Concerning Plaintiff’s claims against Regulation Counsel Yates, his complaint encompasses the disciplinary actions brought by OARC and any involvement OARC had in transmitting the outcome of those actions to federal agencies like EOIR.

First, OARC and Regulation Counsel Yates were not involved in the transmittal at all.

Second, even if they were, Plaintiff’s request is purely retrospective–so, apart from being barred by Rooker-Feldman, it also does not satisfy the “narrow” Ex parte Young exception that requires seeking prospective relief. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (exception is narrow and does not permit declaring past judgments violated federal law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (only prospective relief allowed).

Put differently, any prospective relief only concerns Plaintiff’s ability to practice before EOIR (or other federal forums). But that does not concern Regulation Counsel Yates or any Colorado Defendant.

IV. Plaintiff has not established that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Colorado Defendants.

Plaintiff has satisfied neither the D.C. long-arm statute nor traditional due process, let alone this District’s precedent on government contracts.

As the party invoking this Court’s jurisdiction, he bears the burden of doing so. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

He must provide specific facts supporting personal jurisdiction; he cannot rely on conclusory allegation. Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

The D.C. long-arm statute, D.C. Code §§ 13-423(a), “is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be exercised over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a place of business in the District.” Robinson v. Ashcroft, 357 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D.D.C. 2004).

In addition, Plaintiff must show that exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional principles of due process, including having sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Specific personal jurisdiction can occur only where the defendant’s specific contacts both have a substantial connection and give rise to the claim in question. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).

To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, courts first decide whether D.C.’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction; if it does, then the Court must decide whether an exercise of jurisdiction would comport with constitutional limitations such as due process. Forras v. Rauf, 812 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff does not come close to meeting either burden.

Plaintiff’s sole contention for personal jurisdiction is that the Colorado Defendants’ administrative act of mailing notice of the disciplinary action triggered the injury that prevents his ability to practice in federal forums, specifically EOIR.

But only the PDJ mailed any notice–not the Colorado Supreme Court or Regulation Counsel Yates. See ECF No. 1-1, at 30-32, 47-48.

So, by definition, the PDJ’s ministerial act of mailing notice cannot confer personal jurisdiction over the Colorado Supreme or Regulation Counsel Yates.

Regardless, EOIR requires the sanctioned attorney to self-report. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(c). So, the PDJ’s administrative mailing of the notice is, essentially, irrelevant given EOIR’s requirement of self-reporting.

A. Plaintiff does not satisfy D.C.’s long-arm statute.

Plaintiff disclaims general jurisdiction, instead asserting specific jurisdiction based on D.C. Code §§ 13-423(a)(1) & (4). ECF No. 32, at 16-17.

Subsection 13-423(a)(1) arises when a defendant “transact[s] any business in the District,” while subsection 13-423(a)(4) arises when a defendants act “caus[es] tortious injury” by an “act or omission outside the District” in situations if the defendant (i) regularly does or solicits business in the District, or (ii) engages in a persistent course of conduct in the District, or (iii) derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in the District.

But in his Complaint, Plaintiff did not cite D.C. Code § 13-423 at all, instead only alleging the Colorado Defendants “intentionally directed their conduct toward federal agencies” in D.C. ECF No. 1, at 6.

This framing does not properly encompass D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)’s “transacting any business in the District,” so this Court should not consider that basis. See IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 110 (D.D.C. 2018).

Regardless, specific jurisdiction under D.C.’s long-arm statute requires the plaintiff to “allege some specific facts evidencing purposeful activity by defendants in the District of Columbia by which they invoked the benefits and protections of its laws,” as well as “specific acts connecting the defendants with the forum.” Robinson, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 148.

The Colorado disciplinary actions, and the ministerial transmission of their outcome, does nothing to “invoke[] the benefits and protections of [the District’s] laws” and is not a specific act connecting the Colorado Defendants with the forum.

In Robinson, the defendant was an attorney whose office was not located in D.C. and did not reside or maintain a place of business in D.C.; no tortious act occurred in D.C., and no tortious injury resulted from any action by the defendants that occurred in D.C. Id. at 148-49.

Similarly here, neither Plaintiff nor the Colorado Defendants reside or have an office in D.C. Nor did the Colorado disciplinary actions, or the basis for those actions, occur in D.C.

