THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH )
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, )
et al., )
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO COLORADO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich respectfully submits this Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Colorado Defendants (ECF No. 29) and, pursuant to the Court’s Minute Order of February 4, 2026, responds expressly to the argument raised at page 29 n.15 of that Motion concerning Plaintiff’s request for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief.
I. INTRODUCTION
Colorado Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss rests on a fundamental mischaracterization of this case. They portray Plaintiff’s claims as a collateral attack on a Colorado disciplinary judgment and an attempt to relitigate state-court issues. That is incorrect.
This action does not seek review or reversal of any Colorado judgment. It challenges the federal consequences that followed when Colorado officials transmitted their suspension order into the federal regulatory system, triggering reciprocal federal discipline that remains in effect.
The Complaint alleges two related forms of federal injury:
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), a component of the U.S. Department of Justice, imposed and continues to maintain reciprocal federal discipline based solely on the Colorado order; and
Colorado officials formally transmitted that order to EOIR and other federal authorities—including federal tribunals in Washington, D.C.—with the predictable consequence of triggering federal regulatory action.
The record confirms that the suspension order was officially distributed to multiple federal entities, including EOIR and the Supreme Court of the United States. See Compl. Exs. A and B (ECF No. 1-1 at pages 32 and 48). This transmission was not incidental or private; it was an official communication directed into the federal regulatory system.
Federal Defendants themselves have asserted that once Colorado imposed discipline, EOIR was required to impose immediate reciprocal discipline. See Fed. Defs.’ Reply (ECF No. 22) at 3–4. Under that theory, Colorado’s order operated as a legally binding trigger within the federal disciplinary framework. Colorado cannot both initiate a mechanism that produces automatic federal disability and disclaim any meaningful connection to the federal forum in which that disability is adjudicated.
Colorado advances five arguments: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (including Rooker–Feldman and issue preclusion), Eleventh Amendment immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, and—briefly in footnote 15—an objection to Plaintiff’s request for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief. None warrants dismissal.
Personal jurisdiction exists because Colorado officials intentionally transmitted their order into the federal executive branch, thereby activating a regulatory process that continues to operate in and through Washington, D.C. This case fits within the effects-based framework recognized in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar this action because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief to halt ongoing violations of federal law, bringing the case within the Ex parte Young exception.
Any technical defect in service—if one exists—caused no prejudice and, at minimum, warrants cure rather than dismissal.
Finally, as directed by the Court, Plaintiff addresses below Colorado’s argument regarding temporary and preliminary injunctive relief. That request targets ongoing federal disability and continuing reliance on Colorado’s order—not retroactive review of a completed state proceeding.
At bottom, Colorado seeks to characterize its actions as purely local. But its own conduct—formally transmitting its order into the federal system with predictable and, under Federal Defendants’ theory, mandatory consequences—demonstrates otherwise. Having set in motion a federal disciplinary process, Colorado cannot invoke territorial formalism to avoid federal jurisdiction.
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
II. BACKGROUND
This action arises from Colorado’s decision to discipline a lawyer who was never admitted to practice law in that state, and from the federal consequences that followed.
A. Plaintiff’s Federal Immigration Practice
Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich has been licensed to practice law in the State of New York since 2014. He has never been admitted to practice law in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that Plaintiff “is not admitted to practice law in Colorado.” People v. Ziankovich, 433 P.3d 640, 643 (Colo. 2018).
At all relevant times, Plaintiff represented clients in federal immigration proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1), which authorizes attorneys in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state to appear before EOIR and the Department of Homeland Security.
Plaintiff did not appear in Colorado state courts and did not hold a Colorado license.
B. Colorado Disciplinary Proceeding and Transmission
1. First Colorado Proceeding (17PDJ037)
In 2018, the Colorado disciplinary authorities entered an order suspending Plaintiff for one year and one day, with three months to be served and the remainder stayed upon probation (Case No. 17PDJ037). That suspension became effective October 31, 2018. See Compl. Ex. A.
2. Second Colorado Proceeding (19PDJ068)
In a separate proceeding (Case No. 19PDJ068), the Presiding Disciplinary Judge entered an Opinion and Decision on August 3, 2020, imposing a thirty-month suspension. See Opinion and Decision Imposing Sanctions Under C.R.C.P. 251.19(c), Case No. 19PDJ068 (Colo. PDJ Aug. 3, 2020).
On September 9, 2020, the Colorado Supreme Court issued an Order and Notice of Suspension implementing that sanction. See Order and Notice of Suspension, Case No. 19PDJ068 (Colo. PDJ Sept. 9, 2020).
Both proceedings concerned Plaintiff’s representation of clients in federal immigration matters.
C. Transmission to Federal Authorities
Following entry of the Colorado suspension orders, Colorado officials distributed the disciplinary orders to multiple federal authorities, including:
the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
the Supreme Court of the United States (Admissions Office, Washington, D.C.),
the Internal Revenue Service Office of Professional Responsibility (Washington, D.C.), and
various federal courts.
See Compl. Exs. A & B; see also Order and Notice of Suspension, Case No. 19PDJ068 (Colo. PDJ Sept. 9, 2020) (distribution list).
D. EOIR Reciprocal Discipline
After receiving notice of the Colorado suspension, EOIR imposed an immediate reciprocal suspension in March 2019 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103. See Final Order of Discipline, D2018-0327 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2019).
On November 21, 2019, the Board of Immigration Appeals entered a final order suspending Plaintiff from practice before the Board, Immigration Courts, and DHS for three months, effective as of the date of that order. See Final Order of Discipline, D2018-0327 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2019).
EOIR tied its action to the Colorado suspension and concluded that reciprocal discipline was required under federal regulation. See Final Order of Discipline, D2018-0327 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2019).
EOIR has since maintained that Plaintiff “remains suspended” in connection with his state disciplinary status. See ECF No. 14-1.
Plaintiff remains excluded from the federal roster of practitioners and is barred from appearing before immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.
E. Ongoing Federal Consequences
As a result of EOIR’s reciprocal discipline:
Plaintiff remains barred from representing clients in federal immigration proceedings;
his name appears as subject to federal discipline;
reinstatement is tied to state disciplinary status; and
the federal disability remains in effect.
