of extraordinary personal and professional circumstances, including political persecution and prolonged wrongful detention abroad, formally recognized by the U.S. Department of State.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 2019, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order suspending me from practice before EOIR and DHS for three (3) months, based solely on reciprocal discipline arising from a 2018 Colorado suspension order.

EOIR conducted no independent fact-finding and made no findings of misconduct. The Colorado order originated from a jurisdiction in which I have never been admitted or licensed.

The Colorado suspension expired on January 31, 2019. I did not seek reinstatement in Colorado because I have never held nor sought licensure there. Accordingly, EOIR’s suspension rested exclusively on an extraterritorial action by a non-licensing state, raising substantial Supremacy Clause and Due Process concerns.

I timely opposed the reciprocal discipline, filed motions for reconsideration, and participated fully in EOIR proceedings. EOIR issued its final order on November 21, 2019, and no further EOIR proceedings have occurred since.

II-A. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REGARDING COLORADO PROCEEDINGS

In September 2020, the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ) issued a second suspension order against me for thirty (30) months. At that time, I was not licensed in Colorado, had no business or residential ties to that state, and the proceeding was conducted largely in absentia, resulting in a default judgment.

Prior to that order, I filed a Post-Trial Motion for Relief from Judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) (Exhibit C), asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. I emphasized that I had never been licensed in Colorado, was not practicing or residing there, and was already suspended.

The PDJ denied that motion by order dated December 21, 2020 (Exhibit D), on procedural grounds, without resolving the constitutional jurisdictional defects.

I respectfully submit that the 2020 default suspension cannot serve as an independent basis for continued federal disqualification. It was imposed after the EOIR suspension had already taken effect and during a period of escalating repression that culminated in my wrongful detention abroad.

II-B. FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS AND LACK OF AVAILABLE RELIEF

Between 2020 and 2021, I pursued a federal civil rights action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking declaratory relief against Colorado disciplinary authorities. That action was dismissed by the Tenth Circuit on August 10, 2021, on jurisdictional grounds under Rooker-Feldman and judicial immunity (Exhibit E).

I then filed an administrative petition under D.C.COLO.LAttyR 3(d) seeking relief from the “rule of good standing.” On January 4, 2022, the Disciplinary Panel denied that request for failure to submit additional materials. However, at that time I was being held incommunicado as a wrongfully detained U.S. citizen in the Republic of Belarus and was physically incapable of responding.

I was abducted on April 11, 2021, and remained imprisoned until April 30, 2025.

These proceedings demonstrate that no meaningful federal relief was accessible to me between April 2021 and April 2025. EOIR reinstatement therefore remains the appropriate and necessary remedy.

III. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES

In 2021, I was abducted while traveling abroad and detained under conditions violating international law. From April 11, 2021, to April 30, 2025, I was held in KGB pretrial detention and prison facilities in Belarus, where I was subjected to torture and mistreatment.

My detention was formally recognized by the U.S. Department of State as the wrongful detention of a U.S. citizen (Exhibit A). During this entire period, I was unable to work, communicate freely, or pursue reinstatement.

Upon my return to the United States, I immediately resumed efforts to restore my professional status, including filing a reinstatement motion with the New York Appellate Division on July 9, 2025 (Exhibit B).

IV. PUBLIC INTEREST AND MITIGATING FACTORS

Reinstatement serves the public interest. I am an experienced immigration attorney who has represented asylum seekers, detainees, and immigrant families. I have never been accused of fraud or client harm, and EOIR’s suspension was based solely on a now-expired sanction from a non-licensing state.

My prolonged wrongful detention eliminated any risk of recurrence and constitutes compelling evidence of rehabilitation. Reinstatement is critical to rebuilding my professional life and serving immigrant communities in need of competent representation.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request that the EOIR Office of General Counsel grant this Motion and reinstate me to practice before EOIR and DHS effective immediately.

Respectfully submitted,

Youras Ziankovich, Esq.
Respondent
16913 W. Juneau
Montgomery, TX 77316
Phone: (346) 223-0284
Email: service@polishlawyer.us

Dated: July 9, 2025

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that on July 9, 2025, I served a copy of this Motion for Reinstatement to Practice Before EOIR and DHS, with all attachments, on:

Catherine M. O’Connell
USCIS Disciplinary Counsel
11411 East Jefferson Avenue
Detroit, MI 48214
by

FIRST CLASS MAIL .

(signature)                  July 9, 2025
                             (date)

EXHIBIT A

U.S. Department of State Letter (Feb. 21, 2025)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

February 21, 2025

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter serves to summarize facts known by or reported to the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., concerning the Belarusian government’s wrongful detention of U.S. citizen Youras Ziankovich.

Pursuant to the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act, Section 302(c) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 116-260, the U.S. Department of State has determined that the government of Belarus has wrongfully detained U.S. citizen Youras Ziankovich. He was arrested on April 11, 2021, in Russia before being transferred to Belarus. He is currently held in Mogilev Prison, Belarus. Since his arrest, Mr. Ziankovich has been unable to travel, freely communicate, or complete documentation necessary to manage his personal affairs. The U.S. Department of State has been engaged on Mr. Ziankovich’s case throughout and remains committed to assuring his welfare and securing his release.

If you have any questions, please contact Robert Crotty in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs at 202-485-2130, or by email at CrottyRJ@state.gov.

Sincerely,

Dustin Stewart
Acting Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT B

Motion for Reinstatement to New York (Filed July 9, 2025)

(22 NYCRR § 1240.16)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

————————————————————————-X
In the Matter of

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
an attorney and counselor-at-law:

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,

-against-

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324),
Respondent.
————————————————————————-X

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the annexed Affirmation of Youras Ziankovich, dated July 9, 2025, the undersigned will move this Court at a term thereof to be held at the Appellate Division Courthouse, First Judicial Department, located at 27 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10010, on Monday, August 4, 2025, at 10:00 A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1240.16 reinstating Respondent to the practice of law in the State of New York, and for such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Dated: Montgomery, Texas
July 9, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

______
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH, Esq.
Respondent Pro Se
16913 W. Juneau
Montgomery, TX 77316
(212) 920-5440

TO:
Attorney Grievance Committee
Jorge Dopico, Esq.
Denice M. Szekely, Esq.
180 Maiden Lane, 17th Floor
New York, New York 10038
(212) 401-0800

AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

————————————————————————-X
In the Matter of

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
an attorney and counselor-at-law:

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,

-against-

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
(OCA Atty. Reg. No. 5196324),
Respondent.
————————————————————————-X

I, Youras Ziankovich, affirm under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York (which may include a fine or imprisonment) that the following is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law:

  1. I was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York on February 26, 2014, under Attorney Registration Number 5196324. I maintained good standing until my suspension on February 18, 2020.

