Case 1:25-cv-03121-LLA Document 22 Filed 12/23/25
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YOURAS ZIANKOVICH,
Civil Action No. 25-3121 (LLA)
Plaintiff,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, et al.,
Defendants.
COMBINED REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND
TO BE EXCUSED FROM LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7(N)(1)
Federal Defendants, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”); Pamela J. Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; and Daren Margolin, in his official capacity as Director of EOIR (collectively, “Federal Defendants”), respectfully submit this reply in further support of their Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss,” ECF No. 14) and Motion to Be Excused From Local Civil Rule 7(N)(1) (“LCvR 7(N)(1) Mot.,” ECF No. 15).
ARGUMENT
I. Ziankovich’s Pleadings Are Not Entitled to Liberal Construction Because He Is an Attorney.
As an initial matter, Ziankovich’s assertion that his pleadings are entitled to liberal construction because he appears pro se fails. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 8. The D.C. Circuit recently held that “the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not invariably apply when the litigant is a licensed attorney.” Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 109 F.4th 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2024). “The requirement that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally does not ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers.” Id. Ziankovich is an experienced litigant with formal legal education and a licensed attorney (albeit under suspension). See, e.g., Ex. 1, Ziankovich Attorney Detail Report (attached hereto). In addition to this case, he has litigated in the District of Colorado, see, e.g., Ziankovich v. Large, Civ. A. No. 17-2039, 2019 WL 4640803 (D. Colo. May 31, 2019), the Tenth Circuit, Ziankovich v. Large, No. 20-1030, 833 Fed. App’x 721 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 2020), and Colorado and New York state courts. The Court should not afford Ziankovich’s pleadings the liberal construction afforded to pro se plaintiffs.
II. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.
Federal Defendants established that pro se Plaintiff Youras Ziankovich lacks standing because Ziankovich’s continued suspension is the result of the suspension of his law license in New York, and no order of this Court directed at Federal Defendants will permit Ziankovich to engage in the practice of law. Mot. (ECF No. 14) at 7–8. Ziankovich responds that he does not challenge the state actions but only “federal consequences.” Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 5, 10. He asserts his injury is redressable if the Court orders EOIR to “conduct an independent review,” “cease relying on the Colorado order,” or “set aside or reconsider Plaintiff’s federal suspension.” Id. at 10–11.
Even if the Court orders that relief, it is speculative that any independent review or reconsideration of Ziankovich’s suspension will lead to his reinstatement. To have standing, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). It “would be nothing more than speculation to conclude that” EOIR would arrive at a different conclusion even if the Court orders EOIR to reconsider. Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91, 122 (D.D.C. 2013).
To be restored to practice federal immigration law, Ziankovich must meet the definition of “attorney” under the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f). As Federal Defendants explained in their motion to dismiss, Ziankovich’s Colorado suspension triggered his disqualification. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 11. But the Colorado suspension, which has expired, is not what is currently preventing him from meeting the definition of “attorney”; the suspension of his New York bar license is. Id. at 8; see also id., Ex. 1, Matter of Ziankovich (ECF No. 14-1) at 2.
Until the State of New York restores Ziankovich’s bar license, Ziankovich cannot meet the definition of “attorney,” regardless of the number of times EOIR investigates or reviews his circumstances. In short, there is no relief this Court could grant Ziankovich vis-à-vis Federal Defendants that would redress his alleged injury. He thus lacks standing for all his claims, and the Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
III. Ziankovich’s APA Claim Fails.
Federal Defendants established that Ziankovich’s APA claim fails because federal regulations require EOIR to immediately suspend a practitioner suspended by “the highest court of any State,” and Colorado suspended Ziankovich. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 8–12 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(1), (4)). Ziankovich responds that “EOIR’s disciplinary framework is not automatic.” Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 12 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)).
Ziankovich’s argument fails on its face because the Board of Immigration Appeals “must immediately suspend an attorney who has been disbarred or suspended from practice on an interim or permanent basis by the highest court of any state.” Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)). Indeed, such immediate suspension continues “pending final disposition of a summary disciplinary proceeding.” Id. § 1003.103(a)(4).
Section 1003.103(b)(2), on which Ziankovich relies, requires the initiation of “summary disciplinary proceedings against any practitioner described in paragraph (a).” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b). Where such summary proceedings are “based upon a final order of disbarment or suspension, or a resignation while a disciplinary investigation or proceeding is pending (i.e., reciprocal discipline), a certified copy of a judgment or order of discipline shall establish a rebuttable presumption of the professional misconduct.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2).
That is precisely what happened here, when Ziankovich was served with a Notice of Intent to Discipline, followed by a formal process during which Ziankovich could present evidence and arguments. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 14–15. Even delays of initiating summary disciplinary proceedings “will not impact an immediate suspension imposed pursuant to paragraph (a).” Id. § 1003.103(b).
In short, once Colorado suspended Ziankovich, EOIR was required to immediately suspend him from immigration practice and initiate summary disciplinary proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103. EOIR followed that process, and Ziankovich’s APA claim fails as a result.1
Federal Defendants also established Ziankovich’s Due Process claim fails because he does not identify a constitutionally protected interest in representing clients before immigration authorities. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 13. Ziankovich does not respond, Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 20–21, and the Court should treat “the unaddressed argument[] as conceded,” Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Ziankovich instead presses three unrelated arguments. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 20–21. Ziankovich first argues that EOIR relied on a void state order without independent review. Id. at 20. As discussed above, the regulations require that reliance. “The immigration regulations thus promote reliance on and cooperation with the states, territories, and federal courts.” Gadda, 377 F.3d at 945. “They seek to ensure that qualified attorneys practice before the BIA, Immigration Courts, and the DHS, and that their standards for practice are not contrary to the applicable disciplinary rules of other jurisdictions.” Id.
