Supremacy Case

04. Plaintiff’s Application for TRO/PI

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH )

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; )

PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney )

General of the United States; )

SIRCE E. OWEN, in her official capacity as Acting ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-03121

Director of EOIR; )

BRYON M. LARGE, in his official capacity as Presiding )

Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

WILLIAM R. LUCERO, in his official capacity as )

Former Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

JESSICA E. YATES, in her official capacity as )

Attorney Regulation Counsel for the Colorado )

Supreme Court; and )

COLORADO SUPREME COURT, )

Defendants. )

__________________________________________

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE 1st MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich, an attorney licensed in New York and a U.S. citizen, respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and 5 U.S.C. § 705, for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to halt the continuing enforcement and federal use of a void disciplinary order issued by Colorado authorities and to compel agency action unlawfully withheld by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).

This motion is necessitated by (1) EOIR’s complete failure to act upon Plaintiff’s properly filed Motion for Reinstatement dated July 9, 2025, submitted under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107, and (2) the continuing federal disability that results from Colorado’s void disciplinary orders (2018 and 2020) and the subsequent procedural default of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in 2021. As a direct consequence of these unlawful and unremedied acts, Plaintiff remains indefinitely barred from federal practice without any lawful process or avenue of relief.

Plaintiff seeks this relief ex parte because each day of EOIR’s inaction and the continuing effect of Colorado’s orders cause irreparable professional and reputational harm and further violate his constitutional rights under the Supremacy Clause and the Fifth Amendment. The federal suspension has expired, yet the agency has taken no action to restore his status or acknowledge his reinstatement motion. The harm is ongoing, cumulative, and incapable of later remedy by damages.

This Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702–706 (Administrative Procedure Act), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (Declaratory Judgment Act). Venue and personal jurisdiction are proper in this District because the principal federal defendants reside and act here, and because the state defendants purposefully directed their conduct toward federal institutions in Washington, D.C., foreseeably causing federal injury in this forum. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). Plaintiff also invokes the Ex parte Young doctrine for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.

Through this Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court:

  1. Temporarily restrain EOIR and all federal Defendants from enforcing or giving effect to any disciplinary order originating in Colorado;
  2. Direct EOIR to immediately docket and adjudicate Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Reinstatement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107; and
  3. Schedule a hearing on a Preliminary Injunction to determine the continuing federal validity of Colorado’s orders and the constitutionality of EOIR’s inaction.

The requested relief is narrowly tailored, preserves the status quo ante of federal practice authorization, and ensures that no further unlawful federal disqualification occurs while this Court reviews the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff submits this Motion in good faith to preserve his procedural rights under Rule 65 and 5 U.S.C. § 705. He respectfully defers to the Court’s discretion regarding the timing and format of any hearing and stands ready to participate remotely if required. The requested relief is consistent with established D.C. Circuit precedent governing agency delay and federal preemption.

Plaintiff respectfully informs the Court that between October 29 and November 24, 2025, he will be traveling internationally with limited Internet access but remains reachable by email and stands ready to appear remotely should the Court deem a hearing necessary.

Rooker–Feldman Clarification: Plaintiff does not seek review, reversal, or annulment of any Colorado state-court decision. This motion challenges only the continuing federal consequences of those state actions and EOIR’s failure to act under the Administrative Procedure Act. The requested relief is prospective and federal-facing, consistent with Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual narrative below is presented solely to demonstrate the continuing federal harm and jurisdictional basis for this Court’s intervention.

A. Colorado Disciplinary Proceedings Without Jurisdiction

Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich is an attorney licensed solely in the State of New York (Bar No. 5196324). Between 2015 and 2018, he conducted a federally authorized immigration practice under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1) while residing in Colorado. He was never admitted to practice law in Colorado and did not engage in any activity subject to regulation by that state.