F. Procedural Posture
Plaintiff filed this action challenging the ongoing federal consequences of Colorado’s disciplinary orders and EOIR’s reliance upon them. Plaintiff moved for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 4).
Federal Defendants opposed preliminary relief. Colorado Defendants later filed their Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29), addressing injunctive relief in footnote 15.
By Minute Order dated February 4, 2026, the Court directed Plaintiff to respond to Colorado’s argument concerning temporary or preliminary injunctive relief in this opposition. Plaintiff does so below.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Colorado Defendants move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5), and invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity. Each ground is governed by settled standards that do not support dismissal here.
A. Rule 12(b)(1): Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s authority to hear the case. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiff asserts federal claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Supremacy Clause, and the First and Fifth Amendments, and seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. These claims arise under federal law.
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court accepts the complaint’s material factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Dismissal is appropriate only if the Court lacks statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate the case.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is “confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name”—those brought by state-court losers seeking federal district court review and rejection of state-court judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine does not bar independent federal claims, even where a state judgment forms part of the background. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011).
B. Rule 12(b)(2): Personal Jurisdiction
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court accepts well-pleaded jurisdictional allegations as true and resolves factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor. FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
In the District of Columbia, personal jurisdiction must satisfy both the District’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Due process requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with fair play and substantial justice. Where a defendant commits an intentional act outside the forum that is expressly aimed at the forum and causes foreseeable harm there, jurisdiction may be proper under the “effects test” articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
The analysis focuses on the defendant’s own conduct and whether the claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum-directed activities.
C. Rule 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5): Service of Process
Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) permit dismissal for insufficient process or service of process. Dismissal, however, is not automatic for technical defects.
Under Rule 4(m), if service is not completed within the prescribed time, the Court must extend the time upon a showing of good cause and may extend it in its discretion even absent good cause. Courts in this Circuit generally favor curing service defects over dismissal, particularly where defendants have actual notice and suffer no prejudice.
D. Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte Young
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and state agencies absent consent or valid abrogation. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), however, a plaintiff may seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities to halt ongoing violations of federal law.
The exception applies where (1) the plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law, and (2) the relief sought is prospective and equitable rather than retrospective monetary damages.
E. Preliminary Injunction Standard (As Relevant to Colorado’s Footnote Argument)
Because Colorado Defendants addressed Plaintiff’s request for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief in footnote 15 of their Motion, the Court directed Plaintiff to respond. See Minute Order (Feb. 4, 2026).
A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent relief, (3) that the balance of equities favors relief, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Where the government is a party, the balance-of-equities and public-interest factors merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
These standards govern the analysis of Colorado Defendants’ Motion.
.
IV. ARGUMENT
IV-1. THE COURT HAS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Colorado Defendants attempt to recast this action as a collateral attack on a state-court judgment. It is not.
This Court need not review, invalidate, or reconsider the merits of the Colorado disciplinary decision to resolve the federal questions presented here. Even assuming the Colorado order is valid and binding as a matter of Colorado law, Plaintiff challenges the federal legal consequences imposed pursuant to that order and the constitutional limits on the projection of state discipline into federally regulated practice.
The claims arise under federal law and fall squarely within 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
A. Rooker–Feldman Does Not Apply Because Plaintiff Challenges Independent Federal Injury, Not the State Judgment
Under Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies only where a federal plaintiff seeks review and rejection of a state-court judgment. The doctrine is narrow and does not bar independent federal claims merely because a state judgment forms part of the factual background. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011).
The doctrine does not apply here for two independent reasons.
1. The Injury Alleged Is Not Caused by the State Judgment
Rooker–Feldman bars only claims complaining of injuries “caused by” a state judgment. The injury alleged here is not the existence of the Colorado disciplinary order. It is the ongoing federal disability imposed and maintained by EOIR through reciprocal discipline.
If EOIR had declined to impose reciprocal discipline, Plaintiff would not suffer federal exclusion regardless of the Colorado order. The operative injury therefore flows from EOIR’s federal enforcement decision entered pursuant to federal regulation—not from the state judgment itself.
This distinction is dispositive under Exxon Mobil. The Court need not review the correctness of the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision to determine whether federal actors may constitutionally rely upon that decision as a binding predicate within a federal regulatory regime.
2. Plaintiff Does Not Seek Review or Reversal of the State Judgment
Plaintiff does not ask this Court to vacate, reverse, modify, or declare invalid the Colorado judgment as a matter of state law. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief limiting the federal use of that judgment as a predicate for reciprocal federal discipline.
A federal court may determine the constitutional limits on federal reliance upon a state judgment without engaging in appellate review of that judgment. Relief directed at federal actors does not constitute “review and rejection” of the underlying state decision.
3. Federal Agency Action Is Independently Reviewable
EOIR’s reciprocal discipline constitutes final agency action reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 706. Federal agency action remains subject to judicial review even when it relies on a prior state proceeding.
Indeed, a Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals dissented from the imposition of reciprocal suspension, concluding that Colorado lacked jurisdiction to discipline a practitioner engaged exclusively in federally authorized immigration practice. (Ex. C, ECF No. 1-1 at 59.) That dissent confirms that EOIR’s action involved an independent federal determination rather than a purely ministerial consequence of the state judgment.
4. The “Inextricably Intertwined” Label Does Not Expand the Doctrine
The Supreme Court has made clear that the phrase “inextricably intertwined” does not create an independent test. The controlling question remains whether the injury was caused by the state judgment.
Here, the causal sequence is:
Colorado order →
EOIR’s reciprocal federal enforcement →
ongoing federal disability.
Plaintiff challenges the federal enforcement decision, not the state judgment itself. Even where federal regulations require reciprocal action upon notice of state discipline, the injury remains attributable to the federal agency’s enforcement order entered under federal authority.
5. Relief Can Be Granted Without Disturbing the State Judgment
The Court can declare limits on federal reliance, enjoin EOIR’s enforcement, or require independent APA-compliant review without vacating or disturbing the Colorado judgment.
Because effective relief can be granted without undoing the state-court decision, Rooker–Feldman does not apply.
B. Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply
Issue preclusion applies only where an identical issue was actually litigated, actually decided, necessary to the prior judgment, and the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). None of those requirements is satisfied here.
Colorado Defendants rely on Ziankovich III and Ziankovich IV. Those proceedings addressed whether Colorado disciplinary authorities possessed jurisdiction under Colorado law to regulate Plaintiff’s conduct while he was physically present in Colorado. They did not adjudicate the distinct federal question presented here.
The issue in this case is whether, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state disciplinary order that regulates federally authorized immigration practice may serve as a lawful predicate for reciprocal federal discipline and continuing federal exclusion. That question implicates the Supremacy Clause, federal preemption under Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), and EOIR’s obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act. It was not decided in the Colorado proceedings.
Even if constitutional defenses were raised in Colorado, no court resolved the specific federal predicate question presented here—whether a state order, even if valid under state law, may constitutionally be given binding effect within a federal reciprocal disciplinary regime. A state tribunal’s discussion of Sperry in evaluating its own jurisdiction does not constitute a federal adjudication of the limits on federal agency reliance.
Nor was EOIR’s conduct litigated previously. In Ziankovich III, EOIR was not a defendant. No court adjudicated EOIR’s obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 706, whether EOIR was required to conduct independent review before imposing reciprocal discipline, or whether EOIR’s reliance on the Colorado order was arbitrary or constitutionally infirm. Issue preclusion does not bar claims directed at federal agency action that was not previously at issue.
Finally, the prior judgments rested on findings that Plaintiff violated Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. They did not depend upon, or necessarily decide, the federal constitutional question presented here. The ongoing federal disability imposed by EOIR is a distinct injury arising from subsequent federal action. Moreover, Plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity in the prior proceedings to litigate the distinct federal question presented here.
Because the federal issues presented are neither identical to nor actually decided in the prior proceedings—and because EOIR’s federal conduct was never adjudicated—issue preclusion does not apply.
C. Plaintiff’s Injury Is Redressable As To Colorado Defendants
Colorado argues that Plaintiff’s injury is not redressable because New York also imposed reciprocal discipline and his federal status would therefore remain affected. That argument misstates both Article III and the structure of reciprocal discipline.
Article III requires only that the Court be able to grant meaningful relief as to injury fairly traceable to Colorado’s conduct. It does not require that Colorado be the sole source of Plaintiff’s injury or that relief eliminate every regulatory consequence. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (partial alleviation of injury satisfies redressability).
1. Colorado’s Orders Initiated the Reciprocal Sequence
The disciplinary sequence is documented in the record and reflected in the Exhibits.
Colorado entered its final disciplinary judgment suspending Plaintiff. See People v. Ziankovich, 433 P.3d 640 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2018) (Ex. C); Colorado Supreme Court Order Denying Certiorari and Affirming Discipline (Feb. 1, 2019) (Ex. D).
EOIR imposed immediate federal suspension on March 21, 2019, following notice of Colorado discipline. See In re Ziankovich, EOIR Immediate Suspension Order (Mar. 21, 2019) (Ex. E). Federal reciprocal discipline was subsequently formalized under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.105. See EOIR Final Order of Discipline (Ex. F).
Only thereafter did New York impose reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1240.13. See In re Ziankovich, 180 A.D.3d 140 (1st Dep’t 2020) (Order dated Jan. 16, 2020) (Ex. A). The New York order expressly characterizes its action as reciprocal discipline predicated on Colorado’s suspension and does not purport to conduct a de novo merits adjudication of the underlying federal immigration representation. Id.
The chronology is dispositive. EOIR’s suspension preceded New York’s order. Federal disability therefore did not arise from New York’s action; it arose directly from Colorado’s disciplinary judgment.
New York’s actions were derivative. EOIR’s actions were triggered under the federal reciprocal framework by notices of Colorado discipline. Colorado’s orders thus functioned as the originating legal predicates in a structured reciprocal regime that culminated in and continues to sustain Plaintiff’s federal disability.
The causal chain runs from Colorado outward. Colorado’s orders were not background events; they were the initiating triggers of the reciprocal cascade.
2. Derivative Discipline Does Not Break Causation
The existence of downstream reciprocal actions does not sever causation. Where subsequent discipline is expressly predicated on an originating suspension, the originating order remains a legally operative cause within the regulatory chain.
Exhibit D confirms that Colorado’s disciplinary judgment became final and operative prior to any downstream reciprocal action, underscoring its status as the originating predicate in the reciprocal cascade.
Nothing in the record suggests that New York displaced Colorado’s role through an independent merits adjudication. Rather, New York applied its reciprocal framework to Colorado’s determination.
Multiple reciprocal actions do not convert the initial predicate into a historical irrelevance.
3. Colorado’s Orders Remain Operative Within the Federal Framework
EOIR imposed reciprocal discipline pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103 after receiving notice of state suspension. Federal Defendants have asserted that suspension was required upon notice of Colorado’s action.
Even after New York’s subsequent action, Colorado’s orders remain part of the disciplinary record relied upon by federal authorities. They have not been nullified or rendered legally irrelevant within the federal system.
As long as Colorado’s disciplinary orders remain operative predicates within that framework, injury attributable to Colorado persists.
4. EOIR’s Federal Suspension Is Independently Redressable
EOIR entered a formal federal suspension order and maintains Plaintiff on its public disciplinary roster as a federally suspended practitioner. That designation alters Plaintiff’s legal status under federal law and bars him from appearing before immigration tribunals.
A judicial determination that EOIR may not constitutionally rely upon Colorado’s orders as binding predicates would remove that discrete federal sanction. Even if separate eligibility issues arising from New York’s licensure status remained, elimination of EOIR’s suspension would meaningfully alter Plaintiff’s federal legal position.
Article III does not require complete restoration to practice in all jurisdictions. It requires only that relief likely reduce the injury in a meaningful way. A change in legal status constitutes redress. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002).
To accept Colorado’s theory would render originating discipline effectively immune from review once reciprocal consequences propagate across jurisdictions. Article III does not permit such insulation through cascading reciprocity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s injury is redressable as to Colorado Defendants.