D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4), the primary basis for Plaintiff’s asserted jurisdiction, fails. Subsection (a)(4) is narrower than the “constitutionally available space.” Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Forras, 812 F.3d at 1107).

It requires both an injury in the District and “persistent course of conduct” or “substantial revenue” from the District. Id.

Personal jurisdiction is proper “if, and only if,” both prongs are met. Forras, 812 F.3d at 1107.

In Bigelow, the court rejected personal jurisdiction where the defendants raised funds from District donors and communicated directly with District residents. See 299 F. Supp. 3d at 46. Here, mailing administrative notice of a court outcome falls even further short of Bigelow’s threshold.

Plaintiff relies on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), to assert jurisdiction, but Calder “analyzed personal jurisdiction under the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause alone,” since California’s long-arm statute allowed jurisdiction co-extensive with that clause. Forras, 812 F.3d at 1108.

But subsection (a)(4)’s reach is “far more cabined.” Id.

Personal jurisdiction arose in Calder because the injury–an article–concerned “California activities of a California resident” using “California sources,” and California was the focal point of both the story and the harm. Id. (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 788).

In contrast here, neither Plaintiff nor the Colorado Defendants are D.C. residents, the case does not concern D.C. activities with respect to the Colorado Defendants, and the focal point is the Colorado discipline; to the extent harm arose in D.C., that injury is between Plaintiff and the federal defendants.

And the Calder question does not even arise, since Plaintiff cannot satisfy the narrower requirements of D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). See Forras, 812 F.3d at 1108.

Plaintiff asserts his claims “relate to” Colorado’s forum contacts because the transmission “trigger[s] reciprocal discipline,” and thus his claim “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to” the Colorado Defendants’ forum-directed conduct. ECF No. 32, at 23 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021)).

But his sole reliance on Ford is just recitation of boilerplate language on minimum contacts, which only arises in the second part of the analysis–once Plaintiff satisfies D.C.’s long-arm statute (which he doesn’t).

Indeed, the “arise out of or relate to” framework requires a defendant to “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359.

It is undisputed that none of the Colorado Defendants purposefully avail themselves of conducting activities within D.C.

Further, in Ford, “substantial business” supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 354, 361.

It is undisputed that the Colorado Defendants do not conduct “substantial business” or even have substantial contacts with this District.

D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). Even if this Court addresses Plaintiff’s newly asserted basis for jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1), it, too fails, as Plaintiff cannot show that the defendants “purposefully engaged in some type of commercial or business-related activity directed at District residents.” IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 110.

“Commercial or business-related activity” includes business transactions, commercial deal-making activities like negotiating or performing contracts, advertising, operating an office or holding a board meeting in the District, making employment decisions like firing employees, or representing a corporation before the patent and trademark office. Id. at 111.

On the other hand, courts decline to find personal jurisdiction where the conduct is not business-related–like a criminal conspiracy outside the District that affects District residents, the in-state commission of a tort, or for professional activities that physically take place in the District.
Id.

And no court appears to have held that mailing notice from an outside state to a government agency in D.C. constitutes commercial or business-related activity; mailing notification of discipline simply has nothing to do with conducting “commercial or business-related activity” to District residents. See id.

B. Plaintiff cannot surmount D.C.’s government contacts rule.

D.C. explicitly adopted a “government contacts” rule that precludes personal jurisdiction “over a non-resident whose only contacts with the District of Columbia for purposes of dealing with a federal agency.” Bigelow, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 45.

Plaintiff contends United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995), concerned “petitioning-type contacts, not enforcement export of a state sanction” contacts and thus the government contacts analysis does not apply. ECF No. 32, at 21.

But as discussed throughout this Reply, the Colorado Defendants were not “exporting” enforcement; the PDJ (and only the PDJ) supplied administrative notice of the outcome of a proceedings, but did not suggest, request, or pursue any sort of “exported” or reciprocal enforcement.

Plaintiff also asserts that “Colorado’s contacts are not ‘petitioning’” but rather “are sanction implementation and regulatory activation.” Id.

But even if the federal defendants initiated regulatory action upon receipt, the PDJ’s act of mailing notice is no more than an administrative government contact; what a jurisdiction does with that notice is beyond Colorado’s control.

Colorado did not tell EOIR what to do with the notice.