Nevertheless, on October 31, 2018, the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ) issued an order of suspension in In re Ziankovich, Case No. 18PDJ059, for conduct arising exclusively from Plaintiff’s federal immigration representation (see Exhibit A). The proceeding, initiated by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), was conducted under a claim of jurisdiction that exceeded the state’s constitutional and statutory authority, as later demonstrated by its direct interference with federally authorized practice. The OARC treated Plaintiff’s representation before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as the practice of law “in Colorado” subject to Colorado regulations—an assertion directly contrary to Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). In substance, Colorado authorities applied the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) to conduct governed exclusively by the New York RPC, which lawfully authorized Plaintiff’s actions in issue as a New York–licensed attorney engaged in federal practice. By asserting jurisdiction over a non-licensee and substituting Colorado’s rules for those of New York, the PDJ effectively claimed regulatory authority over a federal practitioner—a position preempted by federal law and inconsistent with NYSBA Ethics Op. 1027 (2014).

Following issuance of that order, then-PDJ William R. Lucero personally transmitted the Colorado suspension to federal agencies, including EOIR and DHS, on November 1, 2018, thereby triggering reciprocal federal consequences (see Exhibit B).

In September 2020, the PDJ issued a second order of suspension, Case No. 19PDJ068, again purporting to regulate Plaintiff—a non-licensee who had already ceased all professional activity in Colorado and resided at that time in Texas. That proceeding was conducted largely in absentia and resulted in a default judgment[1]. Both orders together created the predicate for EOIR’s reciprocal suspension and the present federal disability.

These actions by Colorado authorities were purposefully directed toward federal institutions located in Washington, D.C., with the foreseeable and intended effect of altering Plaintiff’s federal status. This deliberate transmittal of state disciplinary orders to federal agencies headquartered in Washington, D.C., satisfies the “effects test” for specific jurisdiction and further reinforces that the resulting harm is properly situated within this District for purposes of venue and judicial review. Under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 107–08 (3d Cir. 1992), such intentional out-of-forum targeting satisfies minimum contacts and supports personal jurisdiction in this District. It also reinforces that the resulting harm is federal in character, arising directly from unconstitutional interference with federally authorized practice.

B. Federal Proceedings in the District of Colorado (2018–2021)

On November 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado an Application to Relieve from the Ruling of the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge and Reinstate in Good Standing under D.C.COLO.LAttyR 3(d) (see Exhibit C). The Application explained that the Colorado disciplinary orders were void for lack of jurisdiction, violated the Supremacy Clause, and should not affect Plaintiff’s federal standing.

For nearly three years the matter remained pending with no action or communication from the Committee on Conduct or the Disciplinary Panel. Then, on December 29, 2021, while Plaintiff was wrongfully detained abroad and entirely deprived of access to counsel or correspondence, the Disciplinary Panel entered an Order Denying Petition for Relief from the Rule of Good Standing, citing an alleged failure to respond within thirty days (see Exhibit D).

That order was issued without notice and mailed to addresses in New York and Texas at a time when Plaintiff was imprisoned in Belarus. The denial, rendered ex parte, deprived Plaintiff of due process and entrenched the federal consequences of Colorado’s void disciplinary actions.

The 2021 denial of Plaintiff’s petition by the District of Colorado, issued without notice and during a period of wrongful detention, underscores the procedural deprivation at the core of this case. The failure to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard renders that decision voidable under fundamental due process principles. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949) (default judgments entered against detained or incapacitated parties are incompatible with due process). Plaintiff moved the District Court of Colorado to set aside the decision, the action remains pending.

C. Wrongful Detention and Loss of Access to Courts (2021–2025)

From April 11, 2021, through April 30, 2025, Plaintiff was wrongfully detained by the Government of Belarus under internationally condemned conditions. The U.S. Department of State formally recognized him as a wrongfully detained U.S. citizen (see Exhibit E, Letter of the U.S. Department of State).
Throughout that period, Plaintiff was held incommunicado and completely unable to access courts or counsel, which rendered him incapable of responding to or appealing the 2021 order issued by the District of Colorado.

D. Post-Release Efforts to Restore Federal Standing (2025)

Upon his return to the United States in May 2025, Plaintiff immediately undertook steps to restore his professional status. On July 9, 2025, he filed a Motion for Reinstatement to Practice Before EOIR and DHS, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107, accompanied by six exhibits, a memorandum of law, and proof of service to the EOIR Office of General Counsel and to the USCIS Disciplinary Counsel (see Exhibit F).