Ziankovich next argues EOIR provided him no meaningful opportunity to be heard. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 20–21. Federal Defendants described the extensive proceedings EOIR afforded to Ziankovich to present evidence and arguments in his defense. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 14–15. Ziankovich does not explain, as he must to allege a procedural Due Process claim, “the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
Ziankovich also argues he has no path to reinstatement. But just this year, he petitioned the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) for reinstatement. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, Matter of Ziankovich (ECF No. 14-1) at 1. The Board denied him because Ziankovich did not submit “evidence establishing he no longer is suspended from the practice of law in New York.” Id. at 2.
Indeed, the online database of the New York State court system shows Ziankovich’s status as “suspended.” Ex. 1, Ziankovich Attorney Detail Report (attached hereto). In any event, Ziankovich may seek EOIR reinstatement after he is restored to practice in New York. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107 (providing for procedure for reinstatement following disbarment or suspension).
V. Ziankovich’s Remaining Claims (Counts I and IV) Fail.
Ziankovich argues his Supremacy Clause claim (Count I) is not subject to dismissal. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 16–19. That is irrelevant because Ziankovich has not asserted a Supremacy Clause claim against Federal Defendants; he only asserts that claim against the State Defendants. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 20–21. To the extent Ziankovich now seeks to assert Count I against the Federal Defendants, he may not amend his “complaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 168 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation modified).
Federal Defendants also established that Ziankovich’s Declaratory Judgment Act claim (Count IV) fails because that law does not provide an independent cause of action. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 15. Ziankovich agrees and disclaims invoking the Declaratory Judgment Act “as a stand-alone source of substantive rights. Rather, he seeks declaratory relief as a remedy for independently viable federal causes of action—including his APA claim, Supremacy Clause claim, and constitutional claims.” Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 22. Ziankovich has thus abandoned Claim IV.
VI. The Court Should Relieve Federal Defendants From Producing a Certified Administrative Record.
Federal Defendants established that the Court should relieve them from the requirements of Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1) to produce a certified administrative record because it is not necessary to resolve the pending motion. Mot. (ECF No. 14) at 19–20. During the parties’ conferral, Ziankovich indicated he did not oppose that request. Ex. 2, Emails (attached hereto). He now opposes, without explaining his change of position. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 30–33.
Ziankovich’s chief complaint appears to be that the Federal Defendants rely on EOIR’s “disciplinary decision,” “rationale for reciprocal discipline,” “statements about its process,” and “description of the basis for continuing federal suspension.” Id. at 30–31. On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Federal Defendants properly cited to the attachments Ziankovich submitted with his complaint to show Ziankovich received substantial administrative process. Mot. (ECF No. 14) (citing Compl. Ex. 1, Compl. Attachments (ECF No. 1-1)).
Federal Defendants’ reliance on public records is likewise proper. The Court may take judicial notice of “public records.” Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2018). In their motion to dismiss, Federal Defendants rely on the BIA’s latest decision in Ziankovich’s administrative process. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, EOIR Decision (ECF No. 14-1). That decision is a matter of public record. See EOIR Decision, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1416971/dl?inline (last visited on Dec. 23, 2025). Federal Defendants merely attached that decision for ease of access.
Ziankovich purports to quote Federal Defendants’ position that a certified administrative record is unnecessary because EOIR’s decision was “‘mandatory’ and ‘ministerial,’ and therefore ‘no administrative record exists.’” Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 32. Federal Defendants have not advanced such argument. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 19–20. Indeed, neither “mandatory” nor “ministerial” appear anywhere in Federal Defendants’ combined filing. See generally id. Nor do Federal Defendants argue that an administrative record does not exist. Id. at 19–20. These arguments, therefore, are baseless.
Federal Defendants do argue—and Ziankovich does not dispute—that an administrative record is unnecessary to resolve the pending motions, id. at 19–20, and that, at a minimum, the Court should resolve the question of its subject-matter jurisdiction before requiring “Federal Defendants to compile and certify an administrative record,” id. at 20. Indeed, courts in this District regularly excuse the government from filing a certified administrative record at the motion to dismiss stage. Htet v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 24-1446 (RC), 2025 WL 522033, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2025) (citation modified); see also Connecticut v. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279, 294 (D.D.C. 2018); Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minn. v. Zinke, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 n.12 (D.D.C. 2017); Carroll v. Off. of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 235 F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 n.1 (D.D.C. 2017); PETA v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and the reasons in Federal Defendants’ combined motion to dismiss and preliminary injunction opposition, the Court should grant Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss, deny Ziankovich’s motion for preliminary injunction, and dismiss Federal Defendants from this case.
Dated: December 23, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
Washington, DC
JEANINE FERRIS PIRRO
United States Attorney
By: /s/ Dimitar P. Georgiev
DIMITAR P. GEORGIEV, D.C. Bar # 1735756
Assistant United States Attorney
601 D Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 252-7678
Attorneys for the United States of America
1 Ziankovich argues EOIR’s decision to suspend him is a final agency action. Opp’n (ECF No. 19) at 13. Federal Defendants have not argued to the contrary. See generally Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14).