If Colorado’s theory were correct, reciprocal discipline would become self-insulating: once multiple jurisdictions rely upon the original predicate, no court could ever examine the legality of that predicate so long as at least one downstream suspension remains. Article III does not permit such jurisdictional circularity.
IV-2. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER COLORADO DEFENDANTS
This Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over the Colorado Defendants because their conduct was not confined to Colorado. Through formal disciplinary mechanisms, they intentionally directed their orders into federal enforcement channels headquartered in Washington, D.C., thereby triggering the federal disability challenged in this action.
Plaintiff’s jurisdictional showing is not limited to ‘transacting business’ under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). The Complaint also pleads forum injury caused by Defendants’ acts outside the District and their deliberate, structured transmission of the suspension into federal channels in Washington, D.C., fitting § 13-423(a)(4).
This case arises directly from that forum-directed conduct.
A. Colorado’s Disciplinary Rules Mandate and Supervise Interstate and Federal Notification
Colorado’s disciplinary system does not end with entry of a suspension order. Its rules require and supervise interstate and federal notification as part of the sanction’s operative framework.
Under C.R.C.P. 242.32(e), a lawyer subject to suspension must notify “every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted, certified, or otherwise authorized to practice law” and provide a copy of the disciplinary order within fourteen days. This obligation includes federal jurisdictions in which the lawyer is authorized to practice.
Rule 242.32(f) requires the suspended lawyer to file an affidavit with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge certifying compliance with these notification obligations and to provide a copy to Regulation Counsel. Compliance is therefore not left to private discretion; it is reported to and reviewed within the State’s disciplinary proceeding.
Rule 242.32(i) further provides that “[n]oncompliance with this section 242.32 may be grounds for additional discipline or denial of reinstatement or readmission.” Colorado thus conditions reinstatement upon certified compliance with interstate and federal dissemination requirements.
Taken together, these provisions establish three features relevant to jurisdiction:
Dissemination of suspension orders beyond Colorado is mandatory.
Compliance is formally supervised within the disciplinary case.
Failure to effectuate dissemination carries additional regulatory consequences under Colorado law.
Transmission of disciplinary orders to other jurisdictions, including federal authorities, is therefore not incidental to the sanction. It is an integrated and enforceable component of Colorado’s disciplinary regime.
Because compliance with interstate notification is mandated, certified within the disciplinary proceeding, and enforced through potential additional discipline or denial of reinstatement, dissemination of the suspension order operates as a state-conditioned component of the sanction rather than purely unilateral private action.
B. The Disciplinary Order Was Formally Transmitted to Identified Federal Authorities in Washington, D.C.
The Colorado disciplinary order was not merely entered on a public docket. The record reflects formal transmission to specifically identified federal authorities located in Washington, D.C.
The Certificate of Service accompanying the suspension order lists, among the recipients, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Internal Revenue Service Office of Professional Responsibility. See Compl. Ex. B (Certificate of Service/Distribution List, ECF No. 1-1 at 48). Both entities are headquartered in Washington, D.C., and exercise regulatory authority relevant to attorney practice.
The transmission reflected in the Certificate of Service was not the independent action of a third party accessing a public record. It was part of the formal distribution accompanying entry of the disciplinary order. The service list identified federal adjudicative and regulatory bodies located in this District and directed copies of the order to them.
The forum contacts at issue therefore consist of documented transmission of a state disciplinary order to federal authorities headquartered in Washington, D.C. These contacts are concrete and record-based. They do not depend on generalized foreseeability of nationwide effects but on identified communications into this forum as part of the implementation of the suspension order.
C. Colorado’s Order Served as the Regulatory Predicate for Federal Suspension
The transmission of the Colorado suspension order had legal consequences under the federal regulatory framework governing immigration practitioners.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a), the Executive Office for Immigration Review may impose immediate suspension upon notice that an attorney has been suspended by a state licensing authority. The regulation does not require a plenary misconduct adjudication before interim reciprocal discipline is imposed. Notice of state suspension is sufficient to initiate federal suspension proceedings.
The federal disciplinary regime at issue is administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a component of the United States Department of Justice headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Attorney Discipline Program, including reciprocal suspension determinations and maintenance of the federal disciplinary roster, operates under authority exercised in this District.
Colorado publicly maintains a registry of attorneys admitted elsewhere but disciplined in Colorado. (Ex. I). This reflects a deliberate and institutionalized assertion of disciplinary authority over out-of-state lawyers engaged in federal practice within Colorado’s borders.
Colorado’s suspension order did not merely generate generalized national effects. It invoked and activated a federal adjudicative mechanism administered in Washington, D.C. The resulting federal suspension was not an incidental downstream event; it was the legally operative consequence of invoking that federally administered disciplinary framework.
Where a state actor deliberately invokes a federal enforcement system headquartered in this District, and where the challenged disability is adjudicated and maintained here, the claims arise from and relate to forum-directed conduct within the meaning of due process.
Here, Colorado’s suspension order supplied that predicate. Absent the Colorado suspension, reciprocal discipline under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103 would not have been triggered.
The sequence reflected in the record is straightforward:
Colorado entered a suspension order.
The order was transmitted to federal authorities, including entities located in Washington, D.C.
EOIR initiated reciprocal discipline upon notice of that state suspension.
Plaintiff was suspended from practice before EOIR.
The federal suspension challenged in this action thus arose from the transmission and regulatory effect of the Colorado order within the federal system.
This satisfies the requirement that the claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts. See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021). Plaintiff’s claims are not based on remote downstream effects. They challenge the federal suspension that followed from the notice and implementation of Colorado’s disciplinary order.
The forum contacts identified above—the documented transmission of the suspension order to federal authorities in Washington, D.C.—are directly connected to the regulatory process that produced the federal suspension at issue. The relationship between the forum-directed transmission and the challenged injury is therefore direct rather than attenuated.
D. Colorado’s Forum Contacts Are Not “Government Contacts” Under Ferrara and Are Not Ministerial
Colorado argues that any forum contact is either “ministerial” or barred by the government-contacts doctrine, relying on United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Those arguments fail because the contacts here are not petitioning activity and are not merely incidental communications with the federal government; they are the State’s documented, sanction-implementing transmission and continuing maintenance of an “active” disciplinary predicate that triggers federal exclusion.