As of the date of this filing, EOIR has provided no acknowledgment, docket entry, or response. The agency’s silence—now extending well beyond ninety days—constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Under the TRAC factors, the length of EOIR’s delay is unreasonable in light of the human welfare interests at stake, the absence of any administrative timetable, and the continuing daily prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to engage in his profession. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The delay therefore constitutes not a mere administrative backlog but an unlawful failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty.

This inaction perpetuates Plaintiff’s disqualification from federal practice even though the reciprocal suspension expired in 2019 and no independent misconduct has ever been found.

EOIR’s failure to docket or respond to the reinstatement motion constitutes not mere administrative delay but a clear instance of agency action “unlawfully withheld” within the meaning of Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under TRAC and In re American Rivers, 372 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2004), courts in this Circuit have consistently held that prolonged, unexplained inaction that perpetuates continuing harm justifies judicial compulsion under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

E. Continuing Federal Disability and Irreparable Harm

The combined effect of the void Colorado orders, the procedural deprivation in the District of Colorado, and EOIR’s continuing inaction has left Plaintiff in a state of permanent federal suspension without due process. He remains unable to represent clients before immigration tribunals, maintain his professional credentials, or rehabilitate his reputation.

This condition constitutes a “continuing disability” under federal jurisprudence — an ongoing legal and practical restraint comparable to those recognized in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and subsequent professional-discipline cases — and presents a textbook example of irreparable harm under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Each day of administrative silence extends the unlawful deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to engage in federally authorized legal practice and inflicts ongoing reputational and economic injury that monetary damages cannot repair.

In addition, Plaintiff’s inability to resume federal practice despite full expiration of any reciprocal suspension constitutes an ongoing deprivation of rights under color of federal authority. Such continuing disability is a paradigmatic case for equitable intervention under Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 187–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006), where courts recognized that loss of professional standing and First Amendment–protected advocacy satisfies the irreparable harm standard for injunctive relief. The injury is ongoing and self-perpetuating: Plaintiff remains excluded from federal immigration practice, has no state mechanism for reinstatement as a non-licensee, and continues to suffer reputational and economic harm. This “continuing disability,” recognized in cases such as Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and related professional-discipline jurisprudence, sustains Article III standing and prevents mootness by showing that the federal consequences persist every day the EOIR fails to act.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts in the District of Columbia apply the Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006), framework for evaluating requests for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief. While the four traditional factors are considered together, the D.C. Circuit recognizes that a particularly strong showing on one factor—such as irreparable harm—may justify relief where the other factors are substantial. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

This Motion meets each of those criteria and seeks narrowly tailored relief consistent with Rule 65 and 5 U.S.C. § 705 to preserve the status quo and prevent continuing constitutional injury pending adjudication on the merits.

A. Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

A Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction may be issued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 when the moving party demonstrates:

  1. A likelihood of success on the merits;
  2. Irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
  3. That the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and
  4. That the injunction serves the public interest[2].

Under Rule 65(b), an ex parte TRO may issue without notice to the adverse party when specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury will result before the adverse party can be heard, and the movant’s counsel certifies in writing why notice should not be required. The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that courts may grant such temporary relief where delay would “nullify the purpose of the suit.” Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

The purpose of a TRO or preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo ante and prevent ongoing constitutional or statutory violations until the court can fully adjudicate the merits. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Moreover, the requested relief serves the public interest by preserving the independence of federally authorized legal practice and protecting immigrant communities’ access to qualified counsel. The D.C. Circuit has recognized that professional disqualification implicates not only private harm but also the public’s interest in fair and effective access to legal representation.

B. Judicial Authority to Stay Administrative Action

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 705, a reviewing court may “issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.” This provision grants federal courts independent authority to stay or compel administrative action during litigation.

Where an agency fails to act within a reasonable time, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) authorizes courts to compel the agency to perform a duty “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” The D.C. Circuit has held that such relief is available when the agency’s inaction has legal consequences or deprives a party of rights to which they are lawfully entitled. See Trudeau v. Federal Trade Commission, 456 F.3d 178, 188–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

In the D.C. Circuit, the “irreparable harm” inquiry focuses on whether the injury is “both certain and great” and “of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.”[3] Courts have repeatedly found that professional disqualification and loss of reputation constitute such harm, particularly where they impede First Amendment–protected advocacy or access to federal fora. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 187–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Here, the continuing federal suspension effectively nullifies Plaintiff’s right to pursue his federally authorized profession and erodes his credibility before the very agencies that regulate it. The absence of any administrative remedy magnifies the immediacy of this harm, satisfying the strictest standard for preliminary injunctive relief.