  2. The Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, suspended me pursuant to reciprocal discipline following disciplinary action in Colorado. See Matter of Ziankovich, 180 A.D.3d 140 (1st Dep’t 2020). This was extended by subsequent order dated January 5, 2021. See Matter of Ziankovich, 192 A.D.3d 180 (1st Dep’t 2021).

  3. Since the effective date of the suspension, I have not engaged in the practice of law in any form in the State of New York or elsewhere. I have fully complied with the terms of the suspension and the requirements of 22 NYCRR § 1240.15.

  4. From April 12, 2021, through April 30, 2025, I was wrongfully detained in the Republic of Belarus for political reasons. I was kidnapped from Moscow on April 11, 2021, by agents of the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB), tortured, and later convicted on multiple charges related solely to my peaceful political activity and U.S. citizenship.

  5. I was convicted in Belarus during this period under the following articles of the Belarusian Criminal Code:

  • Article 357(1) — Conspiracy to seize power
  • Article 361(3) — Calls for seizure of power
  • Article 361-1(1) — Creation of an extremist formation
  • Article 130(3) — Incitement of hatred
  • Article 369 — Insulting a government official
  • Article 411(2) — Malicious disobedience to prison authorities

  1. These charges and my detention were politically motivated and have been formally recognized as such by the U.S. Department of State. I was designated a “wrongfully detained” U.S. national under the Levinson Act (22 U.S.C. § 1741 et seq.) by determination dated February 21, 2025. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit “A.”

  2. During the entire period of suspension and wrongful detention, I did not appear before any court or tribunal, did not represent any party as a lawyer, and did not receive compensation for legal services. I did not participate in any legal employment or affiliation with any attorney or law firm.

  3. I filed an Affidavit of Compliance dated July 8, 2025, which includes: address history since 2020; confirmation of non-participation in legal activity; absence of unsatisfied judgments; tax compliance; no pending disciplinary complaints; no defaulted debts exceeding $500; no other bar sanctions or disbarment; and no impairment affecting my ability to practice law.

  4. On May 9, 2025, I paid all overdue attorney registration fees in accordance with Judiciary Law § 468-a. A copy of the payment receipt from the Office of Court Administration is annexed as Exhibit “B.”

  5. I have not completed CLE credits during the suspension due to my unlawful detention abroad. I have requested a waiver based on extraordinary circumstances and my total inability to access legal education materials while held in solitary confinement and prison facilities.

  6. I have reviewed 22 NYCRR Part 1200 (Rules of Professional Conduct) and commit to full compliance with the ethical and professional standards of the legal profession.

  7. I submit this motion in good faith, having complied with reinstatement requirements under 22 NYCRR § 1240.16 and having demonstrated character and fitness to return to practice.

  8. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Court grant this motion and reinstate me to the practice of law in the State of New York.

  9. All correspondence concerning this matter may be addressed to:
    Youras Ziankovich
    16913 W. Juneau
    Montgomery, TX 77316
    Phone: (212) 920-5440
    Email: business@ziankovich.com

Dated: July 9, 2025
Montgomery, Texas

______
Youras Ziankovich

EXHIBIT B

New York State Attorney Registration Receipt (OCA) — Payment/Registration (May 9, 2025)

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION UNIT

NEW YORK STATE RECEIPT — Page 1 of 2

Attorney Registration No.: 5196324
Receipt No.: 516246
Online Process Date: 05/09/2025
Name: YOURY ZIANKOVICH

Biennial Period(s): 2020–2021; 2022–2023; 2024–2025

This will acknowledge receipt of your 2020–2021, 2022–2023, 2024–2025 registration as an attorney and receipt of the $1125 fee.

Payment Method: Credit Card (ending *4764)
Registration Fee Transaction No.: *090525O3B-9A5902CA-1D94-44D0-847F-0EA8B8577461
Authorization Code: 06775G

Non-Refundable Service Fee: $33.64
Service Fee Transaction No.: 090525O3B-8E48867D-8F04-47ED-AFE3-E7EF81B748B0
Service Fee Authorization Code: 06781G

DOB: XX/XX/1977
SSN: XXX-XX-XXXX

Next Registration: Oct 2026
Registration Status: Suspended

Admission Data:

  • Year Admitted: 2014
  • Judicial Department of Admission: 2

PERSONAL INFORMATION
(The Rules of the Chief Administrator require that this office be notified of any changes in the below information within 30 days.)

Law School: FORDHAM LAW; UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF BANKING

Business Address:
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
1 WORLD TRADE CTR STE 8500
NEW YORK, NY 10007-0089
Business County: New York
Business Phone: (212) 920-5440
E-mail (optional): BUSINESS@ZIANKOVICH.COM
Note: If provided, the e-mail address will be made public.

Home Address (public only if no business address is provided):
16913 W JUNEAU
MONTGOMERY, TX 77316-6738

OCA Address / Contact (as printed on receipt):
P.O. Box 2806, Church Street Station, New York, NY 10008
Phone: (212) 428-2800 | Email: NYATTY@NYCOURTS.GOV | Website: www.nycourts.gov

NEW YORK STATE RECEIPT — Page 2 of 2

OTHER REPORTS & CERTIFICATIONS
(Please review the below information for accuracy.)