1. Ferrara concerned petitioning-type contacts, not enforcement export of a state sanction.
Ferrara addressed whether a nonresident state disciplinary official could be haled into the District of Columbia based on contacts that, in substance, amounted to pursuing and communicating about a disciplinary matter involving federal employment in Washington, D.C. See United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828–31 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The government-contacts doctrine is aimed at protecting access to federal institutions in this forum; it does not create categorical immunity for state regulators who deliberately export an operative sanction into federal enforcement systems.
2. Colorado’s contacts are not “petitioning”; they are sanction implementation and regulatory activation.
This case does not involve lobbying, advocacy, or requests for discretionary federal action. Colorado’s disciplinary framework mandates and supervises interstate and federal notification as part of the sanction’s operative structure. See C.R.C.P. 242.32(e), (f), (i). The record reflects formal transmission to identified federal recipients in Washington, D.C. See Compl. Ex. B.
Those acts are not expressive petitioning; they are state-conditioned implementation of a suspension order designed to propagate collateral and reciprocal consequences.
3. The contacts are legally operative, not “ministerial.”
A contact is not “ministerial” where it is part of the enforcement architecture of a sanction and where federal law treats notice of the state suspension as sufficient to initiate immediate reciprocal discipline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a).
In other words, Colorado’s transmission is not a neutral clerical act; it is the step that places the state suspension into the federal disciplinary pipeline that produced the injury at issue.
4. This case arises from Colorado’s own forum-directed conduct, not merely from downstream federal action.
Defendants’ “independent federal action” framing collapses causation into a label. The Complaint challenges the use of Colorado’s order as an operative predicate for federal exclusion and the State’s deliberate projection of that predicate into federal channels.
The federal suspension did not break the chain; it implemented a mechanism triggered by Colorado’s suspension notice.
5. At minimum, Ferrara does not justify dismissal on an underdeveloped record.
Even in the D.C. Circuit, where jurisdictional facts are plausibly alleged and material details are uniquely in defendants’ possession, jurisdictional discovery may be appropriate before dismissal. See Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
E. The Claims “Relate To” Colorado’s Forum Contacts Under Ford
As detailed above, the documented transmission of Colorado’s suspension order to federal authorities in Washington, D.C., triggered reciprocal federal discipline under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103. Plaintiff challenges the resulting federal suspension. That direct regulatory sequence satisfies Ford’s requirement that the claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum-directed conduct. See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021).
F. Walden Does Not Defeat Jurisdiction
In Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), the Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction must be based on the defendant’s own contacts with the forum, not solely on the plaintiff’s injury or connections to the forum.
This case does not rest on Plaintiff’s residence, presence, or unilateral activity. The relevant forum contact is Colorado’s documented transmission of its suspension order to federal authorities headquartered in Washington, D.C.
That transmission was an act undertaken in the course of implementing a disciplinary sanction and was directed to identified federal bodies located in this District. The jurisdictional analysis therefore turns on defendant-generated conduct connected to this forum, not on the location of Plaintiff’s injury.
Because the asserted contacts arise from Colorado’s own transmission of its order to federal authorities in Washington, D.C., Walden does not preclude the exercise of specific jurisdiction here.
G. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
This forum is also practically compelled by the presence of the Federal Defendants, who are headquartered in Washington, D.C. and do not dispute litigating here. Proceeding in a single forum avoids fragmented litigation over the same operative federal disability and promotes efficient resolution of the federal questions presented.
Once minimum contacts are established, the exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985). The defendant bears the burden of presenting a “compelling case” that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.
Colorado Defendants have not made such a showing. The contacts at issue arise from the implementation of a state disciplinary order that was transmitted to federal authorities located in Washington, D.C., and that operated within a federal regulatory framework headquartered in this District.
Litigation in this forum is not arbitrary. The challenged federal suspension was imposed by a component of the United States Department of Justice, and the federal regulatory consequences at issue are administered in Washington, D.C. The District therefore has a substantial interest in adjudicating disputes concerning the interaction between state discipline and federal regulatory systems operating here.
The dispute concerns the interaction between a state disciplinary order and a federally administered regulatory regime headquartered in this District. Adjudicating the federal predicate and its state trigger in separate forums would risk inconsistent interpretations of the same federal disciplinary framework and fragment resolution of a single, ongoing federal disability. Consolidated adjudication in this forum promotes coherent interpretation of the federal regulatory system that governs immigration practice.
Nor is the burden on Colorado so substantial as to render jurisdiction unreasonable. The dispute concerns legal and regulatory questions arising from documented transmissions to federal authorities in this forum. Modern litigation does not impose a constitutionally significant hardship on a state regulator required to defend such conduct in federal court.
The cascading reciprocal discipline reflected in Exhibits A, B, D, and G demonstrates that Colorado’s order did not remain confined within state boundaries but operated as a triggering predicate within a structured interstate disciplinary network. Exhibit G further shows that Colorado’s suspension was formally communicated and recognized beyond Colorado, reinforcing that the regulatory consequences were neither incidental nor geographically isolated but structurally designed to propagate.
Under the factors identified in Burger King, the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
It cannot be fundamentally unfair to require a state regulator to defend the constitutional validity of its deliberate invocation of a federally administered disciplinary system in the forum where that system is headquartered and operates.
Colorado participates in an integrated interstate and federal reciprocal discipline network. Where it intentionally activates federal enforcement mechanisms administered in this District, litigation in this forum is neither random nor unexpected.
H. At Minimum, Jurisdictional Discovery Is Required Before Dismissal
Even if the Court were to conclude that the present record does not conclusively establish personal jurisdiction, dismissal at this stage would be premature. At minimum, limited jurisdictional discovery is warranted.
A plaintiff is entitled to jurisdictional discovery where he has made a non-frivolous showing of personal jurisdiction and the relevant facts are within the defendant’s control. See, e.g., FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff has already produced documentary evidence demonstrating that Colorado’s suspension order was transmitted to federal authorities located in Washington, D.C. See Compl. Ex. B (ECF No. 1-1 at 48). This is not a case resting on speculation. The record reflects identified transmission to federal entities in this District.