Additionally, the state actions underlying EOIR’s reciprocal enforcement constitute an unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation, as prohibited by Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989), because they were purposefully directed beyond Colorado’s borders to affect federal administrative outcomes in Washington, D.C.

C. Declaratory and Equitable Relief

This Court also has authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (the Declaratory Judgment Act) to declare the rights and legal relations of parties affected by state or federal actions that contravene federal law. Declaratory relief is appropriate where an actual controversy exists and the declaration will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue.

In conjunction with declaratory relief, courts may issue equitable orders to prevent the continued enforcement of unconstitutional or ultra vires actions by state or federal officials. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Injunctive and declaratory relief are particularly warranted where, as here, an individual suffers continuing professional or reputational injury from an unconstitutional or jurisdictionally void order.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits

Plaintiff’s claims rest on well-established constitutional and statutory principles prohibiting states and federal agencies from penalizing conduct authorized by federal law and from imposing discipline without jurisdiction or due process.

  1. Supremacy Clause Violation

Under Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), a state may not discipline an attorney for conduct authorized by federal law. Plaintiff’s immigration practice was conducted solely pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1) and was fully authorized by federal regulation. Colorado’s disciplinary orders—issued against a non-licensee for federally authorized conduct—are void ab initio and preempted by federal law. Their transmission to EOIR and DHS, and EOIR’s reliance on them, constitute direct violations of the Supremacy Clause.

  1. Due Process Violations (Fifth Amendment)

Both the Colorado and federal disciplinary actions were undertaken without notice or opportunity to be heard. The District of Colorado’s 2021 Order Denying Petition for Relief was entered while Plaintiff was wrongfully detained and unable to respond. Likewise, EOIR’s ongoing failure to act on Plaintiff’s July 9, 2025 Motion for Reinstatement deprives him of a meaningful opportunity to regain his professional status. This pattern of administrative silence and procedural deprivation violates fundamental due-process guarantees. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (relief appropriate where imprisonment prevented participation in proceedings).

  1. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Violations

EOIR’s refusal to act for more than three months constitutes “agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Agency inaction that perpetuates a legal disability is reviewable and remediable. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 188–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Moreover, EOIR’s earlier reciprocal discipline, imposed without independent findings or hearing, was “arbitrary and capricious” within the meaning of § 706(2)(A).

  1. Unconstitutional Extraterritorial Regulation

Colorado’s attempt to regulate a New York-licensed attorney for federal conduct occurring outside its jurisdiction violates the Commerce Clause and the constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial state regulation. See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989). The injury—federal disqualification—occurred in Washington, D.C., confirming this Court’s jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s likelihood of success.

Given these uncontested facts and the controlling precedent of Sperry, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992), Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

B. Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Without Injunctive Relief

Every day that EOIR fails to act extends Plaintiff’s continuing disability—a state of de facto permanent suspension from federal practice. This ongoing deprivation:

  • Prevents him from representing clients before EOIR and DHS;
  • Damages his professional reputation and earning capacity; and
  • Chills his constitutionally protected advocacy.

Courts consistently hold that loss of professional standing and the inability to pursue one’s chosen profession constitute irreparable harm. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Because EOIR’s inaction effectively extends an expired three-month suspension into an indefinite ban without process, monetary compensation cannot remedy the harm. Only immediate injunctive relief can restore the status quo ante.

C. The Balance of Equities Favors Plaintiff

The requested TRO merely preserves existing rights and prevents unlawful enforcement of void disciplinary orders. Granting temporary relief imposes no cognizable harm on the Defendants, who remain free to defend the underlying merits.

Conversely, denial of relief would perpetuate an unconstitutional and jurisdictionally void professional disqualification, causing Plaintiff continuing economic and reputational damage. The equities thus weigh decisively in Plaintiff’s favor. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

D. The Public Interest Strongly Supports Injunctive Relief

The public interest lies in ensuring that:

  1. Federal agencies act within the limits of their lawful authority;
  2. Attorneys are not disciplined by states lacking jurisdiction; and
  3. Administrative due process is observed in the enforcement of federal professional regulations.