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (22 NYCRR § 1500):

  • 2020–2021 — Requested Waiver Date: 05/09/2025
  • 2022–2023 — Requested Waiver Date: 05/09/2025
  • 2024–2025 — Requested Waiver Date: 05/09/2025

Compliance With Child Support Obligations (Gen. Oblig. L. § 3-503):

  • No obligation

Report of Pro Bono Services (Rule 6.1):

  • Pro Bono Signature: Yes

Affirmation of Compliance With Part 1200 (Rule 1.15):

  • Affirmation Signature: Yes

Admission to Practice Law in Other Jurisdictions and Discipline Report:

  • Only Admitted in NY: Yes
  • Ever the Subject of Discipline in Any Jurisdiction: Yes

Discipline Entries (as printed):

  • Date Imposed: 06/30/2018 | Advised Appellate Division: 07/15/2018 | Dept: 1st
  • Date Imposed: 09/09/2020 | Advised Appellate Division: 09/15/2020 | Dept: 1st

Signature: ____
Date: ________

EXHIBIT C

NYS CLE Board Email — Confirmation and Grant of Waiver/Modification (May 9, 2025)

From: cleoffice@nycourts.gov
To: business@ziankovich.com
Date/Time: May 9, 2025, 15:17:31
Subject: Automatic reply: Waiver or Modification request

Thank you for submitting your application(s) for an Extension of Time, Modification, or Waiver of your New York State CLE requirement. This email confirms receipt of your application(s).

The application(s) you submitted for an Extension of Time, Modification, or Waiver is (are) granted.

Extension of Time — CLE Credits To Be Completed
If you applied for an Extension of Time and still have CLE credits to complete, your application is granted and you have 90 days from the date of this email to complete your CLE requirement.

If you have not already submitted your Attorney Registration Form, please indicate in the Continuing Legal Education section of your Attorney Registration Form that your extension of time was granted and, after you complete your CLE credits, you must complete and electronically submit an Attorney Registration CLE Update Form available at:
https://ww2.nycourts.gov/attorneys/cle/float.shtml

Extension of Time — CLE Credits Already Completed
If you applied for an Extension of Time and have already completed your CLE credits but need them applied retroactively, your application is granted.

If you have not already submitted your Attorney Registration Form, please indicate in the Continuing Legal Education section that your extension was granted and you must also complete and electronically submit an Attorney Registration CLE Update Form at the link above.

Modification of CLE Requirement
If you applied for a Modification, your application is granted. Please indicate the modification in the CLE section of your Attorney Registration Form and submit the Attorney Registration CLE Update Form at the link above.

Waiver of CLE Requirement
If you applied for a Waiver, your application is granted. Please indicate in the CLE section of your Attorney Registration Form that your waiver was granted. If you already indicated that you applied for a waiver, you must complete and submit the Attorney Registration CLE Update Form at the link above.

Attorney Registration CLE Update Form
When completing the form, complete only the certification that applies to your situation and sign (electronic signatures permitted) and date the form. Do not complete more than one certification.

Submit the completed form at:
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/courtforms/cle/

Please retain a copy of this email with your CLE records for at least 4 years.

Thank you,
The New York State CLE Board Staff
Questions: cle@nycourts.gov

AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE

(Appellate Division, First Judicial Department)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE

STATE OF TEXAS )
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY ) ss.:

I, Youras Ziankovich, being duly sworn, depose and say:

  1. I was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York on February 26, 2014, under Attorney Registration Number 5196324.

  2. On February 18, 2020, I was suspended from the practice of law by order of the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, pursuant to reciprocal disciplinary proceedings based on an order issued in the State of Colorado. (Matter of Ziankovich, 2020 NY Slip Op 00369). That suspension was reaffirmed and continued by a further order of the same Court on January 7, 2021, which denied my motion to vacate the prior suspension. (Matter of Ziankovich, 2021 NY Slip Op 00024).

  3. Since the entry of the order of discipline, I have complied with the terms of the order in all respects and have not:
    a. engaged in the practice of law in any form in the State of New York, either as principal or as agent, clerk, or employee of another;
    b. accepted any new retainer or otherwise agreed to represent any legal client in New York;
    c. solicited or procured, directly or indirectly, legal business for any attorney in New York.

  4. I have not practiced law in any jurisdiction during the period of suspension.

  5. I was wrongfully detained in Belarus from April 12, 2021, to April 30, 2025, which rendered me unable to fulfill professional or compliance obligations during that time.

  6. On May 9, 2025, I paid my past-due attorney registration fees pursuant to Judiciary Law § 468-a, and I am current with registration requirements.

  7. I have no disciplinary complaints pending against me in any jurisdiction other than the matter that resulted in the above-mentioned suspension.

  8. I have fully complied with the order of suspension and with all applicable provisions of the rules of the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department.

  9. I attest that the discipline imposed upon me was not predicated upon misconduct involving misappropriation of funds or property, nor was it predicated upon misconduct resulting in a felony conviction under New York or federal law. I further attest that no client funds or property were at issue in the disciplinary matter giving rise to my suspension.

  10. I attest that, to the best of my knowledge, there are no motions, applications, or other proceedings pending before any court or disciplinary authority in connection with my suspension that remain unresolved.

  11. I have been admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and before the Board of Immigration Appeals. I confirm that no separate administrative proceeding is pending in those forums that is unrelated to the reciprocal suspension reflected above. [If you want this sentence to be more exact, tell me which forums you want named.]

  12. I am not disbarred in any other jurisdiction, nor am I currently suspended outside of New York, other than reciprocal consequences that may have flowed from the New York suspension. I have not resigned from the bar in any jurisdiction while under investigation.

  13. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1240.15(f), I submit this affidavit of compliance in lieu of any other form, as permitted by the Court’s rules.

  14. In further compliance with the Court’s rules, I provide the following addresses at which I have resided since the date of suspension:

  • XXXX XXXXX Drive, Houston, TX 77XXX — from February 2020 to March 2021
  • Detention Facilities, Belarus — from April 2021 to April 2025 (wrongful detention)
  • 16913 W Juneau, Montgomery, TX 77316 — from May 2025 to present

  1. I attest that neither I, nor any firm, corporation, or business entity in which I have or had an ownership interest, has filed a petition in bankruptcy in any court.

  2. I attest that I have filed all required federal, state, and local tax returns, and that all taxes due through the date of this affidavit have been paid or are the subject of an approved payment plan.

  3. I attest that I have no unsatisfied judgments presently existing against me or any entity of which I am or was a principal.

  4. I attest that I have no debts with a balance over $500 that are presently overdue by at least 60 days.

  5. I attest that, since the entry of the Order of Discipline, I have not defaulted in the performance or discharge of any obligation or duty imposed upon me by any court or governmental/administrative agency.