What remains unknown are facts uniquely within Defendants’ possession, including:
The policies and procedures governing OARC’s transmission of disciplinary orders to federal authorities;
Whether Colorado maintains standing or recurring distribution lists that include federal entities headquartered in Washington, D.C.;
The frequency and regularity with which such transmissions occur;
Communications or coordination between Colorado disciplinary authorities and EOIR concerning reciprocal discipline.
These facts bear directly on whether Colorado’s contacts with the District of Columbia are isolated or part of a regular and structured course of conduct.
Where a plaintiff has produced documentary evidence of forum-directed transmission and identified additional jurisdictional facts within the exclusive control of the defendants, limited discovery—narrowly tailored to jurisdictional issues—is appropriate before dismissal.
I. Jurisdiction Is Proper Where the Federal Adjudicative Machinery Is Located
Defendants’ theory would create a structural anomaly: a state may deliberately invoke a federally administered disciplinary system headquartered in Washington, D.C., yet remain insulated from suit in the very forum where that federal machinery operates.
The injury challenged here is not abstract reputational harm. It is exclusion from practice imposed and maintained through a federal adjudicative system administered in this District.
If activation of that federally administered regime cannot support jurisdiction here, it is unclear where such claims could be heard. The federal disability was adjudicated and is maintained in Washington, D.C. The regulatory mechanism was activated through Defendants’ transmission. This forum is therefore the natural locus of the dispute.
Due process does not require that a defendant have physical presence in the forum. It requires purposeful engagement with the forum’s legal system. By invoking a federally administered disciplinary regime headquartered here—and by doing so in a manner that predictably and legally triggered compulsory federal exclusion—Defendants purposefully engaged this forum.
IV-3. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION
Colorado Defendants contend that sovereign immunity bars this action because the challenged conduct consists solely of completed judicial acts. The Complaint, however, challenges the ongoing maintenance and enforcement of an active suspension status, not the act of adjudication itself.
Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), sovereign immunity does not bar suits for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law. The inquiry is whether the complaint alleges (1) an ongoing violation and (2) seeks prospective relief. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Both elements are satisfied here.
A. Plaintiff Challenges the Ongoing Maintenance of an Active Suspension Status
The disciplinary order at issue is not merely a past judicial act with exhausted effect. Colorado continues to designate Plaintiff as suspended in its official attorney registry and continues to treat that suspension as active.
Colorado publicly maintains a registry of “Attorneys Admitted to the Practice of Law in Other Jurisdictions but Not in Colorado Who Have Been Publicly Disciplined in Colorado,” in which Plaintiff remains listed as publicly disciplined. See Ex. I. This registry is maintained by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel and reflects active disciplinary status. The continued public designation constitutes present regulatory maintenance, not a completed historical act.
Colorado retains exclusive authority over the suspension’s removal or modification. As long as the suspension remains in force in official records, reciprocal jurisdictions and federal bodies rely on that designation in determining disciplinary status.
The continued maintenance of an active suspension entry is a present regulatory condition, not a historical artifact. The injury alleged flows from the ongoing status designation and its continuing regulatory consequences.
B. The Required Enforcement Nexus Exists
Ex parte Young requires that the named state officials have “some connection with the enforcement” of the challenged action.
That connection exists here. Colorado disciplinary authorities:
Maintain the suspension designation in official records (Ex. I);
Control the mechanism—if any—for altering or lifting that status;
Communicate or certify disciplinary status to other jurisdictions and regulatory bodies within reciprocal discipline systems (Compl. Ex. A & B).
The federal disability challenged in this action continues to operate because Colorado maintains the suspension as an active disciplinary status. The alleged constitutional violation therefore arises from the present enforcement posture, not solely from the historical entry of the order.
C. This Action Does Not Seek to Enjoin Judicial Decision-Making
Plaintiff does not seek to reopen state proceedings, restrain adjudication, or direct judges how to decide cases. There is no pending state proceeding.
The relief sought is prospective and directed at the ongoing maintenance and regulatory consequences of an active suspension status. That distinction places this case within the traditional scope of Ex parte Young.
D. The Violation Is Ongoing
The suspension remains in effect today. Colorado requires reinstatement proceedings for suspensions exceeding one year, yet Plaintiff was never licensed in Colorado and therefore cannot access any reinstatement mechanism. (ECF No. 1-1 at 102)
As a result, the suspension operates as a continuing regulatory disability with no available path to termination. A regulatory status that remains in force and cannot be lifted through any available state procedure is not a completed act; it is an ongoing condition maintained under state authority. The ongoing maintenance of that status—together with its reciprocal consequences—constitutes the present injury for which prospective relief is sought.
New York subsequently imposed a 30-month suspension pursuant to the doctrine of reciprocal discipline, expressly predicated on Colorado’s order. (Ex. D at 2–4). The interstate regulatory consequences of Colorado’s discipline are therefore neither hypothetical nor attenuated; they are concrete and operative.
Where a state official maintains an active suspension that continues to produce present regulatory consequences, the alleged violation is ongoing for purposes of Ex parte Young.
E. The Relief Sought Is Prospective and Non-Monetary
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief clarifying the constitutional limits of Colorado’s disciplinary reach and prospective injunctive relief addressing the continued maintenance and enforcement of suspension status within reciprocal systems. He seeks no damages or retrospective monetary relief.
Because the Complaint alleges an ongoing regulatory condition maintained under state authority and seeks forward-looking relief, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action.
IV-4. SERVICE WAS PROPER OR, AT MINIMUM, SHOULD BE CURED
Colorado Defendants challenge service on technical grounds. The record reflects that Plaintiff acted diligently and in good faith, that Defendants received actual notice, and that no prejudice resulted.
A. Plaintiff Acted with Reasonable Diligence
Plaintiff retained a professional process server to effect service on the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”) at its publicly listed address: 1300 Broadway, Suite 500, Denver, Colorado.
The process server attempted service at that location. As reflected in the Supplemental Declaration filed contemporaneously with this Opposition, the office was not accessible for in-person service at the time of the attempt.
Plaintiff thus undertook reasonable steps to effect service at the official address provided by the agency.