And Ferrara is clear that contact with a federal forum in D.C. does not give rise to personal jurisdiction. 54 F.3d at 831.

C. Jurisdiction over the Colorado Defendants does not comport with due process.

At bottom, Plaintiff’s basis for asserting personal jurisdiction is little more than asserting he was injured in D.C. because of the Colorado ruling; but the Supreme Court has explicitly held that a “plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”

Rather, a “defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014).

So, Plaintiff must show the Colorado Defendants “reached out beyond” their home state, for example by “exploit[ing] a market” in this District or entering a contractual relationship in this District. Id. at 285.

The focus is “not [on] the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” Id.

Plaintiff would have received the same Colorado disciplinary rulings, and the same responsibility to report them to federal agencies like EOIR, regardless of Plaintiff’s residence or desired location for licensure or practice law.

So, the sole connection Plaintiff has demonstrated Defendants have with the District of Columbia is through Plaintiff. This is insufficient.

And, unlike Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89, where the “focal point” of the action and the harm was in the plaintiff’s state, here the “focal point” was Colorado and the harm Plaintiff caused to Colorado residents that triggered the disciplinary proceedings.

Because Plaintiff has not established the requisite minimum contacts, personal jurisdiction over any of the Colorado Defendants is improper and would not comport with constitutional principles of due process.

It also would be fundamentally unfair for PDJ Large, Regulation Counsel Yates, and especially the Colorado Supreme Court to be haled into this jurisdiction to defend disciplinary proceedings that occurred in and originated from conduct in Colorado.

None of the Colorado Defendants has any control over the residency of litigants before them, in what forums they may wish to practice.

In the context of disciplinary procedures, the Colorado Defendants’ sole aim is to protect Colorado citizens from attorneys violating Colorado’s Rules of Professional Conduct for actions taken while in Colorado.

If
Plaintiff’s theory is right, then any time the PDJ issues a disciplinary order, or any time OARC institutes disciplinary proceedings that result in sanction, or any time the Colorado Supreme Court upholds a disciplinary action–or, frankly, enters orders in any case–they could be haled into a foreign jurisdiction if the Plaintiff claims a trickle-down injury based on the state ruling.

That cannot be what issuing a ruling results in.

D. Jurisdictional discovery is unwarranted.

While this Court has the discretion to order jurisdictional discovery, doing so only is warranted where there is a “good faith belief that such discovery will enable [the plaintiff] to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” as opposed to “mere conjecture or speculation.” IMAPizza, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 108.

The plaintiff must make a “detailed showing of what discovery it wishes to conduct or what results it thinks such discovery would produce.” Bigelow, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 47.

Here, Plaintiff’s request for limited jurisdictional discovery does not provide any basis for a good faith belief that such discovery will show that personal jurisdiction exists.

Plaintiff seeks “policies and procedures” governing OARC’s transmission of disciplinary orders to federal authorities; whether Colorado maintains standing or recurring distribution lists to federal entities; the frequency of such transmissions; and communications between Colorado disciplinary authorities and EOIR concerning reciprocal discipline.

As to that latter request, it is pure speculation and irrelevant to the proceeding at issue here–on its face, EOIR’s regulations address reciprocal discipline, and there is no allegation that the Colorado Defendants were involved with EOIR’s reciprocal discipline.

Nor were they.

Plaintiff’s sole allegation is based on transmission of the disciplinary orders, a fact capable of adjudication on its face.

OARC’s “policies and procedures” are irrelevant as they have no bearing on the fact of the transmission here.

Critically, it was the PDJ, not OARC, that transmitted notice of the discipline, making such policies further irrelevant.

And any frequency or recurring nature of transmitting disciplinary orders is equally irrelevant, does not amount to “deliberately invoking” federal discipline, and is ultimately a faulty premise as no Colorado Defendant is “invoking” federal action: the PDJ simply mailed notice of an outcome.

What Plaintiff seeks is little more than a burdensome fishing expedition; it does not come close to establishing substantial revenue or a persistent course of conduct in D.C. See Bigelow, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 46.

None of this information, in short, would help establish personal jurisdiction.

V. Alternatively, Plaintiff has not effected proper service, Colorado’s appearance to contest service does not waive their Rule 12(b)(5) defense, and an additional extension for Plaintiff to secure service is unwarranted.