  6. I attest that, since the entry of the Order of Discipline, I have not applied for any license that required proof of good character.

  7. I hereby list convictions entered against me during the period following my suspension:
    During my wrongful detention by the Belarusian regime between April 11, 2021 and April 30, 2025, I was convicted in proceedings in the Republic of Belarus under the following provisions of the Belarusian Criminal Code:

  • Article 357(1) — Conspiracy to seize power
  • Article 361(3) — Calls for seizure of power
  • Article 361-1(1) — Creation of an extremist formation
  • Article 130(3) — Incitement of hatred
  • Article 369 — Insulting a government official
  • Article 411(2) — Malicious disobedience to prison authorities

These convictions were politically motivated and arose solely from my peaceful political activities and opposition to the Belarusian regime. On this basis, the United States Department of State has officially found me to be a wrongfully detained person under U.S. law. (See 22 U.S.C. § 1741 et seq. and the Department of State determination letter.)

  1. I affirm that I have not been the subject of any governmental investigations since my admission to the bar, with the sole exception of politically motivated persecution carried out by Belarusian authorities during my wrongful detention abroad.

  2. I attest that, since the entry of the Order of Discipline, I have not suffered from or been treated for any condition or impairment that impairs or limits my ability to practice law.

  3. I attest that, within 30 days preceding the execution of this affidavit, I have read the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200.0), and if reinstated, I will conform my conduct to those rules.

  4. I affirm that I did not complete CLE courses during the period of my suspension; however, I obtained a waiver/modification based on extraordinary circumstances, including my wrongful detention abroad.

  5. I have reviewed the records maintained by the Office of Court Administration and affirm that, to the best of my knowledge, there are no inaccuracies regarding my attorney registration history or public disciplinary history.

  6. I further affirm that there is no impediment to my reinstatement under the Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department, and I know of no reason why my return to practice would be inconsistent with the public interest or integrity of the bar.

  7. I confirm that I have not been employed in any capacity, legal or non-legal, since the date of my suspension, and I have not received compensation from, nor provided services to, any law firm, attorney, or legal services entity in any jurisdiction.

  8. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Court grant my motion for reinstatement to the practice of law.

Youras Ziankovich

Sworn to before me this ___ day of ____, 2025.

Notary Public, State of Texas
(Notary name / ID / commission expiration as applicable)

AFFIRMATION OF SERVICE (July 9, 2025)

I, Youras Ziankovich, affirm this 9th day of July, 2025, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of the State of New York (which may include a fine or imprisonment), that the following is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law:

I served the attached Notice of Motion for Reinstatement, Affirmation in Support, Affidavit of Compliance, and Exhibits A through C upon all parties in the above-captioned matter by email to the following recipient:

  1. Attorney Grievance Committee — AD1-AGC@nycourts.gov

Dated: Montgomery, Texas
July 9, 2025

Youras Ziankovich

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

1300 Broadway, Suite 250, Denver, CO 80203

Complainant: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
v.
Respondent: YOURAS ZIANKOVICH

Case No. 19PDJ068
(OARC File No. 10290)

AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3)

“Relieve the judges from the rigour of text law, and permit them, with pretorian discretion, to wander into its equity, and the whole legal system becomes uncertain.”
— Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 1785)

I, Youras Ziankovich, Respondent Pro Se in this action, affirm under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. I am Respondent Pro Se in this action. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below, and the exhibits annexed hereto are true and correct copies of the original documents.

  2. This affirmation is submitted in support of Respondent’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), seeking the following relief:
    a. an order finding the Opinion and Decision in this action void;
    b. an order finding the Order and Notice of Suspension in this action void;
    c. an order finding the order granting costs and awarding restitution in this action void; and
    d. such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

  3. I conferred with opposing counsel and understand that the People intend to oppose this Motion.

II. FACTS

  1. This is an original proceeding in discipline before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge under C.R.C.P. 251.9 through 251.14, maintained by the Complainant through its attorneys, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel, by filing the initial pleading on or about October 7, 2019.

  2. Respondent contends that this action is outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court and its administrative arm, the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, because, as of commencement of this proceeding, Respondent was not and is not a Colorado-licensed attorney, did not and does not conduct legal business in Colorado, did not and does not maintain a law office in Colorado, and did not and does not reside in Colorado.

  3. In an effort to address this jurisdictional defect, on or about January 6, 2020, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b).

  4. The Office of the PDJ denied that motion, which Respondent contends reflected bias and prejudice, and was issued with disregard for the evidence and governing law.

  5. Lacking an opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing, Respondent abstained from further participation in the unlawful proceeding.

  6. Continuing the proceeding, on March 30, 2020, the Office of the PDJ entered a default under C.R.C.P. 251.15(b) and, on August 3, 2020, issued an Opinion and Decision imposing sanctions under C.R.C.P. 251.19(c).

  7. Thereafter, on September 9, 2020, the Office of the PDJ issued an Order and Notice of Suspension and, on the same date, entered an order granting costs and awarding restitution.

  8. At all relevant times, Presiding Disciplinary Judge William R. Lucero was and remains a defendant in the federal action Ziankovich v. Members of the Colorado Supreme Court and Lucero, Case No. 20-cv-00158-WJM-SKC.

  9. In that federal case, Judge Lucero, through counsel, argued that Respondent (plaintiff in the federal action) was not an attorney due to his suspension, and therefore lacked standing to challenge attorney regulation rules. (See ECF Nos. 21 and 23 in that action.)

  10. On or about August 6, 2020, the federal district court agreed and found that Respondent lacked standing to challenge the attorney discipline rules, relying on Levin v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 74 F.3d 763, 767–68 (7th Cir. 1996), on the theory that, upon suspension, Respondent was not an attorney. The decision is published at Ziankovich v. Members of Colorado Supreme Court, No. 20-cv-0158-WJM-SKC, 2020 WL 4539625 (D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2020).

  11. It appears that, under that federal ruling, Respondent has not been an attorney since the Office of the PDJ imposed a prior suspension on or about October 31, 2018. See Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Under C.R.C.P. 12(b) (Feb. 18, 2020) at page 5.

  12. The PDJ’s position and findings in connection with Respondent’s January 6, 2020 motion are inconsistent with the position taken by Judge Lucero in the federal action and with the federal court’s findings.