B. The Public Closure of OARC’s Office Limited In-Person Service
OARC’s publicly available website indicates that its office space was inaccessible due to a security incident and instructs members of the public not to visit the office in person.
The website does not identify an alternative physical location for service of process or designate a substitute in-person procedure during the period of closure.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s inability to complete personal service at the listed address was not the result of neglect, but of the office’s temporary inaccessibility.
C. Service Through the Colorado Attorney General Provided Notice
After in-person service at the listed address proved unavailable, Plaintiff effected service through the Office of the Colorado Attorney General, which represents OARC and the other Colorado Defendants in civil litigation.
As reflected in the Supplemental Declaration, the Attorney General’s Office received the materials and has appeared through counsel on behalf of the Colorado Defendants.
Defendants are therefore fully before the Court.
D. Defendants Had Actual Notice and Identify No Prejudice
Colorado Defendants have filed a comprehensive Motion to Dismiss and are actively litigating this case. They do not identify any prejudice resulting from the manner of service.
Courts in this Circuit routinely decline to dismiss where a defendant has received actual notice and its ability to defend has not been impaired.
E. Rule 4(m) Favors Extension Rather Than Dismissal
Even if the Court were to conclude that service was technically imperfect, Rule 4(m) authorizes extension of time for service.
Here, Plaintiff retained a professional process server, attempted service at the official address, encountered a publicly inaccessible office, and promptly clarified the circumstances in a sworn declaration.
These facts demonstrate diligence and good faith. Where substantial federal claims are at issue and defendants have actual notice, extension—rather than dismissal—is the appropriate remedy.
Colorado Defendants received notice, have appeared through counsel, and identify no prejudice. Service was reasonable under the circumstances, and in any event, any technical defect should be cured rather than serve as a basis for dismissal.
IV-5. COLORADO’S SOLE ARGUMENT AGAINST TRO / PI (ECF 29 n.15) FAILS
This section responds to the Court’s instruction that Plaintiff address Colorado Defendants’ argument concerning temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, raised in footnote 15 of their Motion to Dismiss.
A. Procedural Posture
In a Minute Order dated February 4, 2026, the Court directed Plaintiff to respond to Colorado Defendants’ argument regarding injunctive relief in his opposition. Colorado did not file a separate opposition to the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief but instead raised their sole argument in footnote 15 of their Motion (ECF No. 29 at 29 n.15). Plaintiff responds as directed.
B. Colorado’s Argument Repeats Their Jurisdictional Theories
Colorado’s footnote contends that injunctive relief is unwarranted because Plaintiff’s claims constitute an improper attack on a state judgment and because Colorado is not responsible for the ongoing federal consequences.
Those contentions mirror the Rooker–Feldman, causation, and redressability arguments addressed above. The footnote does not present an independent ground specific to the preliminary injunction standard.
C. The Requested Relief Targets Ongoing Injury
Plaintiff seeks relief directed at ongoing federal exclusion from immigration practice and continuing reliance on Colorado’s order within the federal system. He does not seek to reopen or vacate the state proceeding.
The harm identified in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is not historical. Plaintiff remains barred from appearing before EOIR, remains listed as federally suspended, and continues to suffer professional and reputational injury within the federal regulatory framework.
Where the alleged constitutional and professional injury is ongoing, equitable relief remains available. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (constitutional injuries constitute irreparable harm).
EOIR’s suspension order expressly rests on the existence of the Colorado discipline and was entered pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a). (Exs. E–F). The federal disability is thus structurally derivative of Colorado’s order.
Colorado’s footnote does not dispute the continuing nature of the harm; it merely reframes the jurisdictional arguments addressed above.
D. Colorado Remains a Proper Party to Prospective Relief
Colorado’s order continues to function as the predicate for reciprocal federal discipline. Federal Defendants have asserted that EOIR’s action was triggered by Colorado’s suspension.
So long as the suspension remains active and operative within the reciprocal framework, Colorado officials remain proper parties to prospective relief addressing the ongoing regulatory consequences of that status.
E. The Preliminary Injunction Factors Are Not Defeated by the Footnote
Colorado’s footnote does not meaningfully engage the preliminary injunction factors. It relies on jurisdictional and causation arguments already addressed.
If the Court concludes that jurisdiction exists, Plaintiff’s motion presents:
substantial constitutional and statutory questions,
ongoing professional and reputational harm, and
a public interest in the lawful administration of federal regulatory systems.
At this stage, Colorado’s footnote does not independently defeat Plaintiff’s request for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief.
For these reasons, and as directed by the Court’s Minute Order, Colorado’s argument in footnote 15 should be rejected.
IV-6. PLAINTIFF HAS STATED
PLAUSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUPREMACY CLAIMS
To the extent Colorado challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s constitutional and Supremacy Clause claims, dismissal at the pleading stage is unwarranted. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Colorado’s disciplinary action, as applied, burdens federally authorized immigration practice and continues to produce ongoing federal disability.
A. Supremacy Clause (Sperry)
Under the Supremacy Clause, a state may not prohibit or burden conduct that federal law affirmatively authorizes.
In Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Supreme Court held that Florida could not enjoin a non-lawyer from performing services before the U.S. Patent Office where federal law authorized such practice. The Court explained that a state may not enforce licensing rules that give the state “a virtual power of review over the federal determination.” Id. at 385.
Federal immigration regulation is an area of dominant federal authority. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012). Federal regulations independently authorize attorneys in good standing of any state to represent individuals before EOIR. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(1).
Plaintiff alleges that:
he was not admitted in Colorado,
his practice consisted exclusively of federally authorized immigration representation, and
Colorado imposed discipline based on that federally authorized conduct and projected that discipline into the federal system, triggering reciprocal federal exclusion.
At minimum, these allegations plausibly raise a conflict preemption question: whether state discipline, as applied to a non-licensee engaged solely in federally authorized practice, may constitutionally operate as a predicate for federal exclusion.
Although the Colorado tribunal addressed Plaintiff’s reliance on Sperry for purposes of state disciplinary jurisdiction (see Ex. C at 5–6), that determination does not resolve the distinct federal constitutional question presented here: whether the state order may constitutionally burden federally authorized practice within the federal regulatory framework.