Plaintiff claims there has been no prejudice as to service because the Colorado Defendants appeared to defend against his Complaint. ECF No. 32, at
30-32.

That is flat wrong.

“Federal courts have firmly established that a court appearance alone can never waive otherwise valid Rule 12(b)(5) defense.” Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 162 (D.D.C. 2007) (merely being on notice of suit does not cure defective service).

Moreover, the Colorado Defendants have been prejudiced by the defective service: since service is and remains improper, the clock has not started running on any obligation to respond to Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4), as they have not properly been made parties to the case.

Indeed, ECF No. 4 was filed before the Colorado Defendants were served (improperly, let alone properly).

Nor did Plaintiff confer with the Colorado Defendants on that motion, as required by LCvR 7(m). See 12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Bd., 361 F. Supp. 3d 22, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2018) (non-compliant motions can be denied for failing to confer as required by Local Rule
7(m)).

Further, LCvR 65.1(a) requires applications for TROs to show either “actual notice” of service to the adverse party or that sufficient efforts were otherwise made.

And LCvR 65.1(c) requires that the opposition (i.e., from the Colorado Defendants) “shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the application for preliminary injunction.”

But the Colorado Defendants were never served with the application for the preliminary injunction.

And since Plaintiff moved for Preliminary Injunction on October 20, 2025, see ECF No. 4, before the Colorado Defendants were even purportedly served (and where service remains un-accomplished) the Colorado Defendants are not postured to respond.

Yet, Plaintiff contends this Court should entertain his motion for preliminary injunction and TRO.

So, the Colorado Defendants would be quite prejudiced by his improper service.

Notably, Plaintiff did not specifically respond at all to the Colorado Defendants’ discussion about the September 15th summonses being expired as issued more than 90 days before service on PDJ Large and the Supreme Court (as well as for the attempt at serving OARC through the Attorney General’s Office). See Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion and therein addresses only some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as conceded.”).

Plaintiff instead argues that under Rule 4(m), he should get an extension to effect service. ECF No. 32, at 32.

But this Court already twice granted Plaintiff extensions to effect service, see ECF Nos. 13, 21, and the expired summons date was plain on the face of the documents then.

Awarding more extensions to effect proper service simply provides extra bites at an apple already half-eaten.

Plaintiff next asserts that serving the Colorado Attorney General sufficed to effect service and provided actual notice to Regulation Counsel Yates. ECF No. 32, at 31.

But this Court already rejected that assertion. See ECF No. 21, at 2 n.2 (recognizing that when service is on an officer, agent, or employee of the state, Colorado’s Rules of Civil Procedure require the Attorney General to be served in addition to the subject individual (citing Raymer v. Hickox, 905 P.2d 2, 3 (Colo. App. 1995)); ECF No. 13, at 3 (service must be on both officer, agent, or employee, and state attorney general (citing Colo. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(10)(A))).

So, this Court has twice told Plaintiff that service on the Colorado Attorney General does not suffice.

Simply put, service has never been effected on Regulation Counsel Yates.

And no good cause exists give Plaintiff an additional opportunity to “cure” service against this backdrop.

Next, Plaintiff contends he was unable to contact OARC to serve Regulation Counsel Yates.

But that claim does not hold water, either.

Plaintiff previously avowed, by sworn declaration, that he had served Regulation Counsel Yates and that service had been accepted by authorized personnel. See ECF No. 26, at 2 § 2.

He now concedes that wasn’t so. ECF No. 32, at 33.

Instead, he says service was not possible, so it was instead effected on the Colorado Attorney General. See ECF No. 32 at 30-31.

But the Colorado Attorney General is not authorized to accept service on behalf of–or in lieu of–OARC. See Exhibit E, attached.

Nor was the Colorado Attorney General specifically authorized to do so in this case. See id. ¶ 19.

Further, OARC’s website specifically–and prominently–directs parties to “use email and phone services” to contact OARC. See id. ¶ 14; see also https://www.coloradolegalregulation.com/.

Yet Plaintiff (and his process server) never contacted OARC. Id. ¶ 16.

That lack of diligence is not attributable to OARC and does not amount to good faith efforts to secure service.