III. ARGUMENT

  1. Respondent brings this motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) because the PDJ’s orders are void and must be vacated.

  2. “Void judgment may be vacated at any time regardless of time limits established by rules of civil procedure.” Don J. Best Trust v. Cherry Creek Nat’l Bank, 792 P.2d 302 (Colo. App. 1990).

  3. “If a judgment is void, the court must set it aside regardless of when the party seeking to set aside the judgment moves to set it aside. No time limit applies to a motion under section (b)(3).” Burton v. Colo. Access, 2015 COA 111, 410 P.3d 1255, aff’d, 2018 CO 11, 428 P.3d 208, cert. denied sub nom. Olivar v. Pub. Serv. Emple. Credit Union, 139 S. Ct. 87 (2018).

  4. “A void judgment is a judgment entered where jurisdictional defects exist and is a nullity, whereas an erroneous judgment is one rendered in accordance with method of procedure and practice allowed by law but is contrary to law; if a trial court has jurisdiction, it may correct an erroneous judgment.” In re Pierce, 720 P.2d 591 (Colo. App. 1985).

  5. The Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, possesses jurisdiction in disciplinary actions against attorneys pursuant to C.R.C.P. 202.1 and C.R.C.P. 251.1.¹

  6. A person who is not an attorney may not be subject to attorney discipline regulations by the Supreme Court. See Coffman v. Williamson, 2015 CO 35, ¶ 44, 348 P.3d 929, 941.

  7. Respondent contends that, as of the commencement of this action, Respondent was not an attorney and was not within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court, contrary to the allegation in paragraph 9 of the Complaint.

  8. Therefore, the Complainant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the Opinion and Decision imposing sanctions and all subsequent orders are void as a matter of law.

  9. “Judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The court must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the issue to be decided if its judgment is to be valid.” In re Stroud, 631 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1981).

  10. “[W]here the motion alleges that the judgment attacked is void, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), the trial court has no discretion. The judgment either is void or it isn’t and relief must be afforded accordingly.” In re Stroud, 631 P.2d at 170.

  11. Accordingly, an order finding the challenged orders void and granting Respondent relief is warranted.

¹ See Ziankovich v. Large, No. 17-cv-02039-CMA-NYW, 2019 WL 4463283, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2019).

WHEREFORE

Respondent respectfully requests that the Court enter an order pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3):

  • finding the Opinion and Decision in this action void;
  • finding the Order and Notice of Suspension in this action void;
  • finding the order granting costs and awarding restitution in this action void;
  • granting Respondent relief from the foregoing orders; and
  • granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: Houston, Texas
December 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH, Esq.
Respondent Pro Se
14405 Walters Road, Suite 808
Houston, TX 77014
(346) 223-0284
OARC File No. 10290

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 10th day of December, 2020, I placed a true and correct copy of Respondent’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), with annexed exhibits, in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION COUNSEL
Attorneys for the Complainant
1300 Broadway, Suite 500
Denver, Colorado 80203

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE

THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

1300 Broadway, Suite 250
Denver, CO 80203

Complainant:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

Respondent:
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH

Case Number: 19PDJ068

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

UNDER C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3)

Before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“the Court”) is a Notice of Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) and an Affirmation in Support, both filed on December 10, 2020, by Youras Ziankovich (“Respondent”). Jane B. Cox, Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“the People”), responded on December 17, 2020.

Respondent has been disciplined in this jurisdiction once before, in case number 17PDJ037. In that case, he was suspended from the practice of law in Colorado for one year and one day, with three months to be served and the remainder to be stayed upon his successful completion of a two-year period of probation, with conditions. His suspension in case number 17PDJ037 took effect on October 31, 2018.

The People filed the complaint in this case on October 7, 2019. Respondent did not answer. Instead, he attempted to remove the case to federal court, which remanded the case in late December 2019. On January 9, 2020, Respondent moved to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds. The Court denied his motion in February 2020 and directed him to file an answer. He failed to do so, and the Court entered default on March 30, 2020. The Court held a sanctions hearing on July 1, 2020, via the Zoom videoconferencing platform. Respondent neither submitted any prehearing materials nor appeared for the sanctions hearing. Based on the entry of default and the evidence adduced at the sanctions hearing, the Court issued an opinion on August 3, 2020, in which it suspended Respondent’s authority to practice law in Colorado for thirty months. The suspension took effect on September 9, 2020. Respondent did not appeal the Court’s decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.

In his pending motion, Respondent seeks relief from judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3), arguing that his earlier suspension in case number 17PDJ037 removed him from the ranks of attorneys and thus also from the reach of the Court’s jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. As a result, he contends, the order of sanctions and all subsequent orders in this case were void.

The People’s response is twofold. First, they argue that Respondent cannot raise the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) when he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the case, including the right to appeal the Court’s jurisdictional rulings. Second, they dispute Respondent’s jurisdictional argument. They maintain that the Colorado Supreme Court possesses plenary power over the regulation of all persons practicing law in Colorado, including suspended lawyers.

The Court agrees with the People on both counts. In In re Marriage of Mallon, a litigant who failed to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges during the proceeding and who failed to appeal jurisdictional findings was precluded from attacking the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a motion later brought under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3).¹ The underlying policy of finality directs the same result in this case, where Respondent did in fact litigate the question of subject matter jurisdiction but then failed to appeal the issue.

Even if the Court were to find otherwise, however, Respondent’s motion is not availing. The Colorado Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction over “all matters involving the licensing and regulation of those persons who practice law in Colorado,”² whether those individuals are Colorado-licensed lawyers or lawyers licensed elsewhere who provide or offer to provide legal services in Colorado.³ Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court maintains regulatory jurisdiction over suspended lawyers.⁴ The cases Respondent cites as contrary to these precepts do not, in fact, stand for the propositions he ascribes to them.⁵

Respondent’s motion is precluded procedurally and, in any event, lacks substantive merit. The Court rejects Respondent’s subject matter jurisdiction challenge. Neither the opinion imposing sanctions nor any other order issued in this case is void. The Court DENIES Respondent’s Notice of Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3).

DATED THIS 21st DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020.