Exhibit C further confirms that Colorado expressly asserted disciplinary jurisdiction over a lawyer not licensed in Colorado and engaged exclusively in federally authorized immigration practice. The tribunal did not disclaim the federal nature of that practice; rather, it concluded that Colorado could regulate it notwithstanding federal authorization. That record presentation squarely frames the Supremacy Clause question raised here: whether a state may constitutionally impose discipline that operates as a predicate for federal exclusion from federally authorized practice.
At the pleading stage, Plaintiff need only allege a plausible Supremacy Clause violation. He has done so.
B. Extraterritorial and As-Applied Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff also plausibly alleges that Colorado exercised disciplinary authority over:
a lawyer not licensed in Colorado,
who did not appear in Colorado courts, and
whose practice was confined to federal immigration tribunals.
He further alleges that Colorado intentionally transmitted its suspension order into federal and interstate disciplinary systems, extending its regulatory consequences beyond state boundaries. Colorado expressly asserted disciplinary jurisdiction over a non-licensee engaged exclusively in federal immigration practice within the state. (Ex. C at 3–5). That assertion of authority is the constitutional act challenged here.
New York courts have recognized Colorado’s assertion of jurisdiction over non-Colorado-licensed attorneys engaged in federal practice within the state. (Ex. H at 2–3). That interstate recognition underscores the structural reach of Colorado’s disciplinary framework.
Exhibit H confirms that sister jurisdictions treated Colorado’s assertion of disciplinary authority over a non-licensee engaged in federal practice as legally operative within their own reciprocal frameworks. That interstate recognition reinforces the conclusion that Colorado’s disciplinary order functioned as a structurally exportable regulatory predicate rather than a purely intrastate sanction.
Whether a state may discipline a non-licensee for conduct undertaken solely pursuant to federal authorization—and thereby trigger federal exclusion—presents a live constitutional question. Resolution of that question turns on federal law and cannot be dismissed as implausible at the pleading stage.
C. Ongoing Constitutional Injury
Plaintiff alleges that Colorado’s suspension continues to function as the predicate for federal reciprocal discipline, and that he remains excluded from practice before EOIR.
As reflected in Exhibit A, New York imposed reciprocal discipline expressly predicated on Colorado’s suspension. (Ex. A at 2–3, Ex. B). The federal and sister-state consequences flowed not from independent adjudication of Plaintiff’s federal practice, but from Colorado’s order as the triggering predicate.
An ongoing regulatory disability grounded in state action states a live claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The injury alleged is present and continuing, not historical.
At this stage, the Court does not decide whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail. The question is whether the Complaint alleges facts that plausibly state federal constitutional claims.
Given the interaction between state discipline, federal authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1, and continuing federal disability, Plaintiff has stated such claims. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) would therefore be improper.
IV-7. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD PERMIT
LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
If the Court concludes that the current record does not conclusively establish personal jurisdiction, dismissal would nevertheless be premature. At minimum, Plaintiff should be permitted limited jurisdictional discovery.
The D.C. Circuit has cautioned that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is premature where a plaintiff has identified specific, concrete forum contacts and has shown that additional jurisdictional facts are likely to exist within the defendant’s exclusive control. See FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Where documentary evidence already establishes forum-directed transmission, and the remaining questions concern the structure, regularity, and intended operation of those transmissions, denial of limited discovery would effectively credit Defendants’ characterization of their own conduct without permitting factual development.
Courts in this Circuit allow jurisdictional discovery where a plaintiff has made a non-frivolous, non-conclusory showing of forum-directed conduct and where material jurisdictional facts are within the defendant’s control.
Plaintiff has already produced documentary evidence demonstrating:
formal transmission of the suspension order to federal authorities headquartered in Washington, D.C. (Compl. Ex. B);
the regulatory framework linking state suspension to reciprocal federal discipline under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103; and
the continuing federal disability that followed from that transmission.
These are not speculative allegations. They are record-based facts.
What remains unclear—and lies uniquely within Defendants’ possession—are the scope, structure, and regularity of Colorado’s transmission practices and any coordination with federal authorities.
Plaintiff seeks only jurisdictional discovery narrowly targeted to the existence, frequency, and D.C.-directed structure of Defendants’ transmission practices and related communications. Plaintiff does not seek discovery on the merits of the underlying disciplinary proceeding. Such limited discovery can be completed promptly and without burden disproportionate to the jurisdictional issue.
Limited discovery would therefore be appropriate as to:
policies or procedures governing transmission of disciplinary orders to federal agencies;
whether Colorado maintains standing distribution lists that include federal entities located in Washington, D.C.;
communications between Colorado disciplinary authorities and EOIR concerning Plaintiff’s suspension; and
internal guidance or memoranda addressing interstate or federal notification obligations.
data reflecting the volume of disciplinary orders transmitted to federal authorities headquartered in Washington, D.C. over the past five years.
These materials bear directly on purposeful direction and the nature of Colorado’s forum contacts.
Where a plaintiff has made a concrete, non-frivolous showing of forum-directed conduct and additional jurisdictional facts are within the defendant’s exclusive control, the D.C. Circuit disfavors dismissal without affording limited discovery.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Colorado Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
Plaintiff has adequately established subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, the applicability of Ex parte Young, the sufficiency (or curability) of service, and the plausibility of his Supremacy Clause and constitutional claims. Colorado’s argument against temporary and preliminary injunctive relief, raised in footnote 15 of its Motion, provides no independent basis for dismissal or denial of equitable relief.
Alternatively, if the Court determines that the present record does not conclusively resolve personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court permit limited jurisdictional discovery before ruling on dismissal.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
Deny Colorado Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in its entirety;
Reject Colorado Defendants’ argument against Plaintiff’s request for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief, as raised in footnote 15 of their Motion;
In the alternative, if the Court determines that additional factual development is necessary with respect to personal jurisdiction, permit limited jurisdictional discovery narrowly tailored to Colorado Defendants’ transmission practices, communications with federal authorities, and policies governing notification of federal agencies;
Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated in Baytown, Texas this 17th day of February 2026.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Youras Ziankovich
Youras Ziankovich, Esq.
Plaintiff Pro Se