Preserving the independence of federally authorized practitioners and maintaining confidence in the integrity of federal institutions are matters of significant public concern. Preventing further constitutional violations promotes, rather than hinders, the rule of law.

Accordingly, issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction serves the public interest and aligns with Congress’s intent under the APA to ensure accountability of federal agencies.

The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that the public interest is served when federal agencies are held to the procedural and constitutional standards imposed by Congress. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing judicial review as essential to maintaining the balance between agency discretion and accountability). Where, as here, state officials have intruded into an exclusively federal domain and federal authorities have failed to act, judicial intervention preserves both federal supremacy and public confidence in the rule of law.

Moreover, ensuring that federally authorized practitioners are not excluded from their profession by jurisdictionally void state actions serves a national interest in maintaining uniform access to legal representation in federal immigration proceedings—an area committed to exclusive federal oversight. Preventing further chilling of lawful federal advocacy is itself a substantial public interest warranting equitable relief.

V. REQUESTED RELIEF

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and 5 U.S.C. § 705, this Court possesses concurrent authority to preserve rights pending judicial review and to compel agency compliance with statutory duties. The relief sought is limited to maintaining the status quo and preventing the continued enforcement of void or unconstitutional orders until the merits are adjudicated. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, 5 U.S.C. §§ 705 and 706, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich respectfully requests that this Court issue the following orders:

A. Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order

  1. That the Court temporarily restrain the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the Attorney General of the United States, and all persons acting under their authority from enforcing, recognizing, or giving any effect to the disciplinary orders issued by the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado, including Orders Nos. 18PDJ059 and 19PDJ068;
  2. That such TRO remain in effect for fourteen (14) days, or until further order of this Court, and be extendable for good cause shown pursuant to Rule 65(b)(2);
  3. That the Court set a hearing on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction at the earliest available date.

B. Preliminary Injunction

Upon notice and hearing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court issue a Preliminary Injunction that:

  1. Enjoins EOIR from continuing to enforce any suspension or disqualification based on Colorado’s void orders;
  2. Directs EOIR to immediately docket and adjudicate Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Reinstatement submitted on July 9, 2025, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107;
  3. Requires EOIR to restore Plaintiff’s active status on its registry of recognized practitioners and to refrain from representing him as “suspended” or “not in good standing” pending final judgment;
  4. Prohibits publication or dissemination of disciplinary records originating from Colorado while this case is pending.

C. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff further requests that the Court enter a declaratory judgment that:

  1. The Colorado disciplinary orders issued in In re Ziankovich, Nos. 18PDJ059 and 19PDJ068, were entered without jurisdiction and are void ab initio for purposes of any federal recognition or reciprocal discipline;
  2. EOIR’s failure to act on Plaintiff’s July 9, 2025 Motion for Reinstatement constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1);
  3. The continuing reliance upon the Colorado orders by federal authorities violates the Supremacy Clause and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

D. Mandamus-Style and Restorative Relief

Plaintiff requests that the Court also enter an order:

  1. Compelling EOIR to complete its review of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reinstatement and issue a written decision within thirty (30) days of this Court’s order;
  2. Directing EOIR and the Department of Justice to update their records and public registries to reflect Plaintiff’s active status pending final adjudication;
  3. Requiring Defendants to remove or seal any online references to Colorado’s disciplinary actions against Plaintiff that remain published on federal websites during the pendency of this case.

E. Permanent Relief After Adjudication on the Merits

Following a final determination of the merits, Plaintiff asks that the Court enter a Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment:

  1. Permanently enjoining EOIR and any federal agency from recognizing or enforcing Colorado’s disciplinary orders against Plaintiff;
  2. Declaring that Plaintiff’s federal practice rights under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1) are fully restored; and
  3. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, including reasonable costs and fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

For clarity, Plaintiff reiterates that this Application does not request the Court to vacate, reverse, or otherwise review any Colorado judgment. The requested temporary relief is limited to restraining ongoing federal reliance on state disciplinary actions that were ultra vires as a matter of federal law. The injunction sought is thus prospective and federal-facing only, fully consistent with Exxon Mobil and Skinner.