WILLIAM R. LUCERO
Presiding Disciplinary Judge

FOOTNOTES

  1. In re Marriage of Mallon, 956 P.2d 642, 646 (Colo. App. 1998).
  2. C.R.C.P. 202.1.
  3. Colo. RPC 8.5(a).
  4. In re C. de Baca, 11 P.3d 426, 430 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dolan, 873 P.2d 766, 766 n.1 (Colo. 1994).
  5. The portion of Levin v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 74 F.3d 763, 767 n.5 (7th Cir. 1996), cited by Respondent addresses a disbarred lawyer’s “standing set in a time frame” before a federal court, not a state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a suspended lawyer. Coffman v. Williamson, 348 P.3d 929, 941 (Colo. 2015), concerns regulation of nonlawyer assistants and has no bearing on Colorado’s disciplinary jurisdiction over suspended lawyers.

Copies to:
Via Email: j.cox@csc.state.co.us — Jane B. Cox, Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel
Via Email: y.ziankovich@polishlawyer.us — Youras Ziankovich, Respondent

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Filed: August 10, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert, Clerk of Court

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

MEMBERS OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT, each of them individually and in their official capacity; WILLIAM R. LUCERO, in his individual and official capacity,
Defendants–Appellees.

No. 20-1314
(D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00158-WJM-SKC) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

Youras Ziankovich is a New York attorney who was disciplined by the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) for practicing law in federal courts and agencies in Colorado without a Colorado law license. During the disciplinary proceeding, he challenged the state’s authority to discipline him because he did not practice law in Colorado state courts or agencies. Colorado’s Presiding Disciplinary Judge, William J. Lucero (PDJ), rejected Ziankovich’s jurisdictional challenge, as did the three-member disciplinary hearing board (Board) when it issued its disciplinary decision, and the Colorado Supreme Court when it affirmed the Board’s sanction.

This appeal involves Ziankovich’s second federal lawsuit raising various constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the state’s authority to discipline him. In the first suit, he named Colorado’s Attorney Regulation Counsel and an OARC attorney, both acting through the OARC, as defendants. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and we affirmed. Ziankovich then filed the suit at issue here asserting essentially the same claims, this time against the individual Members of the Colorado Supreme Court (the Justices) and the PDJ, each individually and in their official capacities (collectively, the Defendants).

The district court dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), concluding the claims were barred on various jurisdictional and immunity grounds. Ziankovich now appeals that order and, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This is Ziankovich’s fourth appeal to this court involving his two federal lawsuits. Our decisions in his first two appeals described in some detail the factual and procedural background of the state disciplinary proceeding, his unsuccessful appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, and his first federal lawsuit and related appeals. See Ziankovich v. Large (Ziankovich I), 745 F. App’x 800 (10th Cir. 2018), and Ziankovich v. Large (Ziankovich II), 833 F. App’x 721 (10th Cir. 2020).¹ We do not repeat that background here, other than as necessary to provide context for our consideration of his arguments in this appeal.

Early in the disciplinary proceeding, Ziankovich moved to dismiss OARC’s complaint against him, arguing that the Colorado Supreme Court and the PDJ, who was appointed by that Court to preside over state disciplinary proceedings,² lacked “jurisdiction to discipline him under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct because he is not practicing law in Colorado [within the meaning of the rules], and his law practice is limited to federal immigration cases.” R. Vol. 1 at 20.

The PDJ denied the motion, concluding that under applicable Colorado rules, the Colorado Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all matters involving the regulation of the practice of law in Colorado, including the discipline of attorneys who are not licensed in Colorado but who represent clients in the state.³ In so concluding, the PDJ rejected Ziankovich’s contention that Colorado authorities could not enjoin him from practicing before federal courts and agencies in Colorado, explaining that the Colorado Supreme Court’s regulatory authority over attorneys practicing within the state’s physical boundaries extends to attorneys whose practice is limited to immigration law in federal courts and agencies in Colorado, because regardless of the court or tribunal the attorney practices in, he is practicing law in Colorado. The PDJ thus held that he and the Colorado Supreme Court have “the authority to regulate [Ziankovich’s] practice of law in Colorado.” R. Vol. 1 at 23. Ziankovich filed an interlocutory appeal of the PDJ’s ruling in the Colorado Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.

The disciplinary proceedings moved forward and the PDJ granted summary judgment for the OARC on six of its misconduct claims against Ziankovich. The matter proceeded to a hearing to resolve the remaining claims and to determine the appropriate sanction for the established violations. Ziankovich again moved to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction and raised a number of constitutional and federal law defenses, including that the proceeding violated the Commerce Clause, his state and federal rights to due process, and his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments of the federal and state constitutions. The Board “reject[ed] [his] subject matter jurisdiction challenge on the grounds set forth in the PDJ’s [order] on that issue.” Id. at 39. It also rejected all of his constitutional defenses on the merits. See id. at 39–40. It then suspended Ziankovich from practicing law in Colorado for one year and a day.

Ziankovich sought reconsideration of the Board’s decision. As pertinent here, he reiterated his argument that the Colorado Supreme Court and the PDJ lacked jurisdiction to discipline him and that the disciplinary proceeding violated the Commerce Clause. The Board rejected both arguments and denied reconsideration. As for the jurisdictional challenge, the Board reaffirmed its and the PDJ’s earlier holdings that “a lawyer with an out-of-state law license who provides legal services within the physical boundaries of Colorado under federal law is subject to this state’s disciplinary authority.” Id. at 58. As for the Commerce Clause argument, the Board explained that the order suspending Ziankovich did not regulate his New York law license or his practice of law in federal court—it “simply precludes [him] from practicing law within the State of Colorado”—and the fact that the order might affect the status of his license in New York did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. at 63.

Ziankovich appealed the Board’s decision to the Colorado Supreme Court, which affirmed in a summary order. He filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which the Court denied. See Ziankovich v. Colorado, 140 S. Ct. 133 (Oct. 7, 2019).