Finally, the fact that the summons and complaint served on the Attorney General was stamped “received” by the Attorney General’s front office is not a legal determination that service was either effected or accepted by someone authorized to do so on behalf of OARC; it is a simple fact that reflects service was made on the wrong party.

VI. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the preliminary injunction or TRO factors.

It is neither procedurally proper nor ripe for the Colorado Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4) until Plaintiff effects proper service, especially because Plaintiff’s motion seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction predates service of the Colorado Defendants.

Unless and until this Court rules that proper service has occurred, the Colorado Defendants will not address the substance of that motion, but reserve the right to do so once service is effected.

Even so, based on the above jurisdictional deficiencies, Plaintiff cannot meet the factors for securing that relief.

First, as noted above, Plaintiff did not confer with the Colorado Defendants before pursuing that motion, as required by LCvR 7(m). See 12 Percent, 361 F. Supp. 3d at 24-25.

That alone warrants denying Plaintiff’s motion as to the Colorado Defendants.

Second, a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury to Plaintiff outweighs the injury caused by the preliminary injunction; and (4) that an injunction is not adverse to the public interest.

The final two factors merge when the government is the opposing party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

These same requirements apply to a TRO. See, e.g., Lofton v. District of Columbia, 7 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2013).

Because both are “extraordinary remedies,” TROs and preliminary injunctions “should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Id. (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

Because this Court does not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of success.

Further, the relief he requests, his ability to practice in federal forums, is relief he cannot receive from the Colorado Defendants.

Nor is his injury irreparable; on the contrary, he has a clear avenue to relief: seek reinstatement–something he has not even attempted. See Ex. E, ¶ 17. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (“basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies”).

Neither does the “cost” of complying with government regulations–e.g., rules of professional conduct–constitute irreparable harm. See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1331 (7th Cir. 1980); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1976).

As to public interest: courts “pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

Plaintiff was sanctioned, across two separate proceedings, for numerous violations of Colorado’s rules of professional conduct, violations that directly imperiled vulnerable clients.

The public interest heavily weighs in favor of safeguards for the profession. Cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).

Further, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to “preserve the relative positions of the parties” pending a merits decision. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

An injunction that changes the status quo is disfavored. See Strait Shipbrokers Pte. Ltd. v. Blinken, 560 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92-93 (D.D.C. 2021).

Here, given that Plaintiff has been suspended by the Colorado Defendants since 2018 and by EOIR since 2019, the relative positions of the parties is continued suspension and thus Plaintiff seeks a disfavored injunction.

Finally, as above, the Colorado Defendants are simply the wrong defendants for Plaintiff’s claims here.

A TRO or a preliminary injunction would not redress Plaintiff’s asserted interest and injury–that of EOIR’s suspension of his ability to practice before the federal agency.

As to the Colorado Defendants, there is simply nothing to restrain or enjoin.

VII. Plaintiff wrongly relies on Sperry v. Florida to suggest he has stated a claim.

As an initial matter, the Colorado Defendants have not yet raised Rule 12(b)(6) defenses, so Plaintiff’s arguments about “plausible constitutional and supremacy claims” are premature. ECF No. 32, at 35-38.

Rather, the Colorado Defendants have raised jurisdictional claims under Rule 12(b)(1), (2), (4), and (5).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s reliance on Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), is misplaced–just as it was when he raised this same argument the Colorado proceedings.

In Sperry, Florida tried to enjoin the practice of non-lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office. Id. at 381-82.

The Supreme Court held that the Patent Office had the authority to determine who could practice before it. Id. at 385.

Sperry stands for the proposition that a federal agency has the authority to determine qualifications for admission to practice before that federal agency; it is not about discipline.

Sperry is consistent with the procedures here, both as to Colorado’s imposition of discipline and as to EOIR’s right to determine the qualifications for practitioners in its forum (a matter beyond the scope of the Colorado Defendants).

Colorado never sought to enjoin Plaintiff from practicing before EOIR, nor did it try to dictate what qualifications were necessary for Plaintiff’s admission to EOIR.

As Sperry explained, there is a distinction between the authority to practice in a jurisdiction versus the authority to discipline for violations in a jurisdiction; Colorado’s actions concern only the latter, and EOIR’s authority to regulate practitioners in its forum is not exclusive such that Colorado could not address violations in its jurisdiction.

Further contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, numerous cases–and specific rules here–allow for reciprocal discipline.