Dated at Montgomery, Texas this 15th day of October 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

Youras Ziankovich, Esq.

Plaintiff Pro Se

16913 W Juneau

Montgomery, TX 77316

Phone: (346) 223-0284

Fax: (844) 858-7720

business@ziankovich.com

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YOURAS ZIANKOVICH )

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; )

PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney )

General of the United States; )

SIRCE E. OWEN, in her official capacity as Acting ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-03121

Director of EOIR; )

BRYON M. LARGE, in his official capacity as Presiding )

Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

WILLIAM R. LUCERO, in his official capacity as )

Former Presiding Disciplinary Judge of Colorado; )

JESSICA E. YATES, in her official capacity as )

Attorney Regulation Counsel for the Colorado )

Supreme Court; and )

COLORADO SUPREME COURT, )

Defendants. )

__________________________________________

[PROPOSED] TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, the Court finds that: (1) Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, particularly that the state disciplinary actions at issue were taken without jurisdiction and cannot constitutionally or legally form the basis of federal professional sanctions; (2) Plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable harm — including ongoing loss of the ability to practice his profession and violation of his constitutional rights — if the requested relief is not granted; (3) the balance of equities tips in Plaintiff’s favor, as the requested TRO maintains the status quo ante and causes no material harm to Defendants, who are merely enjoined from enforcing an unauthorized order; and (4) the public interest supports the issuance of interim relief to uphold the supremacy of federal law and ensure due process is afforded. The Court further finds, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), that providing formal notice is not practicable in the time available and that immediate relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm.

Therefore, it is ORDERED:

  1. Enforcement of Colorado Orders Barred: Defendants Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Pam Bondi (U.S. Attorney General), and Sirce E. Owen (Acting Director of EOIR), and all those acting in concert with them, are RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from enforcing, implementing, or giving any effect to the Colorado disciplinary orders issued on October 31, 2018 (No. 18PDJ059) or September 1, 2020 (No. 19PDJ068), against Plaintiff. This includes, but is not limited to, prohibiting or continuing to prohibit Plaintiff’s practice of law before federal immigration tribunals on the basis of those Colorado orders.
  2. Temporary Restoration of Plaintiff’s Authority: Defendant EOIR shall, upon receipt of this Order, take all necessary steps to restore Plaintiff’s ability to practice before EOIR for a pending further order of this Court. This shall include updating any relevant registries to reflect that the prior reciprocal suspension of Plaintiff is stayed and temporarily inactive during the TRO/PI period.
  3. No Further Transmittal or Reliance: Defendants Bryon M. Large (Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge), Jessica E. Yates (Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel), and William R. Lucero (former Colorado PDJ), and all those in active concert with them, are RESTRAINED from transmitting, requesting, or urging enforcement of the above-mentioned Colorado disciplinary orders to or by any federal authority or other state bar, insofar as such transmittal or enforcement would affect Plaintiff’s eligibility to practice law.
  4. Order to Show Cause – Preliminary Injunction Hearing: Each Defendant shall appear and SHOW CAUSE on __________________, 2025 at: ___________________________________ in Courtroom __ of this Court (or by videoconference if so directed), why a preliminary injunction should not be issued enjoining the above conduct for the pendency of this action. Defendants shall file any papers opposing such preliminary injunction by _____________________, 202__. Plaintiff may file reply papers by _____________________, 202__.
  5. Duration of TRO: This Temporary Restraining Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until _______________, 202__, unless extended by the Court for good cause or with Defendants’ consent, or dissolved earlier.
  6. Bond: The Court WAIVES the requirement of a security bond under Rule 65(c), finding that Defendants will not suffer monetary damage from the issuance of this Order and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and the public interest at stake.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ________________, 2025

____________________________________ United States District Judge

  1. Bryon M. Large, then an attorney with the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), wrote in an email communication that Plaintiff had “fled from Colorado to avoid jurisdiction.” This statement evidences OARC’s and Large’s intent to assert and maintain jurisdiction over Plaintiff regardless of the statutory limitations on their authority. ↑
  2. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). ↑
  3. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). ↑