Soon thereafter, Ziankovich filed his complaint in federal district court against the Justices and the PDJ, asserting his now familiar constitutional claims under § 1983 challenging the authority of the Colorado judiciary to discipline him and alleging that the Justices’ and PDJ’s participation in the disciplinary proceeding violated the Commerce Clause and his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also raised a new claim alleging an equal protection violation. He alleged the Justices violated his rights by promulgating civil rules regulating his practice of law in federal court in Colorado, and by affirming the PDJ’s decisions in his disciplinary proceeding. And he alleged that the PDJ violated his constitutional rights every time he issued orders and decisions imposing sanctions against him. He sought damages, an order directing the Justices to repeal the Colorado rules providing a jurisdictional basis for the discipline of out-of-state attorneys who practice in federal courts and agencies in Colorado, and an order invalidating the disciplinary orders against him.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on five grounds. The district court granted the motion on four of them: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Ziankovich’s official-capacity claims; (2) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over state disciplinary proceedings under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine⁴ if the proceedings were concluded, and under the Younger abstention doctrine⁵ if they were ongoing; (3) the claims were barred by absolute judicial immunity; and (4) the claims were barred by legislative immunity. The district court did not reach Defendants’ argument that the claims were barred by preclusion principles.

DISCUSSION

Ziankovich takes issue with all of the district court’s reasons for dismissing his complaint, while the Defendants argue that each of those reasons was sound and that we can also affirm the dismissal order on additional grounds, including issue preclusion. We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we do not address the parties’ other arguments.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). A district court “lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause [when] it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Ziankovich’s claims, we need go no further.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers” challenging “state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It “prohibits a lower federal court both from considering claims actually decided by a state court, and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court judgment.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A federal constitutional claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial of the plaintiff’s state court claims if the district court “is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16; see also Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256 (holding that constitutional claims are barred if addressing them would “request the federal court to upset the state court judgment”). “[C]hallenges to a state court judgment are barred even if the claim forming the basis of the challenge was not raised in the state proceedings.” Khalsa, 446 F.3d at 1031; see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 (recognizing that the fact that constitutional claims were not raised in state court does not mean that a federal district court has jurisdiction over the claims).

We have upheld the dismissal under Rooker-Feldman of a disciplined attorney’s constitutional claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state supreme court and disciplinary administrator. See Kline v. Biles, 861 F.3d 1177, 1180–82 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).⁶ As the Seventh Circuit observed, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine eliminates most avenues of attack on attorney discipline.” Johnson v. Sup. Ct. of Ill., 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999). That includes challenges to the process leading to the disciplinary decision. Feldman itself held that constitutional challenges to the rules used to license or discipline attorneys may be raised under § 1983 if they are separable from the decision in an individual licensing or disciplinary case. See 460 U.S. at 486. Thus, the exclusive avenue for federal-court review of a state disciplinary decision is a petition to the United States Supreme Court. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (providing that “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari”).

B. Application

For the most part, the claims Ziankovich raised in his federal lawsuit are the same claims he raised in the state disciplinary proceeding. The crux of his claims both in the state proceeding and here is that Colorado—whether through its disciplinary administrators (the OARC), the PDJ, the Board, or the Colorado Supreme Court—did not have authority to discipline him because he was not licensed in Colorado and did not practice in state courts and agencies. The PDJ, the Board, and ultimately the Colorado Supreme Court in affirming the sanctions imposed, squarely considered and rejected his claims at every turn, and his federal claims are plainly “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment because he can only succeed if we conclude the state got it wrong and effectively reverse its decision or void its ruling. See Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256; see also Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[t]he essential point [of the inextricably intertwined test is that] barred claims are those complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” meaning that “an element of the claim must be that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is true even for the equal protection claim he raised for the first time in the federal action as well as any repackaged old claims. See Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1284 (affirming Rooker-Feldman dismissal of claim that, though not raised in the state court proceeding, was “a direct attack on the state court’s judgment because an element of the claim [was] that the judgment was wrongful”). Because Ziankovich’s claims asked the district court to second-guess the state’s decisions rejecting his jurisdictional challenges and constitutional defenses, it correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. See id.

Ziankovich’s attempts to avoid this result are unavailing. First, he argues that Rooker-Feldman does not bar his claims because he was suspended, not disbarred, so he is still potentially subject to the PDJ’s jurisdiction and thus has “standing” to challenge the constitutionality of Colorado’s attorney discipline system. Aplt. Opening Br. at 32. For support, he relies on a Seventh Circuit case upholding the district court’s Rooker-Feldman dismissal of a disbarred attorney’s § 1983 claims against the state disciplinary commission alleging that the disciplinary proceeding violated his constitutional rights. See Levin v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of the Sup. Ct. of Ill., 74 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 1996). Contrary to Ziankovich’s suggestion, however, the fact that the attorney in Levin had been disbarred and the state disciplinary commission no longer had authority to discipline him was not the factor that drove the court’s analysis. Rather, the critical factor was that “[t]he gravamen of [the attorney’s] entire complaint is that his disciplinary proceedings were unconstitutional” and “effectively asked the district court to review” the state supreme court’s judgment. Id. Because the attorney’s “claimed injuries stem[med] from the application of allegedly unconstitutional [state rules] to his disciplinary proceedings,” the court rejected his claim—similar to Ziankovich’s here—that he presented permissible “general challenges” to the state rules, concluding instead that the claims were “inextricably intertwined with the [state court’s] decision to disbar him.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (explaining that “the justiciability of Levin’s complaint depends entirely on the allegations that his disciplinary proceedings injured him”). The attorney’s disbarment and resultant lack of standing to challenge the state’s attorney discipline scheme was thus secondary to the court’s dispositive determination that his challenges were a direct attack on the state judgment and were therefore not “general challenges.” See id. (“Even if we strained to read the complaint as posing only general challenges to the [state rules], such general challenges would have been mooted by Levin’s disbarment.”). That Ziankovich is still a licensed attorney, albeit in another state, so may or may not have standing to challenge Colorado’s disciplinary scheme is beside the point. The point is that he may not do so by filing a federal action that effectively seeks federal district court review of a final state judgment, as he attempted to do here.

And his contention that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the decisions the PDJ and the Board made during the disciplinary proceeding are administrative, not judicial, is a non-starter. The Supreme Court has made clear that state attorney discipline proceedings are “judicial in nature.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34 (1982) (finding it “clear beyond doubt” that a state supreme court’s attorney discipline processes and procedures are “judicial in nature” and “are of a character to warrant federal-court deference” under the Younger abstention doctrine (internal quotation marks omitted)). Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we have recognized that Colorado’s attorney discipline process is “definitely judicial rather than administrative in nature.” Razatos v. Colo. Sup. Ct., 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Middlesex). Ziankovich’s argument also ignores the fact that the Colorado Supreme Court issued what is undeniably a final judicial decision affirming the PDJ’s and the Board’s rulings. See Levin, 74 F.3d at 766–67 (recognizing that a disciplinary decision that has been upheld by the state’s highest court is a judicial decision that may not be contested in inferior federal courts).