For example, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.103(a)(1) & (2) require the Board of Immigration Appeals to suspend any attorney who has been suspended or disbarred from the practice of law by the highest court of any state.

But the immediate suspension can be set aside upon a showing of good cause, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(4), and that immediate suspension occurs while summary disciplinary proceedings proceed, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b).

So, Plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that EOIR was required to impose reciprocal discipline (ECF No. 32, at 2).

Regardless, that is a claim against EOIR, not the Colorado Defendants.

Nor do any of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(i)-(iii)’s listed defenses provide for exclusivity of federal jurisdiction.

Indeed, federal agencies affirmatively contemplate parallel state regulation of federal immigration practitioners. See 65 Fed. Reg. 39524 (July 27, 2000).

And the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that reciprocal discipline is appropriate. E.g., Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917) (reciprocal discipline in Supreme Court appropriate unless state proceedings lacked due process, discipline would be grave injustice, or if proof insufficient); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957) (applying Selling to reject circuit court’s automatic disbarment of lawyer without having applied Selling standards, as “grave reason” existed that would conflict with automatic disbarment); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 546 (1968) (reaffirming Selling and confirming that state disbarment does not yield automatic disbarment by the federal court); see also In re Sibley, 564 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding reciprocal discipline in D.C. following imposition of discipline in Florida).

So, Colorado’s imposition of discipline was proper, just as it was separate and distinct from EOIR’s.

VIII. Plaintiff’s avenue for relief is to seek reinstatement.

Plaintiff argues relief from this Court is necessary to allow him to practice before EOIR.

But Plaintiff has a very clear avenue to achieve just that without litigation: to seek reinstatement in New York, which is not a party here.

Regardless of the timeline of the suspensions, EOIR requires licensure and good standing in the highest court of a state.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f), Plaintiff cannot meet the definition of an attorney as he is not a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state.

As he was never licensed in Colorado, reinstating in Colorado simply does Plaintiff no good unless and until he reinstates in New York, which is the only state where he asserts licensure (ECF No. 1, at 13 ¶ 1).

As noted in the Motion to Dismiss, his recourse is to seek reinstatement there. ECF No. 29, at 11-12, 17 & 19 n.12; see Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959) (plaintiff must plead “irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies” to be entitled to relief).

Without doing so, he cannot meet the independent redressability prong for standing. See Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bensten, 94 F.3d 658, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (redressability concerns whether if the relief sought, if granted, would alleviate the particular injury asserted).

Because EOIR will not admit him without licensure with good standing by the highest court in a state, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.103(a)(1), (2) & 1003.107, and because New York is the only state in which Plaintiff is licensed, any ruling by this Court could not have effect without Plaintiff first being reinstated.

Nor has Plaintiff shown that he has tried to reinstate in Colorado or that Colorado has denied any attempt to reinstate.

At bottom, Plaintiff’s complaint is that “[s]o long as the [Colorado] suspension remains active and operative within the reciprocal framework, Colorado officials remain proper parties to prospective relief addressing the ongoing regulatory consequences of that status.” ECF No. 32, at 34.

But the Colorado Defendants are not involved in any decision to impose reciprocal discipline, and challenging Colorado’s disciplinary outcome–or the PDJ’s ministerial transmission of that outcome–is textbook Rooker-Feldman territory.

Further, Plaintiff has not attempted reinstatement.

Even if Colorado’s disciplinary orders are the “Regulatory Predicate for Federal Suspension,” id. at 19, it is the federal suspension that Plaintiff seeks to redress–a claim solely against the federal Defendants.

Any “ongoing” violation concerning federal suspension is a claim solely against federal defendants.

The Colorado Defendants are not proper defendants.

CONCLUSION

This Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint because the Colorado Defendants are the wrong defendants, because Rooker-Feldman prevents consideration of Plaintiff’s claims, because this Court lacks both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdictional over the Colorado Defendants, because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents review, and because Plaintiff’s other assertions all fail as a matter of law.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of March 2026,

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/ Joseph G. Michaels

Joseph G. Michaels
Assistant Solicitor General
Public Officials Unit | State Services Section
Colorado Department of Law
Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Phone: (720) 508-6460
joseph.michaels@coag.gov

Attorney for the Colorado Defendants