Finally, we decline to consider the arguments Ziankovich has raised for the first time on appeal regarding a separate disciplinary proceeding the OARC initiated against him in 2019 and that he did not mention in his complaint. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (recognizing that federal appellate courts generally do “not consider an issue not passed upon below”). There are some “unusual circumstances” in which we should exercise our discretion to consider unpreserved arguments, see Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Tr., 994 F.2d 716, 720–22 (10th Cir. 1993), but Ziankovich has given us no reason to do so here.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing Ziankovich’s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Entered for the Court,
Joel M. Carson III
Circuit Judge

Footnotes

  • After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

  1. Ziankovich’s third appeal sought review of two district court orders denying his motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Because neither order was immediately appealable, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Ziankovich v. Members of the Colo. Sup. Ct., No. 20-1195, Order at 3 (10th Cir. July 2, 2020).

  2. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 251.16(a), (c) (establishing the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, providing that the PDJ is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Colorado Supreme Court, and authorizing the PDJ to preside over disciplinary proceedings and to impose discipline on attorneys who practice law in Colorado).

  3. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 202.1 (“The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction over all matters involving the . . . regulation of those persons who practice law in Colorado.”); id. R. 204.1(1), (3), (5) (authorizing the Colorado Supreme Court to permit an out-of-state attorney who lives in Colorado to act as counsel for a single client as if licensed in Colorado under limited circumstances, and subjecting attorneys with single-client certification to the disciplinary authority of the court); id. R. 205.1(1) (excluding out-of-state attorneys who have a regular place of business from which he accepts Colorado clients from the list of out-of-state attorneys who may be authorized to temporarily practice law in Colorado); id. R. 251.1(b) (“Every attorney practicing law in this state pursuant to [Rule 204 or 205] is subject to the disciplinary . . . jurisdiction of the [Colorado] Supreme Court when practicing law pursuant to such rules.”); Colo. R. Pro. Cond. 5.5(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not . . . practice law in this jurisdiction without a license to practice law issued by the Colorado Supreme Court unless specifically authorized by [Rules 204 or 205] or federal or tribal law.”); id. R. 8.5(a) (“A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is . . . subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.”); id. cmt. [1A] (providing that “a lawyer who is not admitted in this jurisdiction, and who does not comply with [Rule 204 or 205], but who provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction” may be prosecuted for the unauthorized practice of law).

  4. D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

  5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

  6. See also Smith v. Bender, 350 F. App’x 190, 193–94 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred unsuccessful state bar applicant from relitigating the Justices’ refusal to recuse from his appeal); Varallo v. Sup. Ct. of Colo., No. 98-1243, 1999 WL 140161 (10th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (unpublished) (upholding Rooker-Feldman dismissal of disciplined attorney’s § 1983 suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Colorado Supreme Court’s order of disbarment against him and a declaration that Colorado’s lawyer disciplinary process was unconstitutional).

Appellate Case: 20-1314
Document: 010110559623
Date Filed: 08/10/2021
Page: 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Jane K. Castro
Chief Deputy Clerk
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257
(303) 844-3157
Clerk@ca10.uscourts.gov

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court

August 10, 2021

Youras Ziankovich
14405 Walters Road, Suite 808
Houston, TX 77014

RE: 20-1314, Ziankovich v. Members of the Colorado, et al.
Dist./Ag. docket: 1:20-CV-00158-WJM-SKC

Dear Appellant:

Attached is a copy of the order and judgment issued today in this matter. The court has entered judgment on the docket pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 36.

Please contact this office if you have questions.

Sincerely,

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court

cc: Allison R. Ailer
Grant Sullivan
Dmitry B. Vilner

CMW/at

Exhibit F

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
Order Denying Petition for Relief from the Rule of Good Standing
(Filed January 4, 2022)

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Denver, Colorado

JAN 04, 2022
Jeffrey P. Colwell, Clerk

IN THE MATTER OF:

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH
Disciplinary Action No. 18-DP-10

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM THE RULE OF GOOD STANDING

Before the Disciplinary Panel is the recommendation of the Committee on Conduct that the Disciplinary Panel enter an order denying Petitioner’s “Application to Relieve from the Ruling of Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge and Reinstate in Good Standing in the Bar of this Court Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LAttyR. 3(d).”

On October 27, 2021, the Disciplinary Panel entered an order affording Petitioner Youras Ziankovich thirty (30) days to respond to the Committee on Conduct’s recommendation that the Panel deny Petitioner’s application under D.C.COLO.LAttyR. 3(d). To merit relief from the rule of good standing, the Panel required that Petitioner demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the following enumerated factors set forth in D.C.COLO.LAttyR. 3(d)(2) was true:

  1. That the procedure resulting in the discipline by the court was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to deny due process;
  2. That the application of the rule of good standing would result in grave injustice; or
  3. That the kind of misconduct resulting in the original discipline warrants substantially less severe discipline.

Petitioner failed to respond to the Panel’s order. Further, a review of Petitioner’s application in light of the factors cited in D.C.COLO.LAttyR. 3(d)(2) leads the Panel to conclude that Petitioner failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to such relief.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Petitioner’s “Application to Relieve from the Ruling of Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge and Reinstate in Good Standing in the Bar of this Court Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LAttyR. 3(d)” is DENIED.

Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 29th day of December, 2021.

BY THE DISCIPLINARY PANEL OF THE COURT:

Philip A. Brimmer
Chief Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Order Denying Petition for Relief from the Rule of Good Standing, dated December 29, 2021, was served on Respondent Youras Ziankovich by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Youras Ziankovich, Esquire
14405 Walters Road, Suite 808
Houston, TX 77014

and

Youras Ziankovich, Esquire
World Trade Center, Suite 8500
New York, NY 10007

Dated: January ___, 2022

JEFFREY P. COLWELL
Clerk of Court

By: ________
Deputy